Regarding Analogies and Metaphors

I need to extend a bit of an apology to Mr. Patrick Porter of Kings of War for some snide mockery this past weekend.

One of the things that I find amusing about the milblog community is that there's usually quite civil debate when it comes to the principles of war and counterinsurgency. But when we come to actually discussing analogies and metaphors, therein lies the fiercest debate.

While most US Army officers agree that modern warfare requires us to have a broad set of skills ranging from conventional warfighting to supporting civil authorities during natural disasters--we're not certain what sports analogy to use to describe the myriad of attributes required of our leaders. Should we call them "pentathletes", "triathletes", or "Judoka Fighters". Similarly, while Jason Sigger and I are pretty much in agreement on the policy set forth in President Obama's latest Afghanistan speech, we can't describe if the policy is more of a "sacrifice fly" or a "double" in terms of baseball analogies.

Patrick Porter brought up the topic of Afghanistan being the oft-mentioned "Graveyard of Empires" in a recent post on Kings of War. Certainly, we've all heard this phrase before, but I think it might mean many things to many people. I always took it to refer to the fact that many empires have tried to conquer, absorb, or pacify the area, with little success. Certainly, the loss of many thousands of troops during Alexander's campaign (Stephen Pressfield claims some 80% of his force), the first British campaign (which left but one survivor), and the Soviet misadventure contribute to this image.

But Patrick looks at the analogy in a slightly different sense. There are many who (incorrectly, as Patrick points out) take the analogy to mean that many empires meet their undoing in Afghanistan. While the Soviet excursion into Afghanistan might have hastened or partially contributed to the fall of the USSR, it's not an accurate description of Alexander's campaign (he did manage to conquer it, albeit with massive casualties, and the victory was short-lived at best). The British, of course, had the two World Wars to contribute to the liquidation of its empire.

This of course is quite sensible, and Patrick Porter discusses the history of the analogy, as well as provides some insights into the difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan. What actually set off the sarcasm alarm in me is rejection of the "graveyard of empires" cliche was unintentionally similar to last week's essay penned by the Foreign Policy Institute, a US-based neocon think-tank, which had this to say about the "graveyard" metaphor:

“This refrain [The Graveyard of Empires] belongs, as they say now in the military, in the graveyard of analogies,” writes Tom Cotton in the Weekly Standard. “The Soviets, in particular, teach us how not to win in Afghanistan. A heavily mechanized force, the Red Army was ill-suited for Afghanistan's treacherous terrain, and it was dependent on long, vulnerable supply lines. It also discouraged innovative junior leadership, which is critical against an insurgency. To compensate, the Soviets employed vicious, massively destructive tactics that inflamed the Afghan people and still scar the country with depopulated valleys and adult amputees maimed as children by toy-shaped mines. Our present way of war couldn't be more different. We deploy light and wheeled infantry to Afghanistan, making our tactics more flexible, our supply lines shorter, and our soldiers more engaged with the locals. We also radically decentralize decision-making authority to our junior soldiers and leaders, who increasingly can draw on years of combat experience. In short, America has a counter-insurgency strategy, whereas the Soviet Union had a genocide strategy. Afghans I spoke with always recognized the difference, reviled the Russians, and respected our troops.” -- Weekly Standard

Max Boot makes a similar point in Commentary, “The two most commonly cited examples in support of this proposition are the British in the 19th century and the Russians in the 1980s. This selective history conveniently omits the military success enjoyed by earlier conquerors, from Alexander the Great in the 4th century b.c.e. to Babur (founder of the Mughal Empire) in the 16th century. In any case, neither the British nor the Russians ever employed proper counterinsurgency tactics. The British briefly occupied Kabul on two occasions (1839 and 1879) and then pulled out, turning Afghanistan into a buffer zone between the Russian Empire and their own. In the 1980s, the Russians employed scorched-earth tactics, killing large numbers of civilians and turning much of the country against them. Neither empire had popular support on its side, as foreign forces do today.” --

First off (directed at FPI): you mean to tell me that our junior leaders are empowered to make decisions on their own with absolutely no bureaucratic micromanagement whatsoever from ridiculously high echelons and superfluous staff officers? Clearly, there are some who would disagree.

Secondly, FPI's argument against the "Graveyard of Empires" put forth in this essay is laughably bad. It doesn't even address the "graveyard" metaphor in the first place; rather, it attempts to make Afghanistan seem like a cake walk. Clearly, Alexander succeeded...right?

Lastly, (assuming Steven Pressfield is correct) one of the few reasons Alexander actually succeeded was because the Greeks actually could employ the "scorched earth" method and kill anyone they wanted--men, women, children--with the Greeks attempting to breed the last of the resistance out of what few Afghans remained. I mean, if you're down for counterinsurgency by genocide, that's a method to conduct counterinsurgency, but not necessarily the preferred method...

When I saw Pat Porter's article debating the "Graveyard of Empires" cliche last weekend, I immediately had FPI flashbacks.

I'm shuddering again, thinking about the FPI article...

In sum, I apologize that Patrick wound up as a target for my snide commentary on a hangover-induced Sunday morning. I really love the blog you guys have set up at KOW.