Small Wars Journal: Where more people learn about doctrine than probably should...

For those of you who like to keep on top of the US Army's operational planning doctrine, here's the new FM 5-0: Operations, released about three weeks ago (requires AKO login). Bonus: it incorporates Design.

Sad thing is, I don't know anyone else who realized there was a new operations manual. I wouldn't have known either, if it weren't for the posters in the Small Wars Council talking about it for the past year.

I mean, there's a reason Admiral JC Harvey spoke so highly of SWJ during the recent Milblog Conference...

On the Afghan Convoy

Most of you have heard about an incident in Afghanistan where American troops mistakenly shot a bus which contained civilians. One of my trusted friends in Afghanistan contacted me after the incident, and, not violating security procedures, noted that the American patrol had signaled for the vehicle to stop several times before firing at it.

While the deaths of civilians is certainly a tragedy, the US military's public relations people have been a little more quick to mitigate the PR effects than they were with last week's Apache video. The more credible military reporters, namely Spencer Ackerman and Nathan Hodge, have reported on to the "fog of war" surrounding the shooting.

Ackerman quotes the official ISAF press release in the Washington Independent:

Before dawn this morning, an unknown, large vehicle approached a slow-moving ISAF route-clearance patrol from the rear at a high rate of speed. The convoy could not move to the side of the road to allow the vehicle to pass due to the steep embankment.

The ISAF patrol warned off the approaching vehicle once with a flashlight and three times with flares, which were not heeded. Perceiving a threat when the vehicle approached once more at an increased rate of speed, the patrol attempted to warn off the vehicle with hand signals prior to firing upon it. Once engaged, the vehicle then stopped.

Upon inspection, ISAF forces discovered the vehicle to be a passenger bus.

I should also mention that the times around sunrise and sunset are usually the worst in terms of visibility--it's too bright for night-vision goggles, yet too dark for normal eyesight. This would have certainly contributed to US forces misidentifying the vehicle. (So would a propensity for insurgents to use car bombs against military vehicles) It might also explain why the vehicle did not stop right away.

Ackerman notes that the American troops rendered medical aid to the injured civilians, with over a dozen being rushed to hospitals. Nevertheless, the scene bears a chilling resemblance to a side note directly out of General McChrystal's counterinsurgency guidance.

An ISAF patrol was traveling through a city at a high rate of speed, driving down the center to force traffic off the road. Several pedestrians and other vehicles were pushed out of the way. A vehicle approached from the side into the traffic circle. The gunner fired a pen flare at it, which entered the vehicle and caught the interior on fire. As the ISAF patrol sped away, Afghans crowded around the car. How many insurgents did the patrol make that day?

Of course, it's easy for us to sit back and call this a textbook counterinsurgency failure. However, the troops involved would have perceived this as a life-or-death matter. Nevertheless, the incident still sparked protests throughout Kandahar, just as ISAF is preparing its upcoming offensive into the area.

How can we do better?

Tom Ricks, what hath thou wrought?!

From today's "The Best Defense", regarding a TISS forum this past Friday:

[USMC General James] Mattis also spoke without any computer graphics. "The reason I didn't use PowerPoint is, I am convinced PowerPoint makes us stupid." I don't know if I'd go that far, but its absence of verbs does seem to me to emphasize aspirations without saying what actions we intend to take to realize them.

Army Brig. Gen. H.R. McMaster, who also spoke at the conference, also took a pop at PowerPoint, saying that when combined with certain ill-advised metrics, it "is really dangerous."

This prompted Spencer Ackerman to sound off against, well, Microsoft in general. While the post was, well, a little ill-conceived, Ackerman does make some good points. He talks about using a program similar to Google Documents in order to collaboratively work on projects instead of systems like, say, AKO. It's something I've been toying with in my "COIN for Aviators" project, and I think I might give it a whirl. I've just started a Google Wave with, well, the only people I know of that are participating in Google Wave: Adam Elkus, Captain Hyphen, and Josh from al-Sahwa. Guys, help me pass the wave along. (I have no idea how this Google Wave thing works, but it looks interesting. Let me know if you would like to help out)

For those of you who would like to bash the military's use of PowerPoint, however, I merely direct you to the following classics:

• Jason Sigger: PowerPoint Rangers, Rally on Me
• Matt Yglesias: The Military's PowerPoint Problem
• TX Hammes in Armed Forces Journal
• Gulliver at Ink Spots
• I take on PowerPoint and get an admiral to weigh in at Small Wars Journal
• Schmedlap has a PowerPoint presentation on why PowerPoint presentations are bad
• Adam Elkus at Red Team Journal
• Reach 364 at Building Peace

Milblog Conference 2010: The Wrap-up

(You can read the highlights of the conference at Small Wars Journal)

Awesome weekend in our nation’s capital. After checking in to the hotel, my first stop was a little office near the National Theater on Pennsylvania Avenue—the Center for a New American Security. It was more than simply a social call (although I did grab a massive Guinness afterwards); I had a great conversation with Commander Herb Carmen regarding the use of airpower in counterinsurgency, a topic all the more important after the events of this past week. It was a fascinating discussion, and reiterated many of the salient points brought up in a recent blog post at Abu Muqawama.

One of the most interesting things we discussed was the theme of “cultural communication” between members of the different military services. Indeed, one commenter at Abu Muqawama mentioned that any counterinsurgency class for aviators had to be designed for a more, shall we say, ADD crowd, and there’s a great deal of truth to this. In general, military aviators tend to be a very visually-oriented group, which prefers to get much of its information from pictures.

(For example, take a look at a book of instrument approach procedures. Older books will have written text describing the missed approach procedure, for example, it will literally say something to the effect of “Climb to 2,000 feet, then execute a climbing left turn to 4,000 feet to intercept the ART VORTAC”. Newer approach procedures, on the other hand, simply have a series of pictures in the missed approach diagram—an arrow straight ahead pointing at the number “2000”, then a left arrow to the number “4000”, and so forth.)

I also had a chance to meet Andrew Exum, and we chatted briefly about his recent blog post on airpower in counterinsurgency. Ex grabbed a Moleskine notebook (I believe he prefers the full-sized "squared" version) and read a few notes he took during a meeting with General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan (presumably during his trip last summer). Gen. McChrystal had said that even if airpower is used to kill insurgents and produce a tactical victory, it must always be weighed against the probability of collateral damage and the propaganda victory it might give the enemy. This was reflected in one of General McChrystal’s first acts upon taking command in Afghanistan—curtailing the use of airpower. It’s a risky move, for certain, and will require greater effort on the parts of both ground troops and aviators to better coordinate combined arms operations. But the risk of losing the battle for the minds of the Afghan is far too great—we must adapt.

After a great visit with the CNAS crew, it was off to the Milblog conference. I was quite amazed—when I told people I was attending a conference for milbloggers, most thought it was going to look like a Star Trek convention. Far from it. The event was attended by Admiral J.C. Harvey, Gary Trudeau (of Doonesbury), Jamie McIntyre, and featured a recorded message from General David Petraeus, who thanked milbloggers for their contributions.

One of the most interesting conversations I had during the conference was with Lt. Col. Mitchell Bell, who runs “The SandGram”. Lt. Col. Bell began milblogging in 2005, during a deployment to Western Iraq. His blog featured amusing anecdotes from his time in Iraq. I found that we both had a similar experience with blogging while deployed—we both felt that any day, we were going to get called into the commander’s office and explain exactly why we were operating a blog. I also kind of wonder what went through Greyhawk’s mind when the official MultiNational Corps-Iraq screensaver featured a screen shot of the Mudville Gazette emblazoned with the words “Bloggers—are you violating OPSEC (Operational Security)?”.

Lt. Col. Bell also echoed a sentiment from the “View from the Top” panel, which mentioned that the milblogosphere was self-policing. Indeed, senior milbloggers will frequently keep more junior milbloggers in line, dissuading them from gripes against individuals in the chain of command, and posts which violate OPSEC.

I also ran into a good sidebar conversation between Commander Salamander (US Naval Institute) and Jamie McIntyre. CDR Salamander mentioned that a number of milbloggers (including yours truly) had received media inquiries from the BBC regarding the “Collateral Murder” video, as the military’s public affairs units were completely unwilling to discuss the video at all. During the panel, McIntyre noted that it was the milbloggers--not the mainstream media nor WikiLeaks--which provided the best analysis of the video.

But it was Robert Cagle—one of the directors of Team Rubicon, a volunteer emergency medical response team—who provided the best quote of the weekend. Shortly after the Haitian Earthquake, Team Rubicon received literally millions of dollars in donations, allowing them to fly a team of dozens of medical specialists to Haiti in order to provide medical care to the victims of the tragic quake which killed nearly 200,000 people. He told me a heart-wrenching story of a nine-month old girl whose legs were infected with gangrene, and had not seen medical care for twelve days. Although the girl survived, the doctors were forced to amputate the legs. Cagle said that we in the Western world have no idea what it is like to go for so long without life-savin emergency medical care.

Cagle remarked “there are people literally alive today based on the work that milbloggers do each and every day”.

One final highlight: I got to meet Matt Gallagher--author of Kaboom--and received my very own advance copy of his book. At a first glance, the book is great, as Gallagher juxtaposes poetic descriptions of the landscape with cynical anecdotes about Army bureaucracy. In one section of the book, he even uses an appropriate T.E. Lawrence quotation that's not one of the oft-cliched ones. As the Navy would say, Bravo Zulu.

Edit #1: Probably the most recognizable attendee was Greyhawk, who's an excellent speaker, and has some positively awesome stories and experiences. If you ever get the chance to meet him, invite him over for a beer (or three).

Milblog Conference 2010

There are literally people alive today as a result of what you in the milblog community do every single day.

Of all the words which will be spoken at the Milblog Conference this weekend, I doubt any will top these words from Gary Cagle, one of the heads of Team Rubicon. (This is even more amazing when you consider that General David H. Petraeus recorded a short video and Gary Trudeau of Doonesbury is in the audience)

More to follow.

I lied, final thoughts on the Apache video (for the morning)

A brief roundup as I await the start of the upcoming Milblogger Conference:

• MountainRunner--Matt Armstrong--mentions what is perhaps the greatest failure in the entire debacle: the inability of the US military to effectively mount any sort of response to the video. At this point, a response from the Pentagon is so overdue that it's probably best the Pentagon does nothing but simply hope that Miley Cyrus releases a sex tape this week, thus diverting attention away from the Apache video. Although the official investigation, which provides some critical context for the video, is in the public domain, the military hasn't done a whole lot to call attention to it. In fact, half of the time the CENTCOM server which hosts it appears to be down. We could have beaten Wikilinks to the punch and at least shown the public the chaos and difficulty of operating in Baghdad in 2007.
• The New York Times has a great article regarding the psychology of those involved in combat, and provides context--though maybe not an excuse--for the pilots' comments during the video.
• It's obvious that there are some vital portions of the video which are missing. Nevertheless, the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade seems to be unable to produce an uncut version of the video, prompting number of commenters to offer a sarcastic "go figure". I also agree that I'm not surprised that the footage is missing, though not for cynical purposes. The video is nearly three years old by this time, and the investigation was long since complete. As far as I know, most units don't keep footage of this sort on hand for very long, so it seems only natural that it would have been deleted over time. Consider the fact that a large portion of a military organization tends to leave a few months after a deployment. Even if the video survived the deployment, it's plausible that someone might have deleted it, not knowing what it was. Who knows, maybe whoever leaked the video to WikiLinks might have deleted it after they copied it.
• If you can't access the Army's 15-6 investigation, here's a site that sums it up nicely and adds some excellent analysis.

Anyway, next report will be from the Milblog Conference 2010. Hope to see you there!

Infra-Red footage of a different sort...

For those of you looking for something other than commentary on the Apache gun camera video, I give you this footage taken from an OH-58D, presumably at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana. Enjoy, I'm off to the milblog conference.

Anyone else but me think they recognize the "Blue Wolf" callsigns?

Hopefully, the last post on the Apache video

This Apache video is quickly spiraling out of control. Some final thoughts.

For the Army, this is a public relations nightmare. We have a cliche in the military which says that "unlike fine wine, bad news does not get better over time". Such is the case here. In retrospect, it would have been best that the military been first with the video an at least offered an explanation. That would have at least played better than a "leaked" video, with a decidedly anti-war group editing the video to point out the civilians in the frame and not the insurgents. (H/T Schmedlap)

A few of my regular blog buddies have been leading the discussion at the Small Wars Council. Not too surprisingly, I tend to fall in line with the users "Schmedlap" and "Cavguy"--the screen name of Major Niel Smith. There's a general consensus that the first engagement--namely, the mistaking of the camera lens for an RPG--was regrettable, but just another tragic instance of the "fog of war". It's really the subsequent episodes--the van and the Hellfire strike on the building--that seemed to raise a number of questions.

I'm not sure I'll ever really figure out the real deal with the Hellfire strike, which occupies the last ten minutes of the video. I hadn't seen it mentioned in the official investigation, so I don't have a corroborating narrative (although the website keeps going down, so I'll admit I hadn't read the whole thing yet). There also appears to be critical footage cut from this section, which is necessary to reconstruct the event. From what I can gather, the ground element reports the sound of small arms fire coming from around 200 meters away. We see the footage cut to a shot of the Apache tracking a man walking along the street, looking as if he's carrying a rifle. The Apache crew tracks him to an abandoned building, and reports that around six insurgents fled the initial engagement and took shelter in a building. We, the viewer, can't determine if this really is true, based on the Youtube video. For the time being, however, let's assume it is.

The Apache reports the situation to the ground unit, who clears the Apache to engage. The troops in contact hadn't actually seen anyone enter the building--only the Apache crew seems to have seen the insurgents. The Apache gets some distance and makes a pass at the building with its Hellfire missile. Right before the missile is fired, you can see figures walking about the building. The Apache crew actually does notice these men as they begin their missile run, but the crew seems to ignore them.

After the missile hits, the Apache turns around for two more missile runs. On the second attack, we see men walking back into the building. It would be unusual for insurgents to go back into a building which was struck with a missile just moments prior. I'm curious as to who they were and whether or not anyone acknowledged these people going back into the building.

Again, a number of things about the Hellfire strike puzzle me, but it's difficult to really put this in context--vital portions of the recording seem to have been cut.

Anyway, a number of really great people have been weighing in on the issue. The highlights:

Small Wars Journal

Schmedlap

Greyhawk (as always) has the roundup

Voo Tatico (English Translation)

NY Times Blog

The Atlantic

Anyway, I'm off to the Milblog conference in Washington, DC shortly. Hopefully, I can meet up with the CNAS crew and we can discuss some more peculiarities of Aviation and COIN. I'll be sure to keep you posted.

COIN for Aviators -- a scenario

While rushing from meeting to meeting today, I had a lot of time to think about the video that's been making its rounds on the Internet.

For those of you who aren't aware, Wikileaks released a video shot from the Target Acquisition Display Sight (TADS) of an AH-64D Apache Longbow belonging to the 1st Air Cavalry Regiment out of Fort Hood, Texas. The video shows the pilots of the aircraft shooting their 30mm cannon into a group of Iraqis whom they believed to be insurgents. Unfortunately, the attack killed journalists from Reuters, some of whom may have been mistaken for armed gunmen based on video footage of cameras slung over their shoulder somewhat like a rifle. You can view the nearly 40 minutes of footage at Youtube. (WARNING: Extremely graphic)

I'm going to limit my discussion to the first engagement in the video. Some of the subsequent engagements in the video, such as the van and the triangle-shaped building, are fodder for another day; I have plenty of questions about the latter portion of the video.

I should also caveat any criticism with the fact that we in the blogosphere can simply hit pause and rewind in the safety of our living rooms before we comment. No one involved in the video had that luxury. Unfortunately, life and death decisions are made in a split-second, and sometimes, they might not be the best decisions.

The pilots responded to a report from Troops In Contact (what pilots call a "TIC"). In the video, this is the "Bushmaster" element. It's certainly tragic that the journalists were killed, but unfortunately, these things happen in war. Given the situation, it's understandable to see how the pilots might have killed the Iraqis in the first engagement.

To answer a question I received in a previous post, yes, this might be the only real glimpse the pilots had of the target. If I remember my one hour in the Apache simulator correctly, the gunner would be looking through a display in the cockpit similar to this device in the center. It would greatly restrict his view outside. (Gun bunnies, correct me if I am wrong)

The pilot would be watching much of the airspace around him, and not just concentrating on the action below. Not to mention, the aircraft would normally remain a safe distance away from the action. It is likely that the black-and-white video you saw on Youtube would have been their best view of the situation. A similar situation existed in Kunduz province in Afghanistan last year, when German forces directed an American F-15E to drop a bomb on two tanker trucks they believed were surrounded by insurgents.

However, some better counterinsurgency training for the pilots might yield better results. Let's take a look at another situation. A pair of scout helicopters (such as the OH-58D) observes a man digging along the side of a road. This is suspicious, of course, since this is a good indicator that the man might be emplacing an improvised explosive device (IED).

You have a .50-caliber machine gun and a pair of Hellfire missiles at your disposal. Do you:

a.) Engage with the .50-caliber machine gun?

b.) Engage with the Hellfire missile?

c.) Wait and report the information to ground forces

If you picked c, you might be a counter insurgent.

Why not shadow the digger from afar, report the incident to the local "landowner", and ask them to dispatch a quick reaction force (QRF)? The QRF might be able to detain the digger and determine whether or not he actually did emplace a bomb. Even better, if the local police are trustworthy, they might be able to apprehend the man. If the digger was innocent, no harm done. If he was a bombmaker, local police might be able to learn about his bomb making cell and connections, leading to further arrests in a bomb-making network.

Why "COIN for Aviators" is so important

Update: I've written two three follow-on articles with more analysis:

• COIN for Aviators: A Scenario
• Hopefully, the last post on the Apache video (but, as we all know, it probably won't be)
• I lied, final thoughts on the Apache video

Many of you have probably seen the leaked footage of an air strike in Baghdad which claimed the lives of two Reuters employees. (Those that haven't can view the footage here. Warning, the video is extremely graphic)

Let's take a look at the actions on the part of the air crew. (Gun bunnies in particular, take note) The video appears damning, but I'm reserving the bulk of the judgement until I read the official AR 15-6 investigation.

• Despite the advances in thermal and optical sensors, it's still extremely difficult for an air crew to tell an insurgent from a civilian. The Apache pilots believed that they saw AK-47s and RPGs in the hands of the figures in the video. An examination of the video, however, is inconclusive. They could really be carrying anything. Some of the radio chatter from the infantry unit ("Bushmaster 26") indicates that there are insurgents walking about with AK-47s, and the cameras slung over the reporters shoulders might resemble some sort of rifle from a distance. (Edit: After watching the video a few times, I can see at least two figures with AK-47 style rifles as well as the RPG. Rewind was a luxury the pilots didn't have). It should be evident, based on this video, that although modern aerial platforms can collect a stunning amount of data, the most useful intelligence still comes from human networks, infantrymen on the ground, and the Mk-I eyeball.
• After engaging roughly eight people with the Apache's 30mm cannon, a van arrives on the scene, with figures seen carrying the wounded bodies towards the van. According to the pilots, the men in the van are "collecting weapons", and are also shot with the Apache's 30mm cannon. News flash: picking up wounded bodies is not a hostile act.
• Upon hearing that one of the victims is a young girl, the pilots laugh, "Well, it's their fault for bringing their kids to a battle". Wrong.
• The final engagement (the triangle-shaped building) allegedly houses six armed insurgents. However, (33:45-34:00) we see men walking into the building clearly without weapons in their hands (they are swinging their arms freely). The pilots fail to mention these two men walking into the building, nor do they mention another unarmed man (34:40) walking directly in front of the building as they shoot a Hellfire missile. Again, read FM 3-24, Appendix F. Another obvious COIN failure.
• The same thing happens as they fire a second missile into the building--as figures are seen walking into the burning structure. No weapons appear to be in their hands, yet the pilots don't seem to mention them as they launch yet another Hellfire into the building. Were the troops in contact even taking fire after the first Hellfire launch?

Again, this is why I feel so strongly about COIN for aviators. I think that we fail to truly absorb counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, leading to incidents like this.

More at the Small Wars Journal Council.

Official AR 15-6 Investigation, which reveals that the pilots were from the 1-227th Aviation Regiment of the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade. This might be a good read. (H/T Schmedlap)

Thanks

Thanks again to Commander Herb Carmen and Andrew Exum for tackling the topic of COIN for the aviation community. Most aviators haven't had quite the experience that our ground brethren have undergone in the past decade, something which I feel is to our detriment.

The thread's amusing because it gives "ground-pounders" a glimpse of the aviation mentality, one which is characterized by a short attention span. This, of course, is what makes "COIN for Aviators" that much more difficult, in that years worth of counterinsurgency research winds up being compressed into a 45 minute presentation. But hey, any little bit helps.

On Swarming

I'm just as surprised as Andrew Kravetz that Somalian pirates would once again mistakenly attack a US Navy warship--this time the frigate USS Nicholas--with predictable results. While Combined Task Force 150 is fortunate to be squaring off against an opponent which, for the time being, seems to prefer to eliminate itself from the gene pool, that's not to say that all opponents will be so foolhardy. And they might not look too different from the pirates in the Gulf of Aden...

The US Naval Institute once again tackles the threat from "swarming", essentially network-centric warfare upon the high seas (FP Online has more). The idea gained popularity in the wake of the Millennium Challenge 2002 wargames, when retired Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper "decimated" the US Navy (see Adam Elkus' Red Team Journal for much more on the subject here and here).

In 2002, Gen. Van Riper was charged with playing the "Red" force--the enemy in a training exercise--in a computer simulation. The US--the "Blue" force--would be invading a "fictional" country in the Middle East *cough*Iraq*cough*. Van Riper sought to exploit the weaknesses in the US military's doctrine and equipment. Among Van Riper's bag of tricks was an anti-shipping force comprised of small boats, civilian aircraft, and portable anti-ship missiles (such as the Chinese-made C802, which struck the Israeli warship INS Hanit). Although taking massive casualties and using suicide attacks, the "Red" Navy was able to sink a large portion of the US fleet. The US military, presumably upset with the outcome, "re-floated" the fleet and continued with the exercise.

Fast-forward to the present-day. Iran is purchasing several speedboats, and already possesses anti-ship missiles like the C802 (it was assumed that the C802 that struck the Hanit was supplied by Iran). Could a navy such as this pose a threat?

"Springbored" at the US Naval Institute seems to think not. He notes that modern-day helicopters can make quick work of a speedboat attack--witness the success of the US Army's OH-58D Kiowa Warrior during Operation Prime Chance.

Still, it's worth mentioning that the success of the Hezbollah attack against the INS Hanit was a result of gross complacency on the part of the Israeli Navy. The crew ignored warnings of Hezbollah anti-ship missiles, turned the ship's defensive systems off, and lowered their guard as they ate dinner that evening. Perhaps Iran could capitalize on complacency by hiding ships among merchant traffic, and attacking during poor weather--when helicopters would be unlikely to take off or land.

It's certainly a dangerous option, and the US Navy would do well to take measures to prevent such an attack.

Ed. Note: I deleted a portion of this blog entry where I misinterpreted Sprinbored's post. I pray he doesn't track me down with a C802 :)

Links of the Weekend

Had a great weekend zipping around the Adirondack mountains in my open-topped Jeep. I needed to do this, as a complete absence of snow--even from the tops of the Adirondack Mountains--is unheard of for early April. In fact, it's not uncommon for kids in the Fort Drum area to search for Easter eggs in the snow.

With that said, I'm just now catching up on a few of the great links that came up over the last few days. The high points range from articles about General Petraeus to blog entries about Lady Gaga. A brief rundown:

• Sayyid Qutb can take a ride on a disco stick.

Andrew Exum (Abu Muqawama), made a few interesting remarks in response to an article by Bret Stephens in the Wall Street Journal. Exum echoed Stephens' sentiments that the Islamic resentment towards the Western world--and the United States in particular--is not entirely motivated by American policies in areas such as Palestine. Rather, much of the anti-Western sentiment in the Muslim world, according to Exum, is a backlash against globalization and seemingly-omnipresent Western culture.

That means Lady Gaga and Her Royal Hotness Megan Fox.

Others remain skeptical. At Foreign Policy Online, Thomas Hegghammer noted that, while some anti-American attitudes in the Muslim world are a response to western "decadence", support for terrorist organizations is not linked to American culture. Rather, says Hegghammer, al-Qaeda's recruitment tends to swell during periods of perceived injustice in Palestine, as does violence directed against Americans. (Foreign Policy's Daniel Drezner also weighs in on the issue). Indeed, they attack us for our foreign policy, not for our disco sticks.

Of course, the real expert on this issue is none other than the Great Satan's Girlfriend, whose amusing combination of valley-girl talk, foreign policy, military analysis, and pictures of chicks has given her just as many web hits from the sexually frustrated denziens of Middle Eastern countries as they have from the staff at the Washington Post. (Yes, much like that song from the Cardigans, GSGF is a site that we all look at, yet never admit to.)

The GSGF responds to the Wall Street Journal:

"The American girl knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and in the shapely thighs, sleek legs and she shows all this and does not hide it."

Direct Hit! Fire For Effect!

• General Petraeus in Vanity Fair.

The first I heard of Mark Bowden's (Black Hawk Down, Killing Pablo) Vanity Fair article on General Petraeus came in the form of several blog posts bashing the vignette (Attackerman, Ink Spots). Spencer Ackerman not only notes that much of Bowden's vignette seems ripped from Tom Ricks' The Gamble, but that Bowden fills much of the narrative with "sycophantic prose", crossing the line from journalism into legend-writing.

Granted, General Petraeus is quite an amazing person, and many of his exploits are the stuff of legend. He survived a bullet wound to the chest, only to leave the hospital a few days later, knocking out fifty push-ups on his way out the door. He also helped bring a wounded soldier out of a coma by shouting "Currahee", the cry of the 101st Airborne Division. Spencer Ackerman also readily admits to lauding his achievements. I'm certainly no better. In fact, I might have unintentionally contributed to the Petraeus mystique.

I've been getting quite a few visitors arriving from Mother Jones, specifically from an article by Nick Baumann. Baumann references a blog entry I wrote last summer, when General Petraeus was visiting my particular corner of the world: Contingency Operating Base Speicher, near Tikrit, Iraq. A few of us received word that the General's itinerary would take him through the dining facility (in typical military fashion, abbreviated "D-FAC"), and we positioned ourselves near the door to catch a glimpse of him. However, our informant seemed to not know the difference between a "D-FAC" and "D-Main" (the division headquarters, also at COB Speicher), where General Petraeus would actually be visiting. You can read the story in its entirety, but to make a long story short, we spent much of our time waiting for General Petraeus by re-wording all the Chuck Norris facts into General Petraeus facts.

Now it looks like someone actually did make a website of General Petraeus facts. Five hundred years ago, I'm certain students will think that Chuck Norris and General Petraeus single-handedly defended America from the ever-present zombie menace (Probably something like this).

To round-out the weekly update:

• Attackerman on Matt Gallagher's new war novel, "Kaboom". (A must-read for those frustrated with Army bureaucracy)
• Themistocles' Shade reminds us that the regular baseball season begins, linking to the best baseball movie of all time: The Naked Gun.
• And, finally, thanks to the US Naval Institute for allaying some of the hysteria surrounding "swarming" tactics (though I disagree), as well as giving us the following picture:

President Obama in Afghanistan

I'll leave you with this video from President Obama's visit to Afghanistan. Have a nice weekend :)

Hiatus

You'll see a lull in blogging over the weekend. A few factors account for this:

1.) A keyboard malfunction

2.) Temperatures above 70 degrees Farenheit and clear skies. Seriously, this is huge news for the Fort Drum area. Last year it snowed on Mother's Day. No kidding. I have to take advantage of this. It's like Captain Starbuck's Day Off.

With that said, enjoy Easter/Passover. You might see a fun link or two over the next few days, but hopefully, not much.