Blogging slowdown

I'll be living on the floor of my apartment and posting from coffee shops for the next week or two. Don't worry, all is well. I promise to pick up the pace once I'm safe and sound in Germany.

Expect my review of David Kilcullen's "Counterinsurgency" tonight. It's a worthwhile read, however, large portions of the book already exist in blogs and on the Internet, including Kilcullen's "Twenty-Eight Articles" and his commentary on metrics.

Book review to follow

I just finished David Kilcullen's Counterinsurgency, which should be in the cargo pocket of every officer and NCO heading to Iraq and Afghanistan. The book is not, however, without a few flaws. I'll cover them either late tonight or tomorrow, as I'm awaiting the movers right now.

Airpower in Counterinsurgency Crowdsourcing

Thanks for all those who gave me feedback with this project so far. Here are the links which will allow anyone to edit both the MS Word file and the...(gasp) PowerPoint presentation. I need a lot of help with the text for the MS Word file, so please feel free to add your thoughts. Add your name at the bottom and I'll ensure you get credit when I submit it to Small Wars Journal.

Ackerman retains his crown

It's no secret that Ralph Peters' writing often irks me, particularly when he launches one of his diatribes against America's "soft" approach to counterinsurgency, and what he must view as a peacenik culture among combat-hardened junior officers. Fortunately, we have intrepid journalists, like Spencer Ackerman, who take on Ralph Peters whenever he rears his ugly head. Indeed, Ackerman reigns supreme when it comes to taking on Ralph Peters. (Although Dave Dilegge does quite well also)

Nevertheless, Ackerman almost lost his crown this week, as I opened up David Kilcullen's Counterinsurgency, and was treated to this passage:

Some armchair chicken hawks (none with experience of actual warfare in any form, let alone against real guerrillas) have argued that, contrary to recent evidence, you can indeed kill your way out of an insurgency, and have even suggested that an intensely brutal and violent approach is the quickest and best way to suppress an insurgency. Two favorite examples are the Romans and the Nazis, who supposedly ignored the "politically correct" notions of modern counterinsurgency and applied mass brutality with great success.

After reading that, I felt as giddy as a Japanese schoolgirl in a Hello Kitty store.

Kilcullen mentions that the Romans were able to subjugate Gaul, Helvetia, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and other lands not "by the sword", but by instituting Roman law, introducing Latin, and delivering essential civil services, like fresh water, channeled through aqueducts. Indeed, Roman population-centric nation-building efforts are faithfully reproduced in this classic scene from Monty Python's Life of Bryan.

Kilcullen goes even further. He cites one study which suggests that many Wehrmacht commanders during the Second World War actually reduced the level of partisan activity (read: insurgency) by instituting fairer forms of government. I will also submit that in many cases, even the Mongols understood the value of state-building. During the Mongol expansion of the 13th Century, cities which chose to submit rather than fight found themselves treated relatively favorably by the Horde. The Mongols would simply exact a tribute and remove the city's leadership, leaving the civil servants unharmed. It seems even Ghengis Khan understood that "de-Baathification" was a bad policy.

Yet, the chapter didn't really address the question as well as I would have liked to. Certainly, there are hundreds of insurgencies worth examining, many being quelled with a wide range of solutions. Some might resemble the population-centric methods favored in the US Army's Field Manual 3-24. Yet, others might resemble a brutal "crushing" of an insurgency. Strangely enough, the brute force method might seem to be successful in at least a few situations. Even Galula concedes that the brute-force method is effective some of the time.

Granted, it's quite a gamble. As The Duck of Minerva points out, reckless neglect for the welfare of civilians tends to cause mass uprisings, as is evidenced in Afghanistan. Fittingly, The Duck also ends with a particularly notable quote from Machiavelli, one which is often taken grossly out of context by many in the "brute force" camp.

The 16th Century Florentine writer is most famous for claiming that it is better for a prince to be feared than loved, and this much is true. However, the second half of the original sentence notes that it is also important that a prince not make one's self hated. By causing civilian casualties in such a reckless manner, we cross the fine line from "fear" to "hatred".

Focus: Does the brute force method ever work in counterinsurgency? Under what conditions?

Update: Dr. Patrick Porter weighs in at The Offshore Balancer.

Update 2: The Canadian Cincinattus also addressed this issue over the weekend.

By the way...

If you haven't checked out this essay on the Tribal Engagement Workshop (hosted by the Small Wars Foundation), you should. As a bonus, it features noted milbloggers Andrew Exum (Abu Muqawama) and Jason Fritz (Gunslinger from Ink Spots).

What's in a Name?

I suspect one of the reasons many Americans don't follow the Iraq War is its sheer complexity. The Second World War felt a little more simple. There were the good guys (The US, the British, and, I hate to admit it, the Soviets) and then there were the bad guys (obviously, Germany, Japan and Italy). The Iraq War, however, baffles many observers. Our allies in the Iraqi government can be, well, unscrupulous to say the least. Furthermore, the insurgent groups (if they can even be called that--few have any interest in governing) often change names, merge with one another, and splinter off into different factions. There's really no clear villain in the war.

The most vicious of the insurgent organizations the US has faced off with in Iraq is al Qaeda in Iraq, often abbreviated "AQI". Don't let the name fool you though, as they're not quite Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. Often referred to as a "franchise" of al Qaeda, it shares some ideological connections with Osama bin Laden, the occasional communique, but two organizations do disagree on some points. In fact, AQI--the murderous group which relished in beheadings and bombed hotels in Jordan--was actually a little too violent for even al Qaeda's senior leadership. In a 2005 letter, Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the top commanders of al Qaeda, advised Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of AQI, that videos of AQI operatives beheading American contractors might be a little over the edge. (No kidding, look at bullet point #5 in that letter)

Some AQI members left to join "concerned local citizens" groups, which are local militia and police forces dedicated to fighting terrorists. Some insurgent groups actually split, with half supporting the insurgency, and half supporting the US and Iraqi government. One such group was the 1920 Revolution Brigade, which featured a spinoff group, "Hamas in Iraq" (no relation whatsoever Hamas in Gaza, though). Depending on whom you ask, either the 1920 Brigade served alongside US troops in operations against AQI in Diyala Province, or Hamas in Iraq did. I'd say most American troops really can't keep them straight. I can't imagine what the American public thinks about them.

Actually, it reminds me a little bit of...

Confused yet?

Do Aviators Get COIN--A Resounding "Yes"

April in Upstate New York is usually a depressing affair. Large mountains of snow usually lay piled in parking lots, long since streaked black with soot, oil, and dirt. If it's not snowing--which it occasionally does as late as Mother's Day--then there's the misery of persistent cold rain. As the snow melts, it creates lakes and rivers of mud. The sky is usually overcast and grey.

But the last few weeks have been different. Today, as I traveled to a seminar on counterinsurgency, held in a quaint lodge near a lake at Fort Drum, I opened the top on my Jeep, taking in the sunlight and enjoying a sky crystal-clear, and radiant blue. The grass was a deep, vibrant green, occasionally dotted with dandelions. The small lake--normally still frozen over this time of the year--had thawed, leaving behind a pool of water so clear and tranquil, it looked as if it were a mirror, dropped from the heavens.

But the real miracle lay not in the weather, but rather, during the counterinsurgency seminar itself. There, in the lodge beside the lake, lay a pony keg of beer, vulnerable in the presence of over forty aviators. Yet, the pony keg of beer went largely ignored, for the pilots were so interested in discussing counterinsurgency that they neglected the poor keg of that life-giving nectar of the gods that is...probably Miller Lite or something.

Yes, you read that correctly. The aviators completely forgot about the beer and talked about counterinsurgency.

Much to my surprise, aviators do get counterinsurgency, and we get it quite well. A PowerPoint presentation I composed with the help of Commander Herb Carmen, as well as a few other captains, guided a group discussion on the impact of Army aviation in the counterinsurgency environment.

What surprised me the most about the discussion was that, contrary to popular perception, it was the colonels and majors that had the most to add to the discussion, as opposed to the captains. Those who have been studying the US military's recent counterinsurgency odyssey over the last few years might find this a little counter-intuitive. Yet, I think it's a dynamic that's peculiar to the aviation realm. Some potential explanations, as well as some miscellaneous musings:

• First, and most obvious, is that maybe the majors and colonels spoke more because, well, it's the military and we tend to defer to rank.
• Secondly, many of the field grade officers have some unique experiences compared to those of their junior counterparts. After several years in an aviation battalion, an aviation captain usually gets slotted in a billet doing something other than flying. Some get embedded within infantry brigades, others within military transition teams. These jobs give aviators a greater understanding and appreciation for the ground tactical plan.
• As Cmdr. Carmen notes, an aviator's first priority--in conventional conflict or counterinsurgency--is to become proficient in his or her airframe. All the cultural awareness in the world isn't worth a damn if a pilot can't fly the aircraft. For this reason, a new aviator generally spends his or her first few years out of flight school learning the ins-and-outs of aircraft systems, weapons limitations, mission planning, unit standard operating procedures, aircraft maintenance, and airspace. If they're a platoon leader or company commander, they face the additional challenges of knowing their people, administrative procedures, and property accountability. It's a Herculean task simply to learn these skills in those first critical years. Small wonder junior officers in the aviation world lag behind their infantry brethren when it comes to understanding counterinsurgency.
• The AH-64 and OH-58 pilots, as a general rule, seemed to understand COIN better than the UH-60 and CH-47 pilots ("skirts", as we're known). This is likely because these aviators are employing weapons on the battlefield and have to think about the effects of their weapons systems.
• One of the most profound statements came from an Apache pilot, who spent a few weeks in a targeting class. The first few days of the class focused on the principles of Islam and Muslim culture. At first, he found the emphasis a little bizarre; however, upon his deployment to Iraq, he quickly learned the importance of culture. As he looked at the ramshackle buildings and farms below him, he could see a man's livelihood--his only means of supporting his family. Damaging a farm or killing goats might cause an entire family to go hungry--something we must always consider when employing weapons systems on the battlefield. This shouldn't be an excuse to never fire--just another factor to take into consideration before firing. Wiping out a farmer's livelihood might drive him to seek an alternate form of employment: insurgency.

In all, it was a great class. Thanks to the gang at CNAS for all the help. If you want to view the presentation, or help me write a short primer (maybe 10-15 pages of notes) on COIN for aviators, hit me up. I do the crowdsourcing thing :)

On Combined Arms

It seems that the controversy stirred by Col. Gian Gentile's latest article has really taken off. Truth be told, I don't have too many issues with the premise of his article, but rather, some of the semantics. Certainly, we all feel that armored fighting capabilities have declined and that it poses a danger to a balanced force.

The 2006 Lebanon War provides today's military with a wealth of case studies. Perhaps one of the most notable is not the performance of the IDF's Merkava tanks, but rather, the intellectual currents within the IDF's leadership. Prior to the war, the IDF, much like the US, was beginning to incorporate Effects-Based Operations (EBO) doctrine. Unfortunately, the doctrine was poorly understood, unevenly taught, and badly implemented. IDF officers were often found parroting buzz-words from EBO (was their knowledge only PowerPoint deep?), with little understanding of the doctrine. Some officers would use the same word to refer to different concepts, sometimes multiple words were used to describe the same concept.

The new terminology really did little more than muddle the minds of the IDF's leadership. So much so, in fact, that IDF division commanders found themselves receiving orders in July 2006 which directed them to "achieve standoff domination of the theater", and other nebulous and ill-conceived demands.

A similar situation, I fear, is creeping into the recent armor discussion. Specifically, with terms like "combined arms" and "armor mindset". MikeF, in particular, makes a good point that a number of armor officers in the thread agree that the US military is losing the armor mindset, yet can't quite agree what the armor mindset quite is, exactly.

Recently, Col. Gentile claimed that that years of counterinsurgency in Palestine had degraded the IDF's ability to conduct combined arms operations:

Every study that I have read on the Israeli Army in summer 2006 acknowledges that one of the significant problems that led to their drubbing on the ground was the atrophied state of their combined arms competencies.

Yet, Andrew "Abu Muqawama" Exum claimed in a recent study of the 2006 conflict:

U.S. military planners, however, should take heart from the fact that when the IDF was able to mass combat power and make effective use of combined arms, it roundly defeated Hizballah’s formations—even in their makeshift village fortresses.

I'm curious:

1.) What are "combined arms"?

2.) Are we losing our "combined arms" capabilities?

3.) Are we losing certain aspects of combined arms capabilities?

4.) Are we losing combined arms capabilities at different levels?

5.) What contributed to the IDF's defeat in Lebanon?

6.) Did the IDF fail in Lebanon?

Combined arms are "an approach to warfare which seeks to integrate different arms of a military to achieve mutually complementary effects". For example, it might be integrating artillery and infantry, armor, and aviation forces together in a single engagement.

Are we losing that capability? Initially, I might say no. Certainly, the larger battles in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan--such as Wanat, COP Keating, Anaconda, as well as conflicts in urban areas of Iraq would have us believe that such forces can work in close conjunction with one another. The seige at Wanat, in particular, was held off by infantry forces, and driven back by artillery, as well as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Certainly, one can look on this as "combined arms"--just combined arms without tanks and armored personnel carriers. Of course, armored vehicles bring exceptional capabilities to the fight in irregular conflict, and should not lay by the wayside. Nevertheless, is the claim that we're losing our "combined arms" capabilities alarmist? Are we just losing some combined arms and not others?

We're also executing combined arms operations at lower and lower levels, as well. A company or platoon-level mission might have a gunship escort for cover, for example. Troops can call on this gunship for direct support if necessary, bypassing the need for higher-level coordination. Does pushing assets to the lowest level degrade our fighting capabilities at the corps level? (Can higher level planners answer this one?)

I'm also wary of attributing the IDF's performance in Lebanon to one factor, e.g., the over-emphasis on counter-insurgency operations. Hezbollah prepared for the war for nearly six years after the IDF's withdrawal, building hardened fighting positions which were nearly undetectable. The terrain in Lebanon tended to channelize the IDF's movements along a few roads. As IDF Merkavas advanced, Hezbollah fired sophisticated anti-tank missiles from villages--essentially using the villagers as human shields. It also didn't help the IDF that their axis of advance became blatantly obvious to Hezbollah once it began, allowing Hezbollah ample time to set up an ambush.

While the lack of training in the IDF's Merkava crews certainly played some role in the action which claimed the lives of eight IDF troops and resulted in damage to eleven tanks, certainly, there were greater forces at work.

Thoughts? Anyone from the IDF care to weigh in? Hit the comment button.

Hot women from the IDF? You can contact me on Facebook...

The debate rages on

Those of you who truly care about the debate between COINdinistas and armored warfare proponents might want to check out these two links from the world's greatest foreign policy expert:


The Great Satan's Girlfriend

• COINdinistas can look here
• COINtras will want to check this out

Edit: The GSGF is at it again this morning on this very issue. Quote:

Is Great Satan's Armored war fighting doctrine out of sync with her skills? Specifically - are the skill sets needed to do another Thunder Run - the fundamentals of fire and maneuver - on hand and ready to rock?While das unausprechlichen COIN külten has seduced tons of cats gearing up for the small, long wars (all magically located in the CENTCOM Gap), one of Great Satan's premier panzer experts has resisted the sirens call in a sustained effort to reinvigorate the panzer franchise:

Enjoy...

COINtras off their game

Yesterday, Small Wars Journal hosted two articles concerning the future of armored warfare. The first is a link roundup posted in World Politics Review, while the second is an article penned by noted COINtra Colonel Gian Gentile.

Col. Gentile's article--lamenting the death of the once-proud US armor corps--will doubtlessly become the more infamous of the two, so I'll concentrate on that one. Suffice to say, I expected better from the world's leading COINtra. Why are we just now seeing articles decrying the gutting of the armor branch? In case you've been living in a cave for the last few years, here's a list of some recent developments.

(Ed. note: You can tell I've spent too much time this last week making PowerPoint slides, as I'm compelled to use the bullet-point format for sentence fragments.)

• The systematic re-configuring of heavy brigade combat teams into Stryker brigades or light brigades.
• The tendency of heavy brigades in Iraq to leave their M1 tanks at home and fight as motorized infantry in MRAPs and HMMWVs.
• The total absence of tanks from Afghanistan, now apparent due to the fact that Afghanistan is now in the media spotlight.
• The apparent lackluster performance of Israel's Merkava tanks in the 2006 Lebanon War, largely attributed to an armored force which had hardly performed any individual or collective training in the Merkava since 2001. This situation, of course, has some striking parallels with the current state of armored forces in the United States. (Of course, it should also be noted that a recent CNAS paper by Andrew Exum noted that the terrain in Southern Lebanon was "infantry country" and poorly conducive to armored advances. It didn't help that the IDF also used the most obvious approach, either)

Yes, only now do the COINtras begin to raise concerns about the state of the US Army's armored forces. Truth be told, there is reason for alarm in the deterioration of the tank force. Although I would say that "small wars"--insurgencies, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, stability/support, humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, border conflicts, etc--will probably dominate the US military's future, "Black Swans" tend to make their way into the mix.

As a wise man once said, in the wake of his inability to see into the future, "always in motion, the future is".

Despite harboring legitimate concerns, Col. Gentile fails to address them properly. Let's dissect the one-page essay.

The Army has become decidedly infantry centric. This wouldn’t be so bad if it was a fighting kind of infantry centered army. But instead it is an infantry centric Army grounded in the principles of population centric counterinsurgency and Rupert Smith's view of war in the future as "wars amongst the people."

Listen up, everyone: we are no longer a fighting Army. To all you veterans of COP Keating and Wanat--you must have been doing nothing else but touchy-feely tea parties and absolutely no combat whatsoever.

To be sure the American Army will be told to do lots of things from winning hearts and minds in the Hindu Kush, to passing out humanitarian relief in the troubled spots around the world, to nation building in Iraq. But first and foremost it must be an Army grounded in combined arms competencies. This must come first, and not second or third after fuzzy concepts as “whole of government approach” and building emotional relationships with local populations. The latter may of course be important, depending on the mission, but those kinds of competencies must be premised on combined arms and not the other way around.

I recently heard an American Army General speak to a group of young men and women soon to become second lieutenants. The General's main point to these young men and women--what they needed to be good at when they went out into the field army--was establishing "trusting relationships" with local populations. One would have liked soon-to-be-lieutenants told that they must be proficient in their basic branch skills: infantry and armor, basic fire and maneuver with their platoon as part of a maneuver company/team; artillery, fire support; logistics, logistical support; and so on.

Certainly, counterinsurgency contains a considerable emphasis on population security, protection of civilian infrastructure, and diplomatic action. Nevertheless, it's important to place counterinsurgency doctrine in its proper context--FM 3-24 was written in a time when US forces were adept at killing insurgents and terrorists at the tactical level, but poor at understanding the operational impacts of COIN.

We place so much emphasis on understanding the "soft" aspects of counterinsurgency--as opposed to the more "kinetic" aspects--because virtually every single leader understands that they need to be tactically proficient. I don't need a general to tell me that I need to be able to employ forces in combat--that's a given. Maybe we're just amazed that we no longer talk down to our junior leaders like we used to.

Moreover, to state the obvious, the reason tanks and tracked vehicles are missing from contemporary "combined arms" doctrine might have more to do with the fact that we simply haven't used tanks in Afghanistan at all. The mountainous terrain is just not conducive to tanks. (Although this hasn't stopped the Canadians from sending 20 Leopard IIs)

Finally, one of the commenters, "Steve2", addresses the reality of the COINtra v. COINdinista debate.

Manpower and rotation times. Are there really enough to do both (COIN, Armor) at this time? It cannot be COIN or Armor for the foreseeable future, it must be both, but with the tight rotations of the past years, it had to be COIN. Maybe the drawdown in Iraq will provide enough of a breather.

True, true, true. In a perfect world, the US military would be prepared for every single threat. However, with the operational tempo being what it is--a year in combat followed by an incredibly hectic year of reset, re-equipping, re-training, re-integrating new troops, and, of course, resting--it's no surprise that we addressed counterinsurgency, as it's the highest priority right now.

Join the discussion at SWJ--WOI fan MikeF and commenters from around the world have joined in already.

On the Afghan Convoy

Most of you have heard about an incident in Afghanistan where American troops mistakenly shot a bus which contained civilians. One of my trusted friends in Afghanistan contacted me after the incident, and, not violating security procedures, noted that the American patrol had signaled for the vehicle to stop several times before firing at it.

While the deaths of civilians is certainly a tragedy, the US military's public relations people have been a little more quick to mitigate the PR effects than they were with last week's Apache video. The more credible military reporters, namely Spencer Ackerman and Nathan Hodge, have reported on to the "fog of war" surrounding the shooting.

Ackerman quotes the official ISAF press release in the Washington Independent:

Before dawn this morning, an unknown, large vehicle approached a slow-moving ISAF route-clearance patrol from the rear at a high rate of speed. The convoy could not move to the side of the road to allow the vehicle to pass due to the steep embankment.

The ISAF patrol warned off the approaching vehicle once with a flashlight and three times with flares, which were not heeded. Perceiving a threat when the vehicle approached once more at an increased rate of speed, the patrol attempted to warn off the vehicle with hand signals prior to firing upon it. Once engaged, the vehicle then stopped.

Upon inspection, ISAF forces discovered the vehicle to be a passenger bus.

I should also mention that the times around sunrise and sunset are usually the worst in terms of visibility--it's too bright for night-vision goggles, yet too dark for normal eyesight. This would have certainly contributed to US forces misidentifying the vehicle. (So would a propensity for insurgents to use car bombs against military vehicles) It might also explain why the vehicle did not stop right away.

Ackerman notes that the American troops rendered medical aid to the injured civilians, with over a dozen being rushed to hospitals. Nevertheless, the scene bears a chilling resemblance to a side note directly out of General McChrystal's counterinsurgency guidance.

An ISAF patrol was traveling through a city at a high rate of speed, driving down the center to force traffic off the road. Several pedestrians and other vehicles were pushed out of the way. A vehicle approached from the side into the traffic circle. The gunner fired a pen flare at it, which entered the vehicle and caught the interior on fire. As the ISAF patrol sped away, Afghans crowded around the car. How many insurgents did the patrol make that day?

Of course, it's easy for us to sit back and call this a textbook counterinsurgency failure. However, the troops involved would have perceived this as a life-or-death matter. Nevertheless, the incident still sparked protests throughout Kandahar, just as ISAF is preparing its upcoming offensive into the area.

How can we do better?

COIN for Aviators -- a scenario

While rushing from meeting to meeting today, I had a lot of time to think about the video that's been making its rounds on the Internet.

For those of you who aren't aware, Wikileaks released a video shot from the Target Acquisition Display Sight (TADS) of an AH-64D Apache Longbow belonging to the 1st Air Cavalry Regiment out of Fort Hood, Texas. The video shows the pilots of the aircraft shooting their 30mm cannon into a group of Iraqis whom they believed to be insurgents. Unfortunately, the attack killed journalists from Reuters, some of whom may have been mistaken for armed gunmen based on video footage of cameras slung over their shoulder somewhat like a rifle. You can view the nearly 40 minutes of footage at Youtube. (WARNING: Extremely graphic)

I'm going to limit my discussion to the first engagement in the video. Some of the subsequent engagements in the video, such as the van and the triangle-shaped building, are fodder for another day; I have plenty of questions about the latter portion of the video.

I should also caveat any criticism with the fact that we in the blogosphere can simply hit pause and rewind in the safety of our living rooms before we comment. No one involved in the video had that luxury. Unfortunately, life and death decisions are made in a split-second, and sometimes, they might not be the best decisions.

The pilots responded to a report from Troops In Contact (what pilots call a "TIC"). In the video, this is the "Bushmaster" element. It's certainly tragic that the journalists were killed, but unfortunately, these things happen in war. Given the situation, it's understandable to see how the pilots might have killed the Iraqis in the first engagement.

To answer a question I received in a previous post, yes, this might be the only real glimpse the pilots had of the target. If I remember my one hour in the Apache simulator correctly, the gunner would be looking through a display in the cockpit similar to this device in the center. It would greatly restrict his view outside. (Gun bunnies, correct me if I am wrong)

The pilot would be watching much of the airspace around him, and not just concentrating on the action below. Not to mention, the aircraft would normally remain a safe distance away from the action. It is likely that the black-and-white video you saw on Youtube would have been their best view of the situation. A similar situation existed in Kunduz province in Afghanistan last year, when German forces directed an American F-15E to drop a bomb on two tanker trucks they believed were surrounded by insurgents.

However, some better counterinsurgency training for the pilots might yield better results. Let's take a look at another situation. A pair of scout helicopters (such as the OH-58D) observes a man digging along the side of a road. This is suspicious, of course, since this is a good indicator that the man might be emplacing an improvised explosive device (IED).

You have a .50-caliber machine gun and a pair of Hellfire missiles at your disposal. Do you:

a.) Engage with the .50-caliber machine gun?

b.) Engage with the Hellfire missile?

c.) Wait and report the information to ground forces

If you picked c, you might be a counter insurgent.

Why not shadow the digger from afar, report the incident to the local "landowner", and ask them to dispatch a quick reaction force (QRF)? The QRF might be able to detain the digger and determine whether or not he actually did emplace a bomb. Even better, if the local police are trustworthy, they might be able to apprehend the man. If the digger was innocent, no harm done. If he was a bombmaker, local police might be able to learn about his bomb making cell and connections, leading to further arrests in a bomb-making network.

Why "COIN for Aviators" is so important

Update: I've written two three follow-on articles with more analysis:

• COIN for Aviators: A Scenario
• Hopefully, the last post on the Apache video (but, as we all know, it probably won't be)
• I lied, final thoughts on the Apache video

Many of you have probably seen the leaked footage of an air strike in Baghdad which claimed the lives of two Reuters employees. (Those that haven't can view the footage here. Warning, the video is extremely graphic)

Let's take a look at the actions on the part of the air crew. (Gun bunnies in particular, take note) The video appears damning, but I'm reserving the bulk of the judgement until I read the official AR 15-6 investigation.

• Despite the advances in thermal and optical sensors, it's still extremely difficult for an air crew to tell an insurgent from a civilian. The Apache pilots believed that they saw AK-47s and RPGs in the hands of the figures in the video. An examination of the video, however, is inconclusive. They could really be carrying anything. Some of the radio chatter from the infantry unit ("Bushmaster 26") indicates that there are insurgents walking about with AK-47s, and the cameras slung over the reporters shoulders might resemble some sort of rifle from a distance. (Edit: After watching the video a few times, I can see at least two figures with AK-47 style rifles as well as the RPG. Rewind was a luxury the pilots didn't have). It should be evident, based on this video, that although modern aerial platforms can collect a stunning amount of data, the most useful intelligence still comes from human networks, infantrymen on the ground, and the Mk-I eyeball.
• After engaging roughly eight people with the Apache's 30mm cannon, a van arrives on the scene, with figures seen carrying the wounded bodies towards the van. According to the pilots, the men in the van are "collecting weapons", and are also shot with the Apache's 30mm cannon. News flash: picking up wounded bodies is not a hostile act.
• Upon hearing that one of the victims is a young girl, the pilots laugh, "Well, it's their fault for bringing their kids to a battle". Wrong.
• The final engagement (the triangle-shaped building) allegedly houses six armed insurgents. However, (33:45-34:00) we see men walking into the building clearly without weapons in their hands (they are swinging their arms freely). The pilots fail to mention these two men walking into the building, nor do they mention another unarmed man (34:40) walking directly in front of the building as they shoot a Hellfire missile. Again, read FM 3-24, Appendix F. Another obvious COIN failure.
• The same thing happens as they fire a second missile into the building--as figures are seen walking into the burning structure. No weapons appear to be in their hands, yet the pilots don't seem to mention them as they launch yet another Hellfire into the building. Were the troops in contact even taking fire after the first Hellfire launch?

Again, this is why I feel so strongly about COIN for aviators. I think that we fail to truly absorb counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, leading to incidents like this.

More at the Small Wars Journal Council.

Official AR 15-6 Investigation, which reveals that the pilots were from the 1-227th Aviation Regiment of the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade. This might be a good read. (H/T Schmedlap)

Thanks

Thanks again to Commander Herb Carmen and Andrew Exum for tackling the topic of COIN for the aviation community. Most aviators haven't had quite the experience that our ground brethren have undergone in the past decade, something which I feel is to our detriment.

The thread's amusing because it gives "ground-pounders" a glimpse of the aviation mentality, one which is characterized by a short attention span. This, of course, is what makes "COIN for Aviators" that much more difficult, in that years worth of counterinsurgency research winds up being compressed into a 45 minute presentation. But hey, any little bit helps.

Airpower in Counterinsurgency

Out of necessity, I've taken a break from drawing parallels between the Iraq War and the Revolutionary War and moved on to something a little different. I'm doing some volunteer work, of sorts, creating a brief information packet regarding the role of airpower in counterinsurgency. Hey, it's what any self-respecting COINdinista would do, right?

Fortunately, I've been getting some great help from my fellow COINdinistas, such as Mark Safranski and the Small Wars Journal crew. Special thanks to the gang from CNAS, including Commander Herb "Herbal" Carmen--an E-2C Hawkeye pilot, piracy expert, and producer of some of the finest Youtube videos ever.

Another "thank you" goes out to Adam Elkus, my frequent partner in crime, who recommended that I pick up the book "Airpower in Small Wars" by James Corum. After reading it for a day, I've been intrigued by the RAF's experiment in fighting counterinsurgency from the air in Iraq...in the 1920s. Although predating the invention of Sikorsky's helicopter, the jet engine, thermal sights and guided missiles, it still remains an interesting case study for modern air powers attempting to fight insurgencies.

After the end of the First World War, Britain and France suddenly found themselves in possession of much of the former Ottoman Empire, thanks to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. Britain governed Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq), an amalgam country consisting of three former Ottoman states lumped together--the Mosul Province, the Baghdad Province, and the Basra Province. Given the circumstances, it's not surprising that the Kurdish people of the north began to rebel against the fledgling government in Baghdad, which was ruled by a Hashemite.

Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for War and Air, needed to subdue the insurgency in northern Iraq. However, following the First World War, Churchill was compelled to fight the insurgency on the cheap. Then, much like now, the air strike seemed to be a popular alternative to a costly ground campaign--airstrikes were was quick, they could deliver tons of ordnance, and best of all, Britain's enemies had little defense against an aerial attack. Thus, the British reduced the number of troops in Iraq, replacing infantry battalions with RAF squadrons, and giving control of the entire operation to the RAF.

Although the airplane proved to be an effective asset--particularly in the reconnaissance and strike role--the British soon discovered that it was not a replacement for ground troops. Indeed, as British troop levels shrank, the Kurdish insurgency only grew--little surprise to anyone who witnessed the Iraqi Troop Surge. It was only after embarking on a massive land campaign, during which infantry forces fixed Kurdish rebels long enough for airplanes to inflict massive losses, was the rebellion finally quelled.

Among the limitations of airpower was the lack of good human intelligence on insurgent positions. Kurdish rebels managed to construct some ingenious overhead camouflage, concealing them from the prying eyes of RAF fighters. Indeed, even in the era of advanced optical sensors, our most advanced aerial platforms can still be deceived by a cunning enemy. Such was the case in the Kosovo War of 1999, when Serbia's effective use of camouflage allowed many tanks to escape the NATO bombing campaign unscathed. It was also the case in the 2006 Lebanon War, when some well-concealed Hezbollah fighting positions were discovered a mere hundred yards away from IDF observation posts.

I also found it interesting to see how the British would use airplanes to reconnoiter the routes ahead of supply convoys headed from Baghdad to Mosul--just as AH-64 Apaches and OH-58D Kiowa Warriors do nearly 90 years later.

I was contemplating posting the final product on AKO, but that would mean my Air Force and Navy comrades would be unable to use it. I might look at experimenting with the whole Google Wave thing. I don't know. Suggestions greatly appreciated.

The American Insurgency

Over the past few years, I've enjoyed reading about the topic of guerrilla warfare, both from the perspective of successful counter-insurgents and from insurgents themselves. Nevertheless, I found it kind of peculiar that, whenever the topic of insurgency is brought up, the US military neglects to mention the obvious example of the American Revolution.

The American Revolution has all the elements of a successful insurgency. You have the perceived sense of the illegitimacy of the British government in the colonies ("no taxation without representation", anyone?) The British Army was far too small to successfully occupy and pacify the vast majority of the American countryside, in opposition to what we now know about successful counter-insurgency. As in many insurgencies, the Colonists received military aid from a foreign power (France), hoping to bankrupt their Britain in a proxy war. Not to mention, the Colonists had a well-trained militia--the Minutemen--ready to marshal at a moments notice, much like the Mahdi Army in Sadr City, Iraq. Most importantly, America's leading general, George Washington, lost the majority of the battles he participated in, yet he found himself the victor in the war, foreshadowing a famous statement made by an NVA officer about the Vietnam War.

I wonder if we simply don't think of the American Revolution as an insurgency because we have a popular image of the war being fought by rows of men marching rank-and-file towards one another. Does anyone have any good books to recommend about the original American insurgency?

Transformers II: Revenge of the COINtras

The US military's focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations has made many in the defense community uneasy, such as Col. Gian Gentile. According to these "COINtras", the US military's conventional combat capabilities are eroding, potentially putting us at a severe disadvantage should the US military ever face a conventional, near-peer opponent.

Certainly, many of us have looked around and wondered whether or not a neer-peer competitor was out there. Well, it looks like I have apparently found one. Ladies and Gentlemen, our focus on counterinsurgency leaves us woefully unprepared to wage a conventional war against the Revolutionary Republic of the Decepticons.

Seriously, the geo-political-military situation in this movie is too atrocious to ignore, particularly given the amount of assistance--both personnel and high-tech equipment--the military gave the makers of the movie. Let's examine the poor use of military and political tactics within this movie, shall we?

National Sovereignty Fail

In the beginning of the movie, we discover that a Decepticon is running rampant through the streets of Shanghai. The Autobots are called in to assist a strike group consisting of several UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache helicopters as they zoom through the buildings of Shanghai, shooting everything in sight in an attempt to destroy the Decepticon. Somehow, the helicopters are not instantly shot down by the Chinese, who don't subsequently threaten to invade Taiwan or declare nuclear war on the US.

English-Speaking Jingoism Fail

The first live-action Transformers movie was accused of being far too jingoistic, in that the US military is world's last defense against the Decepticons. I order to recognize the value of our allies, Transformers II takes the "GI Joe" approach and introduces a multi-national anti-Decepticon task force, consisting of...Australia, Great Britain, and that's it. No other countries, in the Transformer universe, have special forces. Well, at least not special forces who are skilled in full-spectrum operations, ranging from counterinsurgency to anti-Decepticon action.

Soft Power Fail

While many in the military and foreign policy fields--such the current US Secretaries of State and Defense--advocate the use of "soft power", there are limits. Indeed, as President Barack Obama noted during his Nobel acceptance speech, soft power and diplomacy would not stop the Nazis, nor would it deter the hard-core fanatics within al Qaeda. Nevertheless, in Transformers II, President Obama is seen advocating diplomacy with a race of robots bent on genocide via the destruction of our sun.

Education Fail

In Transformers II, Shia Lebouf is seen leaving for college without taking Megan Fox along.

Seriously, what the fuck is he thinking? (And you thought I stopped posting Megan Fox pictures)

Homeland Security Fail

So in Transformers II, there's this little robot named "Wheels", who appears to be an analogy to the diminutive "Wheelie" robot from the original Transformers movie (from the 1980s). Except while the 1980s Wheelie is a childish, annoying Autobot who speaks in rhyme, his 2009 incarnation is a diminutive, malevolent Decepticon who eventually develops a crush on Megan Fox and humps her leg. I'm

not making that up, either, a little Tonka truck transforms into a tiny Decepticon and actually humps Megan Fox's leg. Well, then again, if I were a little Tonka truck Decepticon, I'd hump Megan Fox's leg, too. Fuck, I'd do that even if I weren't a Decepticon.

Anyway, Megan Fox disables Wheelie as he attempts to attack her, and she tortures him for information. And when I mean torture, I don't mean pouring motor oil into his robot mouth in a bizarre Decepticon waterboarding ritual, she flat-out takes a soldering iron and melts his fucking eye off. If that isn't enough, she decides that she needs to fly across the country to meet up with Shia LaBeouf, all the while holding Wheelie hostage. How does one get a Decepticon across the country in a hurry? Well, apparently, you can put a laser-wielding Decepticon in metal box with chains and take it through security at any airport. All the while, no one at TSA thinks that it's suspicious that she's checking a metal box through as her luggage and absolutely nothing else. I guess it's only suspicious when Nigerian terrorists fly with no luggage, not when Megan Fox flies with no luggage.

Transformers Plot Fail

So, wait, if Shia LaBeouf already has a piece of the Allspark, why doesn't he use that to revive Optimus Prime? Not that Optimus Prime's "death" is really that tragic--we all figure that he will be brought back to life by the end of the movie. Now, when he died in the 1980s cartoon movie--which was a blatant attempt to discontinue the old toy line and introduce new toys by killing off kids' beloved heroes--that was tragic.

Task 2048 (Perform Sling Load Operations) Fail

After Optimus Prime dies, we kind of accentuate the tragedy by having a helicopter sling-load his dead mechanical corpse back to the US military base and literally drop his dead body on the ground in front of the rest of the Autobots. Seriously, the aircrew training manual says that you wait until the load is on the ground and have slack in the sling before you release the cargo hook (after hovering laterally away from the load, so as not to damage it with the clevis). Nevertheless, I think they should add "unless you are attempting to create a dramatic effect, in which case, the pilot may drop the load from ten feet, but only if the cameras are filming in slow-motion, there's a layer of dust the corpse will kick up, and the onlookers have their hands over their open mouths, in shock."

Geography Fail

There's a lot happening during the final, big battle. The problem is, we really have no idea where it's taking place. Apparently, it's in the desert near the Jordanian/Egyptian/Israeli border where all of the following landmarks are within walking distance (in reality, they are all several hundred miles apart):

The city of Petra in Jordan

The Gulf of Aqaba

The Mediterranean Sea

The Pyramids (at Giza?)

Note that I say say the Jordanian/Egyptian/Israeli border, although the movie would have you believe that Jordan and Egypt actually share a border. Admittedly, they do come close, but in order to walk from one point of the battle in Jordan to another point of the battle in Egypt, you kind of have to, well, cross the Israeli border. Something tells me the Israelis don't take too kindly to tanks rolling across their border to transit from one battle to the next, even if they are American.

Sabot Rounds Fail

Remember in the first Transformers movie, we learned that only special rounds could pierce

the armour of the Decepticons? They couldn't be destroyed by air-to-ground missiles, nor by an A-10 Warthog's massive GAU-8 30mm cannon. Only very large rounds fired by an AC-130 Spectre Gunship could pierce Scorponok's skin. Nevertheless, the troops in Transformers II falls victim to the "Godzilla Effect", whereby they expend thousands of rounds into the Decepticons, to no effect, whereupon they just keep firing rounds into them anyway. Sense? This makes none.

Big-Budget Weapons Fail (B-1B, Zumwalt-class destroyer, Future Combat System, etc)

Hi, are you a senior-level defense official trying to develop a weapon which has little use in the counterinsurgency environment? If so, then why not convince the American public that your multi-billion dollar project is still viable by showing its applicability in Major Intergalactic War! During the final battle, when tanks roll ashore in...Petra, Jordan...or something...you half-expect one of the COINtras to jump up in the middle of the battle and say "When you're saluting your Decepticon overlords, you'll bet you hadn't cancelled the Future Combat System!"

The most laughable instance occurs near the end of the battle, when a bunch of robots combine together to make the super-Decepticon Devastator, who even comes equipped with a giant robot scrote-sack. Devastator is ripping apart the Pyramids of Giza, because they are actually built over a giant machine the Decepticons built thousands of years ago to destroy the Earth's sun.

Anyway, fortunately, there's a "battleship" in the Mediterranean that can help. Although it's not actually named, the fact that it's called a "battleship" and that it has a massive rail gun for the naval gunfire support role leads me to believe it's actually the billion-dollar DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer.

Although there is considerable disappointment over the destroyer--its lack of adequate air and ballistic missile defense systems, its size, cost, and so forth--let it be known that the movie showcases its capabilities. Its network-centric warfare C3I systems can receive communications from an ex-government employee running around the desert with a walkie-talkie radio. That's how good it is. It also has a rail gun for some reason, even though rail guns are several decades off, but that's okay. Anyway, if you need to shoot a massive robot on top of a Pyramid, the DDG-1000 and its non-existent rail gun are just the thing for you.

Combat Lifesaver Fail

Seriously, is this part of your CPR certification? During the climax of the movie, Shia LaBeouf falls unconcious and has a near-death experience. Not to worry, though, because Megan Fox knows CPR. Who needs to remember silly thing like the ratio of compressions to breaths, when you can just scream "Why?" "No!" and "I love you!" at the heavens in vain, with the camera capturing you from above. Cracked.com has the Megan Fox guide to CPR:

Theology Fail

Last but not least, Shia LeBoeuf's near-death experience raises a number of serious concerns. Chief among these is the fact that, in Transformers II, there are Autobots in heaven.

What. The. Fuck. Autobots have souls?

Conclusion

Does the military have a support group for COINdinistas who saw Transformers II? I might need that.

In case you didn't get the memo

NATO troops will be going on the offensive around the town of Marjah, in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in an operation known as Operation Moshtarak (the Dari word for "Together"). Currently, some 3,000 British troops are already clearing the area of insurgents. When all is said and done, the entire operation will involve 15,000 troops from the US, and Great Britain, including members of the elite SAS and Special Forces. British and US forces have already secured the road networks to the north and east of Marjah, with approximately 3,000 British troops in a cordon position around the town. Apache gunships are poised to provide support from a base known as Camp Bastion. The ensuing assault will be spearheaded by US Marines.

Of course, I don't really need to repeat this--it's been all over the news today, and already has its own entry in Wikipedia. I'm not kidding, I actually just ripped most of that previous paragraph off of what was written in the Guardian. I kept reading it and feared that I'd be responsible for getting someone killed, until I realized that the newspapers just did the same thing--with interactive maps, no less.

Certainly, it's unusual to broadcast the details of an attack so far in advance. One might argue it's foolish. But General Stanley McChrystal's no fool--there has to be some sort of method to the madness. Could it be a giant deception campaign? Possibly. However, Ken Payne from Kings of War has a more likely explanation, drawn straight from counterinsurgency principles. Well, okay, the first one isn't from COIN principles--it's just plain common sense.

Two very sound reasons for the lack of operational secrecy suggest themselves. First, I’d back the insurgents to know something was coming, even without a subscription to the [Wall Street] Journal.

Second, more importantly, avoiding a big fight is the name of the game for the coalition. Preserving your force and securing the people are key objectives if you’re going to do population-focused counterinsurgency. Ideally you want to take control of the populous areas with minimal fighting, and you want the insurgent out in the sticks, where he can be hunted down more readily than among the population, and where there’s less chance of large-scale civilian casualties.

The insurgent, meanwhile, must fight among the people, not just for safety, but to retain his relevance. Announcing that you’re coming gives him a tough choice.

Still, it all kind of reminds me of this quote from a classic movie:

Ted Striker: My orders came through. My squadron ships out tomorrow. We're bombing the storage depots at Daiquiri at 1800 hours. We're coming in from the north, below their radar.
Elaine Dickinson: When will you be back?
Ted Striker: I can't tell you that. It's classified.

The New Counterinsurgency Era: Day One

I decided to read Dr. David Ucko's "The New Counterinsurgency Era" a little bit backwards. Why? Well, looking through the book, I noticed that a certain Army Aviator's article in Small Wars Journal is used as a reference in Dr. Ucko's book.

Wait, does this mean I'm credible? :)

In all seriousness, I found out that I'm quoted in a portion of Dr. Ucko's book which dealt with the US military's professional educational programs and their reluctance to embrace counterinsurgency. This is certainly one of my greatest concerns. Indeed, Major Neil "Cavguy" Smith weighed in on the issue recently at SWJ, noting that, particularly for junior officers, the level of COIN training can be hit-or-miss, depending on the institution.

Dr. Ucko refers to some research by a number of military experts which document the total number of hours spent on topics related to conventional war-related topics versus those related to counterinsurgency. Although, as he remarks in the endnotes, such studies can be somewhat problematic.

Although I have some issues with the metrics involved, I certainly agree that my professional military education thus far has largely concentrated on conventional war. While I agree that we can't assume that the conventional battlefield will go away--such thinking was a fatal flaw and contributed to the IDF's failure in Lebanon in 2006--we need to focus primarily on counterinsurgency for the time being. The reasoning is simple--we're in the middle of two insurgencies. When these wars wind down, we can then discuss how we re-balance our military. But for now, let's focus on the wars we're actually involved in...

Overall, I have to admit that there's excellent research and plenty of salient points in this book thus far. If you like reading about the US military's other "Transformation"--that from a conventional war fighting force to a counterinsurgency force--you'll really like this book.

Got my stuff from Iraq back...

I just started going through my stuff from Iraq, and I dug out my copy of Dr. David Ucko's The New Counterinsurgency Era. I ordered it from Amazon in August and received it just as we were packing up to head home. When faced with the decision between one book and my lightweight Kindle with hundreds of books, I stuck with the Kindle.

Fortunately, now I can start reading it. The book features impeccable research into the US military's initial aversion to, and later reluctant adoption of, counterinsurgency principles. From my initial glance, Dr. Ucko--who now blogs at the new and improved Kings of War--seems to make a distinction between units in the field, which were relatively quick to adopt counterinsurgency, and what we in the military generally refer to as "Big Army" or the ever-present "they", who continued with educational programs and procurement policies largely dedicated towards major combat operations against a large nation-state.

As I thumbed through the book--and this may be a bit of an unfair assessment as I haven't delved into the book that deeply yet--I noted Dr. Ucko spoke about the dilemma faced by the US Marine Corps in the realm of counterinsurgency versus their traditional maritime role. On one hand, some Marines seem to be averse to being a counterinsurgency/occupation force. This is, of course, kind of amusing, since the original counterinsurgency manual is the US Marine Corps' "Small Wars Manual"--a book written during the "Banana Wars" of the early 20th Century. The book almost certainly lends its name to the counterinsurgency blog "Small Wars Journal", run by former US Marine Corps officers.

On the other hand, there is also value in the Marine Corps' ability to rapidly project power from the sea, as recent experience in Haiti has shown. Procurement programs for each mission set are often mutually exclusive, and I have to admit that I can see the merit to both camps.

I now also realize the challenges that many defense writers have to deal with when writing about a topic which is currently ongoing. Certainly, right as the book was coming out, some tidbits of information became obsolete. For example, Dr. Ucko criticizes the decision to continue with development of the Army's Future Combat System. However, right as the book was being released, the Army's FCS was, indeed, cancelled by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, largely due to the fact--as Dr. Ucko notes--it was seen as ill-suited for counterinsurgency.

Truly, this will be a good read, although I have to sequence it in among my writing about the Lebanon War for CENSA's latest essay roundup (which will feature Adam Elkus)