The article taks about the following counter-insurgency plan:
The history of the US military is that it never does anything right the first time, but over time, it adjusts very effectively for a large institution...the military learned from that experience [in Iraq] more than any other institution. One of the ways it adjusted was to develop the ability to apply local knowledge to their counterinsurgency campaign. That would also help tremendously in Afghanistan where US and NATO troops have been stationed for many years and have amassed much local knowledge.
And the fark.com headline:
The history of the US military is that it never does anything right the first time, but over time, it adjusts very effectively for a large institution. [OBVIOUS tag]
Which, surprisingly to say, is actually not too far from the truth. Look at American losses early in WW2 (The Pacific campaign until Midway, the early N. Africa campaign), pre-Valley Forge in the Revolutionary War, and others. This was actually brought up by General Erik Shinseki as one of the driving reasons behind transformation in an effort to reverse this trend.
*-Well, okay, early Napoleon. See, Napoleon, much like Elvis, was much greater when he was young. As time went on he got fat, uncreative, and worked in Vegas for the remainder of his career. Seriously, look it up...