Human Rights Watch Film Festival in NYC

I'm sitting in the Syracuse airport waiting on a flight to Germany. As an idle mind is a devil's workshop, I'm taking the time to tell you all about a great event taking place in New York City over the next two weeks.

Human Rights Watch is hosting a film festival which begins today and lasts until the 24th of June. The festival will showcase some amazing films on Afghanistan, including RESTREPO, a documentary chronicling the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in the treacherous Korrengal Valley (showtimes on 18, 20, and 21 June). The festival will also feature "Camp Victory, Afghanistan", which documents the building of a new Afghan Army (shows on 12, 13, and 17 June). HRW's festival also includes films on human rights in Iran, Cambodia, and India.

Head over to Human Rights Watch for more information on what looks like an incredible lineup.

Epic Taliban FAIL

These are the people that have been resisting invaders since Alexander the Great? I've seen better coordination and tactical prowess from ROTC cadets.

Something tells me that they might want to get a job in something other than insurgency.

H/T Matt Gallagher. (PS--buy his book)

Addendum: Nick Dubaz informs me that this clip is from "Frontline: Behind Taliban Lines", a great PBS special.

It really is the tribes, stupid...

Dexter Filkins had a good article in the New York Times over the weekend regarding Afghan warlord Matiullah Khan of Oruzgan province. While Matiullah's model of civil administration seems to clash with NATO's vision for stability in Afghanistan, I think it's time we accept the fact that Afghanistan will never be governed as a Western-style democracy--with its headquarters in Kabul--any time soon.

In little more than two years, Mr. Matiullah, an illiterate former highway patrol commander, has grown stronger than the government of Oruzgan Province, not only supplanting its role in providing security but usurping its other functions, his rivals say, like appointing public employees and doling out government largess. His fighters run missions with American Special Forces officers, and when Afghan officials have confronted him, he has either rebuffed them or had them removed.

“Oruzgan used to be the worst place in Afghanistan, and now it’s the safest,” Mr. Matiullah said in an interview in his compound here, where supplicants gather each day to pay homage and seek money and help. “What should we do? The officials are cowards and thieves.”

Mr. Matiullah is one of several semiofficial warlords who have emerged across Afghanistan in recent months, as American and NATO officers try to bolster — and sometimes even supplant — ineffective regular Afghan forces in their battle against the Taliban insurgency.

In some cases, these strongmen have restored order, though at the price of undermining the very institutions Americans are seeking to build: government structures like police forces and provincial administrations that one day are supposed to be strong enough to allow the Americans and other troops to leave.

I guess it really is the tribes, stupid.

Ft. Leavenworth COIN Symposium

Thanks to Jason Sigger, I now have an excellent roundup of the discussion which took place at this week's COIN Symposium in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I'll fill you in on the salient details sometime this weekend. You can read through it when you're not barbecuing.

Who needs imagination?

For the last few days, I've been participating as an exercise controller in a "white cell" staff exercise, replicating Afghanistan. I needed to set the scene for the day's training scenario; to use my imagination to come up with a likely enemy situation.

Unfortunately, I didn't even need to use my imagination this morning. I just read the front page of the newspaper to the participants.

KABUL, Afghanistan — Taliban insurgents launched a brazen assault on the American base at Bagram on Wednesday morning, sparking a large and confusing gun battle that left at least five American soldiers wounded and seven guerrillas dead.

Taliban leaders claimed that seven suicide bombers had blown themselves up at the gates of the base, clearing the way for more than 20 other fighters to get inside. The Taliban reports appeared exaggerated, as they often are. But American officials confirmed that the base, one of the largest in Afghanistan, had come under an ambitious and unusual assault.

An American official said that the base had come under attack by as many as many as 30 insurgents. Another American spokesman, Col. Wayne Shanks, said that no suicide bombs had exploded and that no insurgents had entered the base. “At no time were Bagram defenses breached,” he said.

American officials said that the attack had ended by midmorning Tuesday.

Still, details were sketchy. The main road leading to the base was sealed, and helicopters could be seen flying over the area. Local residents reported hearing gunfire around the base.

The Bagram base, located about 50 miles north of Kabul, the capital, is one of the main hubs of the American campaign in Afghanistan. Bagram serves as the headquarters for the military’s efforts in eastern Afghanistan. It is ringed by several layers of defenses.

The assault on Bagram comes on the heels of an attack Tuesday by a suicide bomber in Kabul, who rammed an explosives-laden bus into an American convoy, killing 18 people, including five American soldiers and a Canadian officer.

Talk about your "strategic corporals"

These Army specialists are working well above their paygrade:

PUZA-I-ESAN, Afghanistan – Living at a remote Afghan National Army outpost in northern Afghanistan, two U.S. Army Soldiers operate autonomously to ensure construction projects for ANA and Coalition soldiers are completed correctly and on time.

Specialists Daniel Booles, contracting officer representative, and Joseph Wagner, COR assistant, who are attached to the Regional Support Team-North at Camp Mike Spann, oversee mission-essential construction at combat outposts across northern Afghanistan. They support the Afghan National Security Forces in efforts to defeat the insurgents and secure the population.

Establishing these combat outposts is critical to the success of the ANSF as they assist with sustaining a presence in the region. This is an integral part of the counterinsurgency initiative, supporting the ANSF mission with the ability to clear an area, hold with security forces, and build support while protecting Afghans.

Team members monitor contracts to build and expand ANA combat outposts to ensure that supplies used to sustain forces are received and that correct construction materials are timely delivered. The pair serves as the RST’s eyes and ears, a critical task that comes with unique obstacles and challenges.

“Being dropped off at a Forward Operating Base without a vehicle, interpreter, and limited supplies definitely made our mission a challenge,” said Spc. Daniel Booles, a Fort Worth, Tex. native assigned to the 10th Mountain 1st Brigade 2-22 Infantry Delta Company from Fort Drum, N.Y. “Making sure equipment and supplies made it to the right locations by the contractors was an interesting experience.”

Ensuring timely delivery of materials by local contractors sometimes requires eliciting the assistance of international partners in the region while they dually work to organize logistical support from other U.S. units operating in the area.

“We had to coordinate with the Germans as well as the ANA to ensure delivery to Bashir Khan,” said Spc. Joseph Wagner, a Crittenden, Ky., native also assigned to 10th Mountain 1st Brigade 2-22 Infantry Delta Company from Fort Drum, N.Y. “I’m glad we were able to get everything done and I am ready for the next mission.”

Despite the remote location and austere conditions, the modest pair managed to ensure the completion of the combat outpost at Puza-i-esan, a critical project that directly contributed to bringing stability to an area that once served as a safe haven for insurgents.

“I liked the autonomy, it was nice to get out here and put our training to work,” Booles said.

Completing the complex project together brought the duo closer during their embedded experience with the ANA soldiers, where they were often the only familiar face each other had.

“I can’t ask for a better partner,” Booles said of his cohort. “We definitely formed a big brother – little brother relationship.”

Upon returning to their home base at Camp Mike Spann, the two-man team moves on to their next assignment: a 30-day project overseeing the expansion of living space for incoming troops at a 209th Corps combat operating post in Khilagay, Afghanistan.

Still the King of Battle

Michael Yon snapped some amazing pictures of a cannon crew from Ft. Lewis' 3-17 Field Artillery. In Afghanistan, cannon artillery is still a vital player on the battlefield, as the Taliban tends to operate in more rural areas, far from major population centers, and is known to gather in large numbers.

The "redlegs"--field artillerymen--fire illumination rounds throughout the night to aid ISAF forces.

(H/T SWJ)

On the Afghan Convoy

Most of you have heard about an incident in Afghanistan where American troops mistakenly shot a bus which contained civilians. One of my trusted friends in Afghanistan contacted me after the incident, and, not violating security procedures, noted that the American patrol had signaled for the vehicle to stop several times before firing at it.

While the deaths of civilians is certainly a tragedy, the US military's public relations people have been a little more quick to mitigate the PR effects than they were with last week's Apache video. The more credible military reporters, namely Spencer Ackerman and Nathan Hodge, have reported on to the "fog of war" surrounding the shooting.

Ackerman quotes the official ISAF press release in the Washington Independent:

Before dawn this morning, an unknown, large vehicle approached a slow-moving ISAF route-clearance patrol from the rear at a high rate of speed. The convoy could not move to the side of the road to allow the vehicle to pass due to the steep embankment.

The ISAF patrol warned off the approaching vehicle once with a flashlight and three times with flares, which were not heeded. Perceiving a threat when the vehicle approached once more at an increased rate of speed, the patrol attempted to warn off the vehicle with hand signals prior to firing upon it. Once engaged, the vehicle then stopped.

Upon inspection, ISAF forces discovered the vehicle to be a passenger bus.

I should also mention that the times around sunrise and sunset are usually the worst in terms of visibility--it's too bright for night-vision goggles, yet too dark for normal eyesight. This would have certainly contributed to US forces misidentifying the vehicle. (So would a propensity for insurgents to use car bombs against military vehicles) It might also explain why the vehicle did not stop right away.

Ackerman notes that the American troops rendered medical aid to the injured civilians, with over a dozen being rushed to hospitals. Nevertheless, the scene bears a chilling resemblance to a side note directly out of General McChrystal's counterinsurgency guidance.

An ISAF patrol was traveling through a city at a high rate of speed, driving down the center to force traffic off the road. Several pedestrians and other vehicles were pushed out of the way. A vehicle approached from the side into the traffic circle. The gunner fired a pen flare at it, which entered the vehicle and caught the interior on fire. As the ISAF patrol sped away, Afghans crowded around the car. How many insurgents did the patrol make that day?

Of course, it's easy for us to sit back and call this a textbook counterinsurgency failure. However, the troops involved would have perceived this as a life-or-death matter. Nevertheless, the incident still sparked protests throughout Kandahar, just as ISAF is preparing its upcoming offensive into the area.

How can we do better?

For those keeping score

Foreign Policy Online has a great roundup of the most recent deaths and arrests among Taliban and Haqqani operatives.

(H/T CourtneyMe109. Photo courtesy of the Telegraph)

The trail heats up?

I haven't seen much reaction to this article from the Times Online in the blogosphere (H/T SWJ). It appears that the Pakistani Army captured a series of over 150 caves near the Afghan-Pakistani border, believed to have harbored al-Qaeda. The story gets even better: according to the article, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's number two operative--some say the real brains of al-Qaeda--may have been in the cave complex just shortly before the raid.


Pakistani forces have taken control of a warren of caves that served until recently as the nerve centre of the Taleban and al-Qaeda and sheltered Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second-in-command to Osama bin Laden.

“It was the main hub of militancy where al-Qaeda operatives had moved freely,” Major-General Tariq Khan, the Pakistan regional commander, said as he gave journalists a tour of Damadola yesterday.

The village, nestling among snow-capped peaks in the Bajaur region along the Afghan border, has been fought over for 16 months. It is the first time that the Pakistani Army has set foot in the village, which had long been dominated by the insurgents operating on the both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

“Al-Qaeda was there. They had occupied the ridges. There were 156 caves designed as a defensive complex,” said General Khan, head of the Frontier Corps responsible for Pakistan’s counter-insurgency campaign in the region. He said that his forces had killed 75 foreign and local militants and cleared a zone up to the Afghan border, and that the campaign against the insurgents was in its final stage...

...Journalists were shown caves strewn with blankets and pillows, left in haste as the army approached in January. The village has been largely destroyed by the fighting...

...According to officials he and some other al-Qaeda operatives had been attending a dinner but left just before the attack. The ruins of the house hit by the missiles were still present...



This comes hot on the heels of Pakistan's capture of nearly half the Quetta Shura--the inner circle of Taliban leaders--just last week.

Baradar's Arrest: More Questions Than Answers...

Update: In addition to the arrest of Mullah Baradar, we've also witnessed the death of the brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the head of the Haqqani Network, in a drone strike in Pakistan. Drones gone wild, indeed.

It's really difficult to discern the implications of Mullah Baradar's arrest in Pakistan. Attempting to read too much into the Taliban based on scattered news articles and rumor is a lot like listening to the ancient auguries predict the future based on animal entrails, so I'm hesitant to listen to the pundits on this one. Nevertheless, I've got a few questions which are downright baffling to me.

• Until recently, the Pakistani government has outright denied the existence of what we term the Quetta Shura--essentially a high council of leaders from the remnants of the ousted Taliban, believed to have been hiding in the Pashtun-dominated city of Quetta, in Baluchistan province of Pakistan. Now we see Mullah Baradar's arrest in the city of Karachi, a port city, and one of the largest cities in Pakistan. Was Mullah Baradar captured in the city? Are Taliban leaders currently hiding in one of the largest cities in Pakistan? Would al Qaeda leaders be moving with Taliban leaders, or do they remain in the border regions?

• Mullah Baradar had advocated a less brutal approach than Mullah Omar and many other Taliban leaders, and had also seemed to be spearheading an effort to reach some sort of settlement with the Afghan government. Are we witnessing an ideological shift and, maybe, a split away from the Taliban as a result of its tactics? Certainly, it wouldn't be without precedent. Al Qaeda in Iraq saw its ranks thin after their campaign of brutality--largely directed at their fellow Muslims--tarnished their image and led to the Awakening movements. Al Qaeda central is also finding it difficult to recruit. Could it be that the Taliban are also finding it difficult to hang on to their supporters as well?

I haven't had the time to follow the war in Afghanistan as closely as I would have liked to recently. Does anyone have any experience of insight to share?

The Fortress of Baradar--Reflections

(Ha! And you thought I just made Star Wars references!)

The arrest of the Taliban's chief of operations, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, is certainly a welcome development in the war in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it's difficult to put the arrest in context. What does Baradar's arrest mean for the ISAF effort in Afghanistan?

The effect on the Taliban:

Some, such as CIA veteran Bruce Reidel, have claimed that Baradar's arrest could "cripple" the Taliban, at least temporarily. While this will certainly cause some disorientation, particularly while NATO is on the offensive in Helmand Province, I'm not quite so optimistic that it will be that devastating. As Joshua Foust notes, the Taliban have suffered the loss of other top-level commanders before, with little setbacks. Similar insurgent groups, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, have also suffered the loss of one or two top leaders and kept on fighting. Nevertheless, the NYT reports that six members of the 19-man inner Taliban circle have been killed or captured in the last three years. However, others inevitably stepped up to fill their slots.

What it means for Pakistan:

After years of Pakistani agencies--particularly the ISI and Frontier Corps--blatantly supporting the Afghan Taliban, we suddenly see the arrest of a major Taliban official.

The Wall Street Journal offers the view that General Stanley McChrystal convinced the Pakistanis that cracking down on the Afghan Taliban--seen as a proxy for Pakistan--meant dealing a blow to the Pakistani Taliban, which has proven to be a thorn in Pakistan's side recently, staging a number of daring raids within 100 miles of Islamabad.

Others, however, echo the belief that Pakistan's actions are less than altruistic, and often come with ulterior motives.

What now?

Baradar had reportedly fallen out of favor with Mullah Mohammed Omar for a few reasons. The first was bureaucratic--Baradar had selected commanders without the the approval of Mullah Omar. (So much for those who think the Taliban operates without micromanagement) The second involves Baradar's alleged "negotiations" with the Afghan government and potentially even the US and Pakistan. According to Josh Foust, Baradar is seen as a less extreme Taliban commander--even writing the Taliban's insurgency field manual as a way to balance some of the Taliban's more heavy-handed approach.

Wait, is this the Taliban's Petraeus?

This, as Foust continues, means that Baradar's successor might be more heavy-handed. Nevertheless, peeling away some of the softer elements of the Taliban can certainly be a welcome development. In fact, some feel strongly that not only will he talk, but that he will be able to negotiate while in prison.

The bit about negotiation while in captivity kind of baffles me--apparently I heard that this was used in the case of the Northern Irish, but I'm not certain how much negotiating one can do in captivity. Can the Kings of War help me on this one? Is someone who has, apparently, been written off by the "mainline" Taliban be in any position to strike a bargain?

Bonus: Foreign Policy's Af-Pak Channel has a decent roundup, and does a good job of describing Baradar's importance in the organization.

82nd Airborne Division Medevac in Action

Thanks to Greg Williams for the link to today's Charlotte Observer, which had over a dozen excellent pictures of medical evacuation helicopters in Afghanistan. The helicopters belong to the 3rd General Support Aviation Battalion and to the 2nd Assault Helicopter Battalion of the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade. You might remember the 2-82 Assault Helicopter Battalion after witnessing their battalion commander in action, landing her UH-60 Black Hawk on one wheel on the side of a mountain.

An assault Black Hawk provides security for the MEDEVAC Black Hawk.

In case you didn't get the memo

NATO troops will be going on the offensive around the town of Marjah, in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in an operation known as Operation Moshtarak (the Dari word for "Together"). Currently, some 3,000 British troops are already clearing the area of insurgents. When all is said and done, the entire operation will involve 15,000 troops from the US, and Great Britain, including members of the elite SAS and Special Forces. British and US forces have already secured the road networks to the north and east of Marjah, with approximately 3,000 British troops in a cordon position around the town. Apache gunships are poised to provide support from a base known as Camp Bastion. The ensuing assault will be spearheaded by US Marines.

Of course, I don't really need to repeat this--it's been all over the news today, and already has its own entry in Wikipedia. I'm not kidding, I actually just ripped most of that previous paragraph off of what was written in the Guardian. I kept reading it and feared that I'd be responsible for getting someone killed, until I realized that the newspapers just did the same thing--with interactive maps, no less.

Certainly, it's unusual to broadcast the details of an attack so far in advance. One might argue it's foolish. But General Stanley McChrystal's no fool--there has to be some sort of method to the madness. Could it be a giant deception campaign? Possibly. However, Ken Payne from Kings of War has a more likely explanation, drawn straight from counterinsurgency principles. Well, okay, the first one isn't from COIN principles--it's just plain common sense.

Two very sound reasons for the lack of operational secrecy suggest themselves. First, I’d back the insurgents to know something was coming, even without a subscription to the [Wall Street] Journal.

Second, more importantly, avoiding a big fight is the name of the game for the coalition. Preserving your force and securing the people are key objectives if you’re going to do population-focused counterinsurgency. Ideally you want to take control of the populous areas with minimal fighting, and you want the insurgent out in the sticks, where he can be hunted down more readily than among the population, and where there’s less chance of large-scale civilian casualties.

The insurgent, meanwhile, must fight among the people, not just for safety, but to retain his relevance. Announcing that you’re coming gives him a tough choice.

Still, it all kind of reminds me of this quote from a classic movie:

Ted Striker: My orders came through. My squadron ships out tomorrow. We're bombing the storage depots at Daiquiri at 1800 hours. We're coming in from the north, below their radar.
Elaine Dickinson: When will you be back?
Ted Striker: I can't tell you that. It's classified.

Afghanistan and the Poppy Trade, Redux

Two of my fellow bloggers have covered the issue of counter-narcotics in the past day or two, and both bring up some interesting points. The first is Sarah from Denmark, who discussed the coca trade in Colombia. While Colombia may be a ways from Afghanistan, rest assured that plenty of people are looking closely at Colombia's recent turnaround in order to find some parallel for Afghanistan. Sarah astutely notes that many farmers grow coca for the sole reason that it's one of the few crops that can turn a profit. If farmers are forced to choose between growing coffee beans legally and starving to death and facing intimidation from drug lords or growing coca and gaining protection and enough money to feed one's family, we shouldn't be surprised when people choose to grow coca. Sarah points towards a number of economic initiatives, such as Fair Trade, which ensures decent pricing for farmers attempting to grow coffee and other legitimate crops.

Certainly, a similar situation exists in Afghanistan. Although, as Shaun Baker--a professor at the US Naval Academy points out--it's made all the more interesting in the hands of the Taliban. Although the Taliban banned opium use when they ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until shortly after 9/11, they have since reversed course and encouraged (or in some cases, coerced) farmers to grow poppies. The Taliban have certainly shown that they're willing to sacrifice a number of principles--such as their ban on mind-altering substances (opium and alcohol)--in the sake of, well, survival. It's a great information ops point for certain, but we still have to deal with the obvious economic impacts of banning opium production and replacing it with something that's not only profitable, but also actually grows in Afghanistan. That's where Dr. Baker points towards saffron ("Mellow Yellow" as he calls it), as a potential alternative to opium. Worth a read.

Small Wars Journal has had some similar articles on this very same topic.

Uh, guys...

While I like reading stories about ISAF clearing the Taliban out of Afghanistan just as much as the next person, I can't help but think that statements like this might not be a tad premature: (H/T SWJ Daily Roundup)

CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. — U.S. forces have driven the Taliban from most towns and villages in the strategic Helmand province of Afghanistan, leaving incoming troops with the mission of holding key areas and rebuilding the economy, Marine commanders say.

"They've taken on the Taliban, the insurgency, right in the heartland, and they've defeated them," Marine Maj. Gen. Richard Mills said in an interview with USA TODAY.

Commanders warn that Taliban forces remain dangerous and could mount a resurgence. Six coalition soldiers were killed in attacks around the country Monday. Still, the developments in Helmand could have broad implications for the war because of the province's importance to the Taliban.

Much of the Taliban's leadership and support comes from the mostly Pashtun province and nearby Kandahar. Helmand, the country's largest province, also produces most of the country's poppy crop, which has helped fund the insurgency.

Recent attention has been focused on President Obama's orders to send about 30,000 reinforcements to Afghanistan this year. But an influx of Marines to Helmand province last year has produced dramatic results, raising hopes that the gains can be consolidated and spread elsewhere, Mills said.

Again, I hope this is true, but past experience has shown that statements like this--particularly when they claim that the insurgency is defeated, can sometimes be way too over-the-top. Anyone in Afghanistan care to shed some light on the recent offensives?

Mi-35 Hind Awesomeness

The Russian-built Mi-35 Hind (which is an upgraded Mi-24/Mi-25 helicopter) sees plenty of service in the fledgling Afghan Air Force. For those of you familiar with the Afghan War, this is exceedingly amusing, as Mujahadeen Rebels shot down Soviet Hinds in great numbers with US-supplied Stinger missiles during the Soviet invasion, courtesy of Charlie Wilson. Oh, how times have changed.

ISAF, in its attempts to help build a stronger security force for Afghanistan, has begun training Afghan pilots in the employment of the Hind, with Soldiers from the Czech Republic providing much of the training, as shown in this awesome video from Combined Security Transition Commad-Afganistan on Youtube (H/T ISAF on Facebook).

The Hind is a menacing, evil-looking attack helicopter, most famous for "starring" in a particularly harrowing scene from Red Dawn, where a a Hind (actually a modified SA-330 Puma helicopter) guns down American teenagers. It serves as the inspiration for the Clone Trooper gunships in the Star Wars films. It is also particularly notable as the first helicopter to participate in air-to-air helicopter combat, with Iraqi-piloted Mi-25s taking on Iranian helicopters during the 1980s.

Fortunately for us in the US Army Aviation community, the weight, size, and peculiar stubby wings (which are lift-producing, unlike those on America gunships) of the aircraft make it notoriously unstable in flight. In fact, an American AH-1 Cobra pilot, jockeying with a Soviet Mi-24 pilot on opposite sides of the West/East German border caused an Mi-24 to crash, as the cumbersome Mi-24 couldn't keep up with the more nimble Cobra.

Nevertheless, it's an interesting aircraft with a long combat history. Definitely check out the video.

Air Assault in Paktika Province, Afghanistan

Thanks to The Thunder Run for the link to these great pictures of CH-47 Chinook helicopters and UH-60 Black Hawks from the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade (home stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia) conducting an air assault into Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan.

I'm not certain if these pictures are from the same mission, but ISAF Media on Flickr also has some great air assault pictures from Paktika province as well.

Army Aviation Video of the Day

(H/T Jamie McIntyre's Line of Departure)

Great video of an American AH-64 Apache helicopter engaging Taliban insurgents after an attack on an ISAF base in Afghanistan. I particularly like how the pilot of the aircraft ensures that the insurgents are well clear of civilians and villages before engaging. Great example of Army Aviation attack assets in a counterinsurgency environment....

Since the UH-60 Black Hawk needs some love...

Those of you who follow me on Facebook have probably seen this video, which I got from Jamie McIntyre at The Line of Departure.

However, for those of you who have yet to see this, here are some amazing mountainside landings conducted by Lt. Col. Carey Wagen and CW2 Jesse Ashhurst of the 2nd Battalion-82nd Aviation Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, NC.

(Ed. note: as is the case for the rather small Army Aviation community, I served with both Lt. Col. Wagen and CW2 Ashhust while a mere lieutenant in the 82nd Airborne Division)