Blogging slowdown

I'll be living on the floor of my apartment and posting from coffee shops for the next week or two. Don't worry, all is well. I promise to pick up the pace once I'm safe and sound in Germany.

Expect my review of David Kilcullen's "Counterinsurgency" tonight. It's a worthwhile read, however, large portions of the book already exist in blogs and on the Internet, including Kilcullen's "Twenty-Eight Articles" and his commentary on metrics.

Book review to follow

I just finished David Kilcullen's Counterinsurgency, which should be in the cargo pocket of every officer and NCO heading to Iraq and Afghanistan. The book is not, however, without a few flaws. I'll cover them either late tonight or tomorrow, as I'm awaiting the movers right now.

What I'm reading

Finally, I've gotten to Dr. Patrick Porter's "Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes". After reading the first chapter, I've skipped ahead to his analysis on the 2006 Lebanon War, as I'm very curious to hear his analysis on that topic. I hadn't seen the war viewed through a sociological/anthropological lens before, so I think it will be quite fascinating.

One consistent theme I've noticed in Dr. Porter's work at Offshore Balancer is the debunking of cultural mythologies which have evolved around history and, in particular, war. As many of the historical interactions of East and West often fall into the realm of pseudo-myth (Lawrence of Arabia, Marco Polo, Ghengis Khan, etc), it should prove to be interesting to see what Dr. Porter has to say about them.

Back to Reading for Pleasure

Based on a recommendation from one notable fan, I've started "The War for America" by Piers Mackesy, a book about the American Revolution written by, of all things, a Briton. Should be an interesting read. It's not available for Kindle, however, so I'm tackling this one the old-fashioned way, with highlighter in hand.

I should order stuff from Amazon in a drunken stupor more often...

Last week, I was out at the bar and ran into a friend from the 10th Mountain Division's 3rd Brigade Combat Team, who had just returned from Afghanistan. As I was mentioning War is Boring's reporter Jason Reich, who was embedded with the 3rd Brigade, I found out that a Soldier within the 3rd Brigade was also a writer, and apparently a pretty good one, too.

The writer was none other than Lt. Col. Jason K. Dempsey, author of the new book "Our Army: Soldiers, Politicians, and American Civil-Military Relations". I actually whipped out my Blackberry at the bar, and pulled up the book using the Amazon plugin on my Blackberry. True to form, I decided to buy it from Amazon while actually standing at the bar. The next morning, I had feelings of regret, largely due to the fact that I keep telling myself that I really need to put a breathalyzer on my Blackberry to prevent me from doing incredibly outrageous stuff with it when I go out drinking.

However, my fears were allayed this week when I received Lt. Col. Dempsey's book, and found that it's actually really good. It's a detailed study of the demographics of American Soldiers, comparing and contrasting their ideological deviations from American society as a mean (summary--Soldiers aren't as different as most people like to think). Certainly, it was one of the best things I've done with my Blackberry while drunk.

At least I'm not the only one who has done something embarrassing with his Blackberry while drunk...

The New Counterinsurgency Era: Day One

I decided to read Dr. David Ucko's "The New Counterinsurgency Era" a little bit backwards. Why? Well, looking through the book, I noticed that a certain Army Aviator's article in Small Wars Journal is used as a reference in Dr. Ucko's book.

Wait, does this mean I'm credible? :)

In all seriousness, I found out that I'm quoted in a portion of Dr. Ucko's book which dealt with the US military's professional educational programs and their reluctance to embrace counterinsurgency. This is certainly one of my greatest concerns. Indeed, Major Neil "Cavguy" Smith weighed in on the issue recently at SWJ, noting that, particularly for junior officers, the level of COIN training can be hit-or-miss, depending on the institution.

Dr. Ucko refers to some research by a number of military experts which document the total number of hours spent on topics related to conventional war-related topics versus those related to counterinsurgency. Although, as he remarks in the endnotes, such studies can be somewhat problematic.

Although I have some issues with the metrics involved, I certainly agree that my professional military education thus far has largely concentrated on conventional war. While I agree that we can't assume that the conventional battlefield will go away--such thinking was a fatal flaw and contributed to the IDF's failure in Lebanon in 2006--we need to focus primarily on counterinsurgency for the time being. The reasoning is simple--we're in the middle of two insurgencies. When these wars wind down, we can then discuss how we re-balance our military. But for now, let's focus on the wars we're actually involved in...

Overall, I have to admit that there's excellent research and plenty of salient points in this book thus far. If you like reading about the US military's other "Transformation"--that from a conventional war fighting force to a counterinsurgency force--you'll really like this book.

Got my stuff from Iraq back...

I just started going through my stuff from Iraq, and I dug out my copy of Dr. David Ucko's The New Counterinsurgency Era. I ordered it from Amazon in August and received it just as we were packing up to head home. When faced with the decision between one book and my lightweight Kindle with hundreds of books, I stuck with the Kindle.

Fortunately, now I can start reading it. The book features impeccable research into the US military's initial aversion to, and later reluctant adoption of, counterinsurgency principles. From my initial glance, Dr. Ucko--who now blogs at the new and improved Kings of War--seems to make a distinction between units in the field, which were relatively quick to adopt counterinsurgency, and what we in the military generally refer to as "Big Army" or the ever-present "they", who continued with educational programs and procurement policies largely dedicated towards major combat operations against a large nation-state.

As I thumbed through the book--and this may be a bit of an unfair assessment as I haven't delved into the book that deeply yet--I noted Dr. Ucko spoke about the dilemma faced by the US Marine Corps in the realm of counterinsurgency versus their traditional maritime role. On one hand, some Marines seem to be averse to being a counterinsurgency/occupation force. This is, of course, kind of amusing, since the original counterinsurgency manual is the US Marine Corps' "Small Wars Manual"--a book written during the "Banana Wars" of the early 20th Century. The book almost certainly lends its name to the counterinsurgency blog "Small Wars Journal", run by former US Marine Corps officers.

On the other hand, there is also value in the Marine Corps' ability to rapidly project power from the sea, as recent experience in Haiti has shown. Procurement programs for each mission set are often mutually exclusive, and I have to admit that I can see the merit to both camps.

I now also realize the challenges that many defense writers have to deal with when writing about a topic which is currently ongoing. Certainly, right as the book was coming out, some tidbits of information became obsolete. For example, Dr. Ucko criticizes the decision to continue with development of the Army's Future Combat System. However, right as the book was being released, the Army's FCS was, indeed, cancelled by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, largely due to the fact--as Dr. Ucko notes--it was seen as ill-suited for counterinsurgency.

Truly, this will be a good read, although I have to sequence it in among my writing about the Lebanon War for CENSA's latest essay roundup (which will feature Adam Elkus)

A Question of Command--additional review from Dr. David Ucko

Dr. David Ucko, author of The New Counterinsurgency Era: Preparing the US Military for Modern Wars, has penned a review of Mark Moyar's latest book, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency Leadership from the Civil War to Iraq. It will appear in an upcoming issue of the Journal of Military History, but you can read the review in full at his blog.

I started reading A Question of Command, but I simply couldn't finish it. If you're curious as to why this is, just read my initial thoughts on the book here. I appreciate that Mr. Moyar is looking at the vital subject of leadership in wartime, but I think it could have been done a bit better. Apparently, there are a few more that agree (SWJ, Kings of War, and Dr. Ucko).

As an added note, I'd like to thank Dr. Ucko for dropping by this blog earlier this week. I have to admit that I have his book, but unfortunately, it's still in the shipping container that just arrived from Iraq. I'll be sure to get on it!

On Reading Lists

'Tis the season to buy things, to be certain. If you're stumped what to get someone this Christmas, here are a few ideas, contributed by quite an eclectic mix of bloggers:

I scanned through a few "Top 10" and "Top 100" lists, and noticed that a book called "The Good Soldiers" by David Finkel keeps popping up. I hadn't heard of this book, but I think I'll check it out.

• On Violence's Christmas Recommendations
• Tom Ricks, "So You're Heading to Afghanistan". (Speaking of which, his recent book, The Gamble, wound up as #11 on Omnivoracious' list of the best books of 2009)
• 101st Airborne reading list for Afghanistan (c/o Tom Ricks)
• Hidden gem: Gen. David Petraeus' reading list (you need to scroll to the bottom), courtesy of Foreign Policy Online
• My summer reading list in Iraq, 2009. As an interesting note, I noticed that someone from Wasilla, Alaska wound up on that page after Googling something to the effect of "kindle books iraq". I only know of one person who resides in Wasilla, Alaska, and that individual does have a son who (at the time) served in Iraq. I never, for the life of me, would have thought she'd actually be interested in a book (unless she wrote it). Truly, blogging thrusts me into all sorts of bizarre situations.
• Andrew Exum's Counterinsurgency Reading List
• US Army War College's Irregular Warfare reading list (h/t Andrew Exum)
• Boss Mongo recommends a series of books, which, despite having a bit of a bizarre premise (The Islamic States of America?), does point out the differences between the branches of Islam quite well, and is an exciting read. It's a trilogy so far, with the first book being Robert Ferrigno's Prayers for the Assassin. Boss Mongo says he enjoys reading the series, when he's not out bludgeoning sharks with his bare hands (seriously, Boss Mongo is who Chuck Norris wishes he was).
• EDIT: Let's not forget The Great Satan's Girlfriend's COIN reading list.

Focus: I know I've accidentally left off a few reading lists, and for that, I apologize in advance. Please, give me a link to your Christmas reading list so I can add it here.

Congratulatons are in order...

Tom Ricks' The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-2008 is #11 on Omnivoracious' Top 100 Books of 2009.

Book Review...

I quit procrastinating and finished In the Graveyard of Empires by Seth Jones while I was having coffee.

I particularly like how the book ended. After discussing the insurgency which developed in that particular Middle Eastern nation, the author writes about his experience visiting some of the ancient ruins in the area, and reflects upon the thousands of years of history in the region, and the uncertain future of the nation. Although I got a strange sense of deja vu--I could have sworn I read a book that ended just like this...

Seriously, though, the book is a great read--I particularly liked how Jones shed light on Pakistan's involvement with the Afghanistan Taliban during the war.

The relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban: Friends with benefits?

A few days ago, karaka pend asked me whether or not it was worth the $35 to purchase War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age. I thought it was a great book, don't get me wrong, but I hate spending $35 for e-books, so I recommended not buying it. Another reader disagreed with me, stating that the book was well worth the money--but caveatted their response with the fact that some of the material in the book might already be common knowledge to some people.

Now, I'll agree that much of the book reiterated information that I felt that I was already familiar with. Yes, I'm well aware that there are bloggers in the military. I know that Soldiers use Facebook to connect with the outside world, share life experiences, post pictures of cats who desire "cheezburgers", etc. I also know quite well that there's this site called Small Wars Journal where people discuss counterinsurgency....and while it's not The Best Page in the Universe, it's still good enough to make the Rolling Stone Hot List.

That being said, War 2.0 (along with another book I've been into recently, In the Graveyard of Empires) does tackle a very important issue which has, until recently, been overlooked in the debate on Afghanistan: the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda. Fortunately, a number of pundits have been able to examine this issue recently, most notably Perter Bergen, who penned an article which appeared in The New Republic recently (h/t Afpak Channel on Twitter).

Bergen--one of the few Western journalists who has actually been able to interview Osama bin Laden--begins his article by summing up the arguments of those who support the "offshore balancing" strategy, which he opposes:

And yet, as President Obama weighs whether to send more troops to Afghanistan, the connection between the region and Al Qaeda has suddenly become a matter of hot dispute in Washington. We are told that September 11 was as much a product of plotting in Hamburg as in Afghanistan; that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are quite distinct groups, and that we can therefore defeat the former while tolerating the latter; that flushing jihadists out of one failing state will merely cause them to pop up in another anarchic corner of the globe; that, in the age of the Internet, denying terrorists a physical safe haven isn't all it's cracked up to be.

These arguments point toward one conclusion: The effort to secure Afghanistan is not a matter of vital U.S. interest. But those who make this case could not be more mistaken. Afghanistan and the areas of Pakistan that border it have always been the epicenter of the war on jihadist terrorism-and, at least for the foreseeable future, they will continue to be. Though it may be tempting to think otherwise, we cannot defeat Al Qaeda without securing Afghanistan.

Mr. Bergen is one of the first people to actually take on many of the valid points of the "offshore balancing" camp--after that camp has run circles around the "comprehensive COIN" camp for the last few weeks. (Read the article--why is General McChrystal not using Bergen's speaking points?)

Bergen brings up an important point which was mentoned in both War 2.0 and Graveyard regarding the Taliban--they've evolved since their ousting in 2002, and they've done so with the help of al Qaeda. The relationship between these two organizations has been a strained one since the 1990s--al Qaeda leadership looked down on the Afghan movement, according to both sources. Nevertheless, in recent years, they have been able to train the Taliban in a number of insurgent tactics--namely, the construction of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, and most importantly, the value of information operations. (As War 2.0 notes very astutely, the Taliban--which had originally banned almost all forms of media--soon came to realize the value of such forms of communication and propaganda).

Now, some of the claims Bergen makes seem a little far-fetched. For example, the fact that one Taliban-allied terrorist attempted a bomb plot in the West is used as an example that the Taliban actually have global aspirations. Nevertheless, it hardly sounds like Taliban policy. Bergen is also one of the few who tackles some of the key issues regarding the Af/Pak safe haven (can al Qaeda move to Somalia, Yemen or the Sudan effectively?), as well as the "internet safe haven" argument (I'd argue that there is, in fact, some value in using these forums).

All in all, Bergen produces an interesting argument, and one of the first well-written arguments I've heard from the "continue the war" camp. Although I still remain somewhat skeptical on some points, the fact of the matter remains that the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban (or "little t" taliban) might be significantly more complex than originally thought. I think it's naive to claim that there is no connection at this point, and that it's equally unrealistic to claim that they are one and the same. For the time being, they have many agenda points which, for the moment, seem to be mutually beneficial. In a way, we might call these organizations friends, with benefits conferred upon the alliance. (Hehehe, I said "friends with benefits")

Edit: I'm not the only one who is confused as to the actual relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda, based on this article from the Los Angeles Times this morning:

Ten years later, could Al Qaeda return to Afghanistan and use it again as a launching pad for terrorist strikes?

The question has taken on heightened urgency as the Obama administration searches for a new war strategy, and Pakistan carries out its first major military offensive in the tribal region that Al Qaeda has called home since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

The issue is also a source of surprising disagreement within the counter-terrorism community.

Some are skeptical that Al Qaeda would return to Afghanistan, even in the event of a substantial U.S. military drawdown. Doing so would mean leaving a sanctuary in Pakistan that has afforded significant protection for eight years, despite a barrage of U.S. Predator drone strikes.

Others argue that Al Qaeda is under mounting pressure in Pakistan, and that a return to Afghanistan is all but inevitable if President Obama endorses anything other than a full-scale, counterinsurgency campaign there.

There is broad agreement among U.S. intelligence officials that Al Qaeda has a minimal presence in Afghanistan and would probably like to return there if it had the chance....

...One senior U.S. counter-terrorism official said the number of Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan is in the "dozens," and that most function as low-level fighters with no significant leadership presence.

"Al Qaeda brings very little to the fight in Afghanistan," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. Militarily, he said, "if you removed Al Qaeda from the equation in Afghanistan, it wouldn't matter."

That may be by design. Over the last eight years, Al Qaeda has burrowed deep into Pakistan's tribal belt, and fostered a closer relationship with local Taliban elements that are focused on carrying out attacks against the Pakistani government.

The Afghan Taliban, by contrast, has sought to distance itself from Al Qaeda, and to portray its insurgent campaign as a local fight.

A statement last month attributed to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar urged the West "not to be deceived" by Obama's assertions that the Afghanistan war is necessary because of the Al Qaeda threat. "The West does not have to wage this war," Omar said....

...U.S. intelligence officials said there is little sign of an active relationship at the top of the organizations, and probably no contact whatsoever between Bin Laden and Omar...

...

Still, they point to ongoing coordination at lower levels. And in his recent military assessment, U.S. Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal said Al Qaeda aids the insurgency with "ideological motivation, training and financial support."

There are reasons that Al Qaeda might be reluctant to relocate. The protective, rugged terrain of Pakistan's Waziristan region and the group's ties with the tribes there offer advantages the terrorist network would struggle to replicate in other places such as Somalia or Yemen.

Pakistan has served as such an effective haven that after eight years, the trail for Bin Laden "is not just cold, it's frozen over," Riedel said.

Moving across the border would expose Al Qaeda operatives to risks of detection by satellites, CIA drones or spies on the ground. And even if the U.S. was to withdraw forces from Afghanistan, America is likely to have a substantial military presence there -- and freedom to operate, unlike in Pakistan -- for years to come.

Edit #2 (Courtesy of Pat O): Seems that Nathan Hodge at Wired's Danger Room has also noticed an ideological shift in the Taliban, based on contact with al Qaeda. Well worth the read.

Focus: This is the crux of the whole Afghanistan debate--What is the relationship between these two organizations?

Links of the Day

Our first link is "A Modern War Reader", which is a counterinsurgency reading list posted by Jules Crittenden, but taken from JH Stuart. I think I am going to have to put together my own counterinsurgency/4GW reading list in the near future to compliment my "what's on my bookshelf" post which earned me an entry in the blog Omnivoracious, entitled "Lawrence and Lad Lit: A Helicopter Pilot's Bookshelf". In the meantime, though, I'll link to Jules Crittenden's COIN reading list, which features a great analysis of my favorite book about insurgency (and favorite book of all time), Seven Pillars of Wisdom by T.E. Lawrence. Crittenden should be commended for noticing the difference between the 1926 and 1922 editions.

Bonus: For those of you who like seeing military bookshelves, check out Omnivoracious' post "The General's Bookshelf: What's Petraeus Reading?" for an analysis of Petraeus' latest book, courtesy of Tom Ricks.

The second great link of the day comes from the US Naval Institute's Blog, and it shows us how to be an OODA-Loopy successful commander.

Sisyphus

After a few months in Iraq, Soldiers tend to gradually lose track of what day of the week it is. With no true weekends, and most days having the same repetitive grind, many Soldiers joke that it’s like the movie “Groundhog Day”, in which Bill Murray wakes up and discovers that he is reliving the same day over and over again.

A few of us, though, have compared the daily life in Iraq to that of a mythological character named Sisyphus. Sisyphus was doomed to Hades and forced to spend eternity rolling a rock up a hill, only to have the rock roll back to the bottom of the hill, causing him to repeat the act for eternity.

But even this doesn’t perfectly the boredom of the current temp job. Nay, I would say the level of boredom roughly equates to that of Persephone, the Queen of the Underworld, who apparently supervised Sisyphus as he pushed the boulder up the hill*. How asinine is that? Did she monitor Sisyphus’ lunch breaks for all eternity? Did she endlessly surf the Internet while Sisyphus worked? Did she fill out risk assessments and file OSHA complaints in case Sisyphus rolled the boulder over his foot? It sounds completely asinine. (If my replacement is reading this, please come back from leave soon)

Fortunately, to kill the boredom, I’ve found a few links for you to enjoy today. This took some work, since apparently it’s Sunday (I often lose track of days of the week), and no one posts good links on Sunday.

Link #1: If you liked the James Bond books by Ian Fleming, you’ll probably like “Devil May Care”, the latest entry in the 007 novel series by the new author, Sebastian Faulks. In this book, which takes place back in the 1960s, Bond’s investigates strange claims of a “Caspian Sea Monster” in the Caspian Sea off of Iran. (The “Department of Recycled 007 Plots” tells me that this is just like the “dragon” in Dr. No)

Bond discovers that the “Caspian Sea Monster” is actually an advanced piece of Soviet weaponry known as an Ekranoplan, a hovercraft which can cross the sea at over 300 knots (550 kph) and carry missiles--in this case, of course, nuclear missiles.

The “Caspian Sea Monster”, interestingly enough, was actually real. The Soviets actually did have a missile-carrying hovercraft capable of traveling at 300 knots, and tested it in the Caspian Sea. Operating at night, many thought that the craft was simply a “sea monster” and constructed legends around it, thus concealing its true purpose. Today, English Russia (where website surf you) carried a special on the 400-ton Soviet ekranoplan program, which is well worth a look.

Link #2 is about me. Yeah, I'm biased.

I've gotten a mention from the writers at a blog entitled “Omnivoracious”, which is a blog for people who like to read and like to talk about what they are reading. They creators of the blog appear to like my, erm, eclectic reading taste, which ranges from T.E. Lawrence to Tucker Max, Thucydides to Huge Titties (I swear that pun works better when read aloud).

One of the questions the author of the post poses is what book on my bookshelf begins with “RAIS”. The answer is “Raising the Bar”, an excellent book on military leadership by Don Vandergriff.

Omnivoracious is definitely going into my RSS reader, along with another other great blog about the Amazon Kindle, The Kindle Chronicles, which features a weekly podcast with interviews and all sorts of tech tips to improve the Kindle experience.

And, as a final note, I had my official US Army Birthday cake yesterday to celebrate the 234th birthday of the US Army. Did you?

*-Well, according to Wikipedia, Persephone supervised Sisyphus, but I have my doubts. I decided to leave it, as my entire three-line joke would have fallen apart if it was proven otherwise.

A War on Two Fronts

When I was in Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras, I got to do a number of interesting missions--airborne operations with nieghboring Latin American militaries, humanitarian relief missions, and security force training.

We also did some interesting training for potential personnel recovery missions in the jungles of Central America. The dense jungle and lack of appropriate landing zones made it necessary to train on the Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction System, or SPIES. Now, I've made one or two not so bright decisions in my life, to be certain. I won't go into details, but I will say that one of those times included a few nurses, a Black Hawk helicopter, and a SPIES harness. Oh, and a bit of a disregard for safety. This, of course, led to a number of important lessons about safety that day. Fortunately, nothing was hurt. Well, save for my pride, but that recovers quickly enough. The Task Force Commander had me at the position of parade rest during that event. Some jackass took the time to snag a picture of it, too, which I wound up hanging in my office. (I even used it as my Facebook profile picture for a little while, too)

The Task Force Commander that gave me quite the thorough lesson was none other than Colonel Christopher Hughes, who just recently published a book entitled "A War on Two Fronts", which received the Army Historical Foundation's Distinguished Writing Award for Excellence last year. Colonel Hughes is an officer cut from the Petraeus mold, advocating higher education, innovation and cultural awareness from officers. I've put the book on order from Amazon (I'll probably get it in two weeks), but the description of the book on Amazon states that Colonel Hughes persuaded some of the Army's professional military courses to adopt counter-insurgency doctrine for their classes. Unfortunately, as I discovered in 2007, not all Army courses had followed suit.

So here's to what looks like an interesting read. Unfortunately, it's not available on the Amazon Kindle, which means that I will have to add it to my ever-growing bookshelf here.

Book of the Week

The Iraq war can be very difficult for the average Westerner to understand.  I've been trying to read a variety of books (rather voraciously) in order to better understand the situation myself.  It's amazing how this war, much like the conflict that engulfed the former Yugoslavia, dates back to conflicts and situations which arose hundreds, if not thousands of years earlier.

I have to give plug to two books about the Mongols, which shed light on the situation in Iraq.  One is The Devil's Horsemen by James Chambers and the other is Great Captains Unveiled by B.H. Liddell Hart.

Although the Mongolia is far removed from Iraq, the Mongols could travel as quickly and as far as most modern armies, which is pretty amazing when you consider that their horses were no larger than your average pony.  They developed a system of fighting similar to the "blitzkrieg" that was later copied by Napoleon, Rommel, Patton, and studied intensely by Air Force Colonel John Boyd, largely credited with drafting the invasion plans for Operation Desert Storm.

In 1258, the Mongols were on the outskirts of Baghdad, which was one of the most advanced cities in the world.  It housed universities, astronomical observatories, and hospitals.  The Caliph (roughly a king) of the Abassid Empire, based in Baghdad, was overconfident and thought that his army was a match for the Mongols.  What he failed to take into account was that his vizier (roughly second-in-command) was a Shiite Muslim, and gave the Mongols the plans to Baghdad, in the hopes that the Mongols would oust the Sunni and give him control of the city.  The Mongols completely destroyed the city, and the new Shia leader only ruled for a few months before he died.  Legend says he died of a broken heart, because his kingdom was reduced to rubble.

James Chambers, as he recalls this story in The Devil's Horsemen, says that there had been "some sectarian conflict" in Baghdad at the time, which is about as accurate as saying that Rosie O'Donnel "kind of likes cupcakes".  Looks like things remained the same for the next eight hundred years.  

Baghdad was the center of the Islamic world up until that point.  The destruction of the city, which was the intellectual heartland of Islam was a catastrophic event to the Islamic world.  Some even partially credit the rise of Islamic fundamentalism to the destruction of the great learning centers in Baghdad, snuffing out the voices of reason and replacing them with fundamentalist thinking.  

Flight from Upstate NY

They say that getting there is just half the fun. I'm hoping that doesn't apply to the flight out of Fort Drum.

Fortunately for us, a lot of local citizens had donated goodies for us as we were about to board the plane. Some people got together and donated a lot of Audiobooks which nowadays come as small iPod-like devices. Some people picked up audiobooks on speaking Arabic, some people got the Bible on Audiobook, and others picked up an audiobook from humorist Dave Barry.

I, however, reached into the bin and pulled out:

The Worst Case Survival Scenario Handbook: Dating and Sex Edition

I was appalled. Not so much that I pulled out a book of smut, but because I already own this book in print.

Anyway, it came time to board the plane and depart for the Middle East. I sat down in my comfy chair and tried to catch a few Zs. I was having a little difficulty getting sleep as we sat on the taxiway and I considered tapping into my prescription Ambien, which is a sleep aid, but decided against it.

Smart move, too, as the plane wound up with a maintenance issue and we all had to get off the plane. The communications officer wasn't so lucky--she actually took her Ambien while still on the taxiway. Based on her description of Ambien, it supposedly gives a person the feeling that they're incredibly drunk. I was kind of glad that I vaguely remembered the pharmacist saying something

along the lines of "take it only when you're really sure you want to go to sleep".

But fortunately, the malfunction was quickly cleared and it was back on the plane to cross the Atlantic. With one fuel stop, however, which I also used to check my Facebook. Clearly, others had the same idea:

A sign of the times...a phalanx of laptops at a wi-fi hotspot