A proposed change to the Aircrew Training Manual for the UH-60 Black Hawk (TC 1-237)

With Memorial Day weekend and my impending move, I haven't been able to post on the flotilla incident. Rest assured that Abu Muqawama, Voo Tatico, Zenpundit, Noah Shachtman, and the Small Wars Journal crew have covered this in great detail.

That being said, though, I think that Army aviators need to take note and examine the incident on the Mavi Marmara in detail. Indeed, the After-Action Review process is a valuable one, allowing us to refine our doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Let's examine the aircrew training manual for the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, particularly, the chapter on "Fast Roping" (Task 2054).

Procedures.

a. To perform a FRIES [Fast-Rope Insertion/Extraction] assault, execute a terrain flight approach to the insertion point. On final, adjust airspeed and altitude during the approach to stop over the insertion point at a predetermined hover height (not to exceed rope length). At a stabilized hover the FRIES operation begins. Remain over the area at a stabilized hover, until all ropers and ropes are clear.

b. After ropers are clear, crewmembers will pull the ropes back inside the aircraft or release them by pulling the locking device and detaching the rope. Keep the aircraft stationary until the "ropes clear" signal is given.

I think this handy visual aid might assist the crew in determining the suitability of the landing zone.



Ahem, when the Aircrew Training Manual says that the duties of the Non-Rated Crewmember and the pilot not on the controls involve providing "adequate warning of obstacles", this might include, you know, dudes with clubs. Just a thought.

Be sure to weigh in at any of the discussion boards mentioned earlier.

(Picture courtesy Commander Herb Carmen)

Britain's upgraded Lynx helicopters arrive in Afghanistan

According to Helmand Blog, Britian's new Mk.9A Lynx helicopters just arrived in Afghanistan. While the Lynx was first fielded in the 70s, the new Mk.9A Lynx boasts more powerful engines, upgraded communications systems, and M3M machine guns. The new engines are of particular importance in Afghanistan, as the temperatures and high altitudes often limit the load-carrying capacity of helicopters. The Lynx is expected to perform convoy escort missions, aerial security, and reconnaissance in Afghanistan.

In other news, Lt. Harry Wales, known to most as Prince Harry, has been selected for helicopter training, being "pinned" by his father, Prince Charles. Some sources have indicated that Prince Harry will be in the cockpit of the Lynx, whereas others indicate that he will be flying Britain's WAH-64 Apache. Lt. Wales served as a forward air controller in Afghanistan in 2008, before being whisked back to Britain after details of his deployment were leaked on the Drudge Report. (Britain's top newspapers agreed to keep details of Prince Harry's deployment secret.)

British Forces News has the latest on the Lynx's deployment, as does ITN News.

Do Aviators Get COIN--A Resounding "Yes"

April in Upstate New York is usually a depressing affair. Large mountains of snow usually lay piled in parking lots, long since streaked black with soot, oil, and dirt. If it's not snowing--which it occasionally does as late as Mother's Day--then there's the misery of persistent cold rain. As the snow melts, it creates lakes and rivers of mud. The sky is usually overcast and grey.

But the last few weeks have been different. Today, as I traveled to a seminar on counterinsurgency, held in a quaint lodge near a lake at Fort Drum, I opened the top on my Jeep, taking in the sunlight and enjoying a sky crystal-clear, and radiant blue. The grass was a deep, vibrant green, occasionally dotted with dandelions. The small lake--normally still frozen over this time of the year--had thawed, leaving behind a pool of water so clear and tranquil, it looked as if it were a mirror, dropped from the heavens.

But the real miracle lay not in the weather, but rather, during the counterinsurgency seminar itself. There, in the lodge beside the lake, lay a pony keg of beer, vulnerable in the presence of over forty aviators. Yet, the pony keg of beer went largely ignored, for the pilots were so interested in discussing counterinsurgency that they neglected the poor keg of that life-giving nectar of the gods that is...probably Miller Lite or something.

Yes, you read that correctly. The aviators completely forgot about the beer and talked about counterinsurgency.

Much to my surprise, aviators do get counterinsurgency, and we get it quite well. A PowerPoint presentation I composed with the help of Commander Herb Carmen, as well as a few other captains, guided a group discussion on the impact of Army aviation in the counterinsurgency environment.

What surprised me the most about the discussion was that, contrary to popular perception, it was the colonels and majors that had the most to add to the discussion, as opposed to the captains. Those who have been studying the US military's recent counterinsurgency odyssey over the last few years might find this a little counter-intuitive. Yet, I think it's a dynamic that's peculiar to the aviation realm. Some potential explanations, as well as some miscellaneous musings:

• First, and most obvious, is that maybe the majors and colonels spoke more because, well, it's the military and we tend to defer to rank.
• Secondly, many of the field grade officers have some unique experiences compared to those of their junior counterparts. After several years in an aviation battalion, an aviation captain usually gets slotted in a billet doing something other than flying. Some get embedded within infantry brigades, others within military transition teams. These jobs give aviators a greater understanding and appreciation for the ground tactical plan.
• As Cmdr. Carmen notes, an aviator's first priority--in conventional conflict or counterinsurgency--is to become proficient in his or her airframe. All the cultural awareness in the world isn't worth a damn if a pilot can't fly the aircraft. For this reason, a new aviator generally spends his or her first few years out of flight school learning the ins-and-outs of aircraft systems, weapons limitations, mission planning, unit standard operating procedures, aircraft maintenance, and airspace. If they're a platoon leader or company commander, they face the additional challenges of knowing their people, administrative procedures, and property accountability. It's a Herculean task simply to learn these skills in those first critical years. Small wonder junior officers in the aviation world lag behind their infantry brethren when it comes to understanding counterinsurgency.
• The AH-64 and OH-58 pilots, as a general rule, seemed to understand COIN better than the UH-60 and CH-47 pilots ("skirts", as we're known). This is likely because these aviators are employing weapons on the battlefield and have to think about the effects of their weapons systems.
• One of the most profound statements came from an Apache pilot, who spent a few weeks in a targeting class. The first few days of the class focused on the principles of Islam and Muslim culture. At first, he found the emphasis a little bizarre; however, upon his deployment to Iraq, he quickly learned the importance of culture. As he looked at the ramshackle buildings and farms below him, he could see a man's livelihood--his only means of supporting his family. Damaging a farm or killing goats might cause an entire family to go hungry--something we must always consider when employing weapons systems on the battlefield. This shouldn't be an excuse to never fire--just another factor to take into consideration before firing. Wiping out a farmer's livelihood might drive him to seek an alternate form of employment: insurgency.

In all, it was a great class. Thanks to the gang at CNAS for all the help. If you want to view the presentation, or help me write a short primer (maybe 10-15 pages of notes) on COIN for aviators, hit me up. I do the crowdsourcing thing :)

Infra-Red footage of a different sort...

For those of you looking for something other than commentary on the Apache gun camera video, I give you this footage taken from an OH-58D, presumably at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana. Enjoy, I'm off to the milblog conference.

Anyone else but me think they recognize the "Blue Wolf" callsigns?

COIN for Aviators -- a scenario

While rushing from meeting to meeting today, I had a lot of time to think about the video that's been making its rounds on the Internet.

For those of you who aren't aware, Wikileaks released a video shot from the Target Acquisition Display Sight (TADS) of an AH-64D Apache Longbow belonging to the 1st Air Cavalry Regiment out of Fort Hood, Texas. The video shows the pilots of the aircraft shooting their 30mm cannon into a group of Iraqis whom they believed to be insurgents. Unfortunately, the attack killed journalists from Reuters, some of whom may have been mistaken for armed gunmen based on video footage of cameras slung over their shoulder somewhat like a rifle. You can view the nearly 40 minutes of footage at Youtube. (WARNING: Extremely graphic)

I'm going to limit my discussion to the first engagement in the video. Some of the subsequent engagements in the video, such as the van and the triangle-shaped building, are fodder for another day; I have plenty of questions about the latter portion of the video.

I should also caveat any criticism with the fact that we in the blogosphere can simply hit pause and rewind in the safety of our living rooms before we comment. No one involved in the video had that luxury. Unfortunately, life and death decisions are made in a split-second, and sometimes, they might not be the best decisions.

The pilots responded to a report from Troops In Contact (what pilots call a "TIC"). In the video, this is the "Bushmaster" element. It's certainly tragic that the journalists were killed, but unfortunately, these things happen in war. Given the situation, it's understandable to see how the pilots might have killed the Iraqis in the first engagement.

To answer a question I received in a previous post, yes, this might be the only real glimpse the pilots had of the target. If I remember my one hour in the Apache simulator correctly, the gunner would be looking through a display in the cockpit similar to this device in the center. It would greatly restrict his view outside. (Gun bunnies, correct me if I am wrong)

The pilot would be watching much of the airspace around him, and not just concentrating on the action below. Not to mention, the aircraft would normally remain a safe distance away from the action. It is likely that the black-and-white video you saw on Youtube would have been their best view of the situation. A similar situation existed in Kunduz province in Afghanistan last year, when German forces directed an American F-15E to drop a bomb on two tanker trucks they believed were surrounded by insurgents.

However, some better counterinsurgency training for the pilots might yield better results. Let's take a look at another situation. A pair of scout helicopters (such as the OH-58D) observes a man digging along the side of a road. This is suspicious, of course, since this is a good indicator that the man might be emplacing an improvised explosive device (IED).

You have a .50-caliber machine gun and a pair of Hellfire missiles at your disposal. Do you:

a.) Engage with the .50-caliber machine gun?

b.) Engage with the Hellfire missile?

c.) Wait and report the information to ground forces

If you picked c, you might be a counter insurgent.

Why not shadow the digger from afar, report the incident to the local "landowner", and ask them to dispatch a quick reaction force (QRF)? The QRF might be able to detain the digger and determine whether or not he actually did emplace a bomb. Even better, if the local police are trustworthy, they might be able to apprehend the man. If the digger was innocent, no harm done. If he was a bombmaker, local police might be able to learn about his bomb making cell and connections, leading to further arrests in a bomb-making network.

Why "COIN for Aviators" is so important

Update: I've written two three follow-on articles with more analysis:

• COIN for Aviators: A Scenario
• Hopefully, the last post on the Apache video (but, as we all know, it probably won't be)
• I lied, final thoughts on the Apache video

Many of you have probably seen the leaked footage of an air strike in Baghdad which claimed the lives of two Reuters employees. (Those that haven't can view the footage here. Warning, the video is extremely graphic)

Let's take a look at the actions on the part of the air crew. (Gun bunnies in particular, take note) The video appears damning, but I'm reserving the bulk of the judgement until I read the official AR 15-6 investigation.

• Despite the advances in thermal and optical sensors, it's still extremely difficult for an air crew to tell an insurgent from a civilian. The Apache pilots believed that they saw AK-47s and RPGs in the hands of the figures in the video. An examination of the video, however, is inconclusive. They could really be carrying anything. Some of the radio chatter from the infantry unit ("Bushmaster 26") indicates that there are insurgents walking about with AK-47s, and the cameras slung over the reporters shoulders might resemble some sort of rifle from a distance. (Edit: After watching the video a few times, I can see at least two figures with AK-47 style rifles as well as the RPG. Rewind was a luxury the pilots didn't have). It should be evident, based on this video, that although modern aerial platforms can collect a stunning amount of data, the most useful intelligence still comes from human networks, infantrymen on the ground, and the Mk-I eyeball.
• After engaging roughly eight people with the Apache's 30mm cannon, a van arrives on the scene, with figures seen carrying the wounded bodies towards the van. According to the pilots, the men in the van are "collecting weapons", and are also shot with the Apache's 30mm cannon. News flash: picking up wounded bodies is not a hostile act.
• Upon hearing that one of the victims is a young girl, the pilots laugh, "Well, it's their fault for bringing their kids to a battle". Wrong.
• The final engagement (the triangle-shaped building) allegedly houses six armed insurgents. However, (33:45-34:00) we see men walking into the building clearly without weapons in their hands (they are swinging their arms freely). The pilots fail to mention these two men walking into the building, nor do they mention another unarmed man (34:40) walking directly in front of the building as they shoot a Hellfire missile. Again, read FM 3-24, Appendix F. Another obvious COIN failure.
• The same thing happens as they fire a second missile into the building--as figures are seen walking into the burning structure. No weapons appear to be in their hands, yet the pilots don't seem to mention them as they launch yet another Hellfire into the building. Were the troops in contact even taking fire after the first Hellfire launch?

Again, this is why I feel so strongly about COIN for aviators. I think that we fail to truly absorb counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, leading to incidents like this.

More at the Small Wars Journal Council.

Official AR 15-6 Investigation, which reveals that the pilots were from the 1-227th Aviation Regiment of the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade. This might be a good read. (H/T Schmedlap)

Thanks

Thanks again to Commander Herb Carmen and Andrew Exum for tackling the topic of COIN for the aviation community. Most aviators haven't had quite the experience that our ground brethren have undergone in the past decade, something which I feel is to our detriment.

The thread's amusing because it gives "ground-pounders" a glimpse of the aviation mentality, one which is characterized by a short attention span. This, of course, is what makes "COIN for Aviators" that much more difficult, in that years worth of counterinsurgency research winds up being compressed into a 45 minute presentation. But hey, any little bit helps.

Airpower in Counterinsurgency

Out of necessity, I've taken a break from drawing parallels between the Iraq War and the Revolutionary War and moved on to something a little different. I'm doing some volunteer work, of sorts, creating a brief information packet regarding the role of airpower in counterinsurgency. Hey, it's what any self-respecting COINdinista would do, right?

Fortunately, I've been getting some great help from my fellow COINdinistas, such as Mark Safranski and the Small Wars Journal crew. Special thanks to the gang from CNAS, including Commander Herb "Herbal" Carmen--an E-2C Hawkeye pilot, piracy expert, and producer of some of the finest Youtube videos ever.

Another "thank you" goes out to Adam Elkus, my frequent partner in crime, who recommended that I pick up the book "Airpower in Small Wars" by James Corum. After reading it for a day, I've been intrigued by the RAF's experiment in fighting counterinsurgency from the air in Iraq...in the 1920s. Although predating the invention of Sikorsky's helicopter, the jet engine, thermal sights and guided missiles, it still remains an interesting case study for modern air powers attempting to fight insurgencies.

After the end of the First World War, Britain and France suddenly found themselves in possession of much of the former Ottoman Empire, thanks to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. Britain governed Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq), an amalgam country consisting of three former Ottoman states lumped together--the Mosul Province, the Baghdad Province, and the Basra Province. Given the circumstances, it's not surprising that the Kurdish people of the north began to rebel against the fledgling government in Baghdad, which was ruled by a Hashemite.

Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for War and Air, needed to subdue the insurgency in northern Iraq. However, following the First World War, Churchill was compelled to fight the insurgency on the cheap. Then, much like now, the air strike seemed to be a popular alternative to a costly ground campaign--airstrikes were was quick, they could deliver tons of ordnance, and best of all, Britain's enemies had little defense against an aerial attack. Thus, the British reduced the number of troops in Iraq, replacing infantry battalions with RAF squadrons, and giving control of the entire operation to the RAF.

Although the airplane proved to be an effective asset--particularly in the reconnaissance and strike role--the British soon discovered that it was not a replacement for ground troops. Indeed, as British troop levels shrank, the Kurdish insurgency only grew--little surprise to anyone who witnessed the Iraqi Troop Surge. It was only after embarking on a massive land campaign, during which infantry forces fixed Kurdish rebels long enough for airplanes to inflict massive losses, was the rebellion finally quelled.

Among the limitations of airpower was the lack of good human intelligence on insurgent positions. Kurdish rebels managed to construct some ingenious overhead camouflage, concealing them from the prying eyes of RAF fighters. Indeed, even in the era of advanced optical sensors, our most advanced aerial platforms can still be deceived by a cunning enemy. Such was the case in the Kosovo War of 1999, when Serbia's effective use of camouflage allowed many tanks to escape the NATO bombing campaign unscathed. It was also the case in the 2006 Lebanon War, when some well-concealed Hezbollah fighting positions were discovered a mere hundred yards away from IDF observation posts.

I also found it interesting to see how the British would use airplanes to reconnoiter the routes ahead of supply convoys headed from Baghdad to Mosul--just as AH-64 Apaches and OH-58D Kiowa Warriors do nearly 90 years later.

I was contemplating posting the final product on AKO, but that would mean my Air Force and Navy comrades would be unable to use it. I might look at experimenting with the whole Google Wave thing. I don't know. Suggestions greatly appreciated.

Good News for Helicopter Crews

Helicopters in Afghanistan will soon be equipped with a system which detects incoming bullets, warning the crew, and giving them the chance to evade.

And if it weren't for Nathan Hodge at Wired's Danger Room, I wouldn't have known this thing even existed...

US Eyes Import Aircraft

Recently, the US Army was in quite a conundrum. It's National Guard inventory consisted of aging UH-1 Huey and OH-58A/C Kiowa aircraft, with UH-60 Blackhawks--badly needed in Iraq and Afghanistan--often filling their roles. Clearly, a new Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) was needed.

After testing a number of models, the Army, surprisingly, picked the proven Eurocopter 145. Renamed the LUH-72A, the "Lakota", as it's officially known, performs homeland defense, search-and-rescue, light medevac, VIP transport, and observer/controller duties. Pilots love the 6-million dollar aircraft, which sports a digital avionics package which rivals those of the latest CH-47F and UH-60M model helicopters. The Lakota will even reportedly fly an entire instrument approach down to a 10-foot hover.

It's part of a larger trend within the US military. Fighter designs such as the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II are soaring well over $100 million per copy. Yet, the F-22, which entered service in 2007, still hasn't flown a combat mission in Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead of these expensive stealth fighters, American troops are asking for inexpensive, low-tech aircraft which can loiter over the battlefield and drop ordnance right on top of insurgents.

That might mean the return of prop-driven ground-pounding aircraft like the A-1 Skyraider, T-6 Texan, OV-10 Bronco, or even the PA-48 Enforcer (a highly modified P-51 Mustang). More likely, though, it might mean Brazil's Embraer A-29 "Super Tucano". Armed with a .50-cal machine gun, 20mm cannons, a rocket pod, and pylons for air-to-ground bombs and air-to-air missiles, the Super Tucano can fly low enough to deliver amazing firepower in support of ground troops, all for $9 million per copy. Just the thing for Iraq or Afghanistan. That's a lot more than can be said for a $180 million stealth fighter.

X-Plane Friday

It's safe to say that most aviation enthusiasts enjoy reading about prototype aircraft that never made it to production. "X-planes", as they're often called, capture the imagination, and include such incredible examples as the XB-70 Valkyrie bomber, the AH-56 Cheyenne helicopter, and the YF-23 Black Widow. While most of these aircraft are painstakingly maintained at museums throughout the world, a few notable prototypes of remarkable aircraft lay battered, broken, and bake in the sun in remote locations.

When I was a lieutenant in flight school in Fort Rucker, Alabama; I drove through the Daleville gate for the first time. I looked to the left, and I saw Fort Rucker's famous Army Aviation Museum, which featured the prototype AH-56 Cheyenne, a CH-54 Tarhe ("Skycrane"), and an OV-1C Mowhawk parked outside. As I made another left turn, however, I noticed that the museum had a back lot, filled with experimental, one-of-a-kind aircraft, just rotting in the sun. There was the XCH-62 Heavy Lift Helicopter, capable of picking up a tank, as well as the Boeing Model 347, the first fly-by-wire helicopter, based on the CH-47 Chinook.

But one of the best finds came when someone told me about the YAH-63 prototype--the aircraft which competed against the AH-64 Apache--located near a golf course at Fort Rucker (Google Maps). After some investigating, I determined that it was located just outside of plain sight, behind a fence. It had simply been abandoned and neglected for years, its remains rotting in the heat and humidity of southern Alabama.

Yes, a prototype attack helicopter in all its glory. Interestingly enough, I have no idea what that plane next to the YAH-63 is either...it almost looks like the cockpit and fuselage of an X-wing starfighter. Anyone care to venture a guess?

The Russians are no different, with one of their most incredible designs rotting away on the shores of the Caspian Sea. It's a "ground effect vehicle"--a half-ship, half-airplane hybrid--that could travel the seas at over 300 miles per hour. The Russians called these types of ships "ekranoplans". Developed in the 1960s, these strange vehicles were spotted by American spy satellites and dubbed "Caspian Sea Monsters". The most impressive of the Caspian Sea Monsters was the 500-ton KM-08 Ekranoplan, the heaviest craft ever flown. Another interesting craft is the Soviet Lun-class ekranoplan, which was armed with missiles and served as part of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet during the late 1980s.

Today, the Lun-class ekranoplan sits in a state of disarray, rusting away along with much of the former Soviet fleet. Check out the Lun today in an impressive blog entry (it's in Russian, but the pics speak for themselves).

The Lun today...

(H/T David Axe and Russian Navy Blog)

Great blog from down south...

If you like reading about helicopters, you need to check out a site called "Voo Tatico", which is Portuguese for "Tactical Flight". It's run by an Army officer by the name of Marcus, who serves in the Brazilian military; a military which received high praise from the former commander of US Southern Command, Admiral James Stavridis.

Marcus has an affinity for rotary-wing aircraft, air assault tactics, and flight simulators. His blog has a great layout, excellent pictures, and awesome articles. Just run the site through Google Translate, and the English translation comes out perfectly.

Read along at the site or follow along at Facebook...

Blast From the Past: S-67 "Black Hawk"

I remember finding this video in the academic video archives at Fort Rucker when I was in flight school. It's an advertisement by Sikorsky for the S-67 "Blackhawk", which was a prototype gunship developed in the 1970s as a proposed replacement for the AH-1 Cobra.

It's interesting that the aircraft looks like it's modeled after the Soviet Mi-24 Hind helicopter, with its wide, lift-producing wings and engines mounted high above the cockpit. If you listen to the narrative, you'll discover that, like the Hind, it's capable of being a gunship and a troop-carrying helicopter at the same time, carrying six troops internally.

The S-67, however, was not without its problems; and the lone prototype crashed at an air show, killing both pilots. Nevertheless, a number of innovations in the S-67 Blackhawk were later incorporated into Sikorsky's UH-60 Black Hawk (two words), such as the horizontal stabilator, cambered tail fin and swept rotor tips.

82nd Airborne Division Medevac in Action

Thanks to Greg Williams for the link to today's Charlotte Observer, which had over a dozen excellent pictures of medical evacuation helicopters in Afghanistan. The helicopters belong to the 3rd General Support Aviation Battalion and to the 2nd Assault Helicopter Battalion of the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade. You might remember the 2-82 Assault Helicopter Battalion after witnessing their battalion commander in action, landing her UH-60 Black Hawk on one wheel on the side of a mountain.

An assault Black Hawk provides security for the MEDEVAC Black Hawk.

Planes don't fix themselves

And while we're on the topic of the occasional scary-looking Su-47 Berkut or PAK-FA, let's also consider that these wunderwaffen are useless unless you have sharp ground crews working countless hours turning wrenches on aircraft.

David Axe from War is Boring provides us with an excellent example of what happens to those shiny new MiGs when their maintainers neglect and abuse them.

Hilarious story in the current issue of Combat Aircraft. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the Hungarian air force was in bad shape. It had inherited a huge fleet of aging airplanes from its former Soviet ally, as well as personnel that were mostly poorly-trained conscripts. Russia had “not proved to be ideal partners for ‘after-sales’ support,” leaving many of the Hungarians’ aircraft unserviceable. The fleet dwindled in size and capability.

The most important aircraft were the two squadrons of MiG-29 fighters that patrolled Hungarian airspace. Poor support grounded most of the MiG-29s. The situation got even worse when the conscript maintainers got their hands on the finicky jets, as Combat Aircraftwriter Zord Gabor Laszlo recounts. The conscripts were

ordered to de-ice them before flying operations in wintertime. It is recalled that, since no jet fuel was available for jet heaters, these soldiers used brooms to remove the ice, a process which resulted in the MiGs’ honeycomb structures such as elevators, flaps, rudders and ailerons being seriously damaged.

Several of the MiGs never flew again. Not coincidentally, Hungary ended the draft in 2005.

Russia develops a new 5th Generation fighter, everyone panics...

(H/T USNI)

Apparently the big aviation news is that Russia has showcased a new prototype technology demonstrator which looks somewhat similar to the US Air Force's F-22 Raptor. You know, the F-22 Raptor first flew early 1990s, and is currently fielded to active-duty Air Force squadrons.

I, for one, am not particularly impressed. Every few years, the aviation community will be in an uproar and exclaim that American fighter technology has been challenged by the one Su-47 Berkut prototype or the Su-37 Flanker--neither of which making it to production They make for scary opponents in video games, but that's about it.

Worrying about these planes is like worrying about the handful of the Luftwaffe's wunderwaffen during the Second World War. Sure, they seemed impressive, but few wunderwaffen actually made it to the production phase. That seems to be the case with this new crop of Russian fighters--they'll appear at an airshow, perform a few spectacular maneuvers, and they'll go back to the hangar. For the time being, Russia cannot field a fighter on par with the American F-22 Raptor, nor can it do so in great numbers. Save the declinism drama for another day.

The Kopp-Etchells Effect?

Helicopter pilots are familiar with a phenomenon which occurs during dusty landings, when the tips of the rotor blades strike tiny dust particles, igniting a charge of static electricity that lights up the tips of the rotor disc, almost like a halo, as described by former Green Beret and war reporter extrordinaire Michael Yon.

The effect is particularly prevalent under night-vision goggles, but even to the naked eye, it's still visible on some nights. It's quite an eerie glow, and as of yet, has no name to describe it. Indeed, it's not even present in the Army's Field Manual 1-230, the manual which describes aerodynamics. Fortunately, Michael Yon has proposed the name "Kopp-Etchells Effect", named for a US Army Ranger and a British Fusileer who both perished in Afghanistan. I think it's a fitting name for the halo effect.

Drop by Michael Yon's website for a spectacular series of photographs of Chinooks in action in Afghanistan.

(Photo by Michael Yon)

Aviators and COIN: Thread of the day at the Small Wars Council

A lieutenant in the military intelligence field in Afghanistan beseeched the Small Wars Council for help recently:

I've been tasked with putting together a "COIN Academy" for our soldiers and aircrews [in an Army Aviation Task Force presumably in Afghanistan]. I already know the biggest obstacle will be overcoming the "WTF?" reaction from crews who have been trained in kinetic action since the dawn of their profession.

What I am struggling with right now -- after consulting FM 3-24, among other sources -- is finding (or developing, if I must) a template for the exponential use of aviation assets in a COIN environment. FM 3-24 focuses on the application of combat power via air assets, but that really isn't a relevant role for us in our current battlespace.

We know we can be more than air taxis and sling-loaders. We're already having some success by shifting the role of the AHs, to the profound consternation of the crews who don't yet understand that by "failing" in an operational sense, specific to that airframe, they are in fact "winning" the strategic fight.

Do you all have any thoughts on how aviation can evolve to be a relevant actor in a COIN environment?

A few thoughts, and a few misconceptions.

1.) First of all, a COIN academy with Army Aviators will have to be relegated to the basics, and just that. Start talking about economic development, David Galula, or anything along those lines, and I guarantee that someone will raise their hand and ask, "All I want to know is whether or not these guys have MANPADS [MAN Portable Air Defense Systems]." Out lieutenant here will need to show how Army Aviation affects the counterinsurgency fight--which it does, despite the naysayers (see the thread).

2.) Air logistics--since when did providing logistical and combat service support from the air become a bad thing? Last I checked, the General Support Aviation Battalions (GSABs) were designed to accomplish many of those functions. Well, maybe not by design--GSABs appear to be a bizarre combination of all the leftover corps-level aviation assets that the Army had prior to transformation--but they serve that purpose nonetheless. Medical evacuation, command and control, heavy lift and tactical VIP transport will always be an important part of any low-intensity fight.

3.) Attack and reconaissance assets are also important. While I believe that counterinsurgency is largely won by building an effective government, and improving civil services, I also take a pragmatic outlook on things and acknowledge that, yes, American troops will find themselves under fire. Many of the respondents in the thread actually believe that attack helicopters (such as the AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra) and armed reconaissance helicopters (such as the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior) have little place in the counterinsurgency fight. I would suspect that the beseiged Soldiers at Wanat and at Combat Outpost Keating would disagree.

4.) Just ask any infantryman who served in Iraq, Afghanistan or Vietnam if he felt that Army Aviation was irrelevant in the counterinsurgency fight. Clearly, this is not the case.

Marine Admits Army Helo Pilots are Amazing...

This will be a day long remembered, courtesy of Chief Warrant Officer Keith Marine, USMC, who has a running series of guest blog posts at Tom Ricks' The Best Defense:

Not that we can do anything about it but realize it and make adjustments but our pilots and aircraft suck in comparison to the Army and Air Force. I noticed it before when these units have flown for me but not like this time. We used Army guys for some training, along with Marines, prior to D-Day and the differences were very noticeable and undeniable even amongst our own FACs. The Army guys will come in and land at the grid you give them, with very limited dispersion between birds -- allowing you to link up with your other elements, and will set the thing right down on the deck in the inbound flight appearing not to lose much speed. In comparison, Marine pilots will bring in their aircraft and attempt several flaring techniques and then wave off. Sooner or later they will land in the midst of a brown out and probably a few hundred meters off target with dispersion of about ½ click between aircraft is the norm. Luckily the Army and Air Force guys will drop right where you want them to pick up casualties, we are lucky to have them.

I have heard a lot of excuses on why this is and here are the two most plausible ones. 1) They have superior aircraft with better handling capabilities; 2) Their pilots are pilots, whereas our pilots fill a dozen different billets and get about a tenth of the actual stick time these guys do. Like most of you, I love the Corps and it hurts me to say it but I think we have been chasing the wrong aircraft. We don't need to create a capability; the other branches already have it in the aircraft they use. We need that capability for when they aren't there. You just can't fit a 46 or 53 and definitely not an Osprey where these things will land.

A few observations:

1.) I will second CWO Marine's assessment on the importance of warrant officer pilots vs. Marine Corps commissioned officer pilots. Whereas the Marines' commissioned officer pilots start as lieutenants with little responsibility and work their way through all sorts of smaller jobs--such as Forward Air Controller, and what have you--Army warrant officers stay in the cockpit and might have an additional duty or two (running flight schedule and whatnot) until they become "tracked", where they specialize in maintenance, safety, tactical operations, or being a flight instructor. They build thousands upon thousands of hours.

Army commissioned officers, on the other hand, start off as platoon leaders of sections of five aircraft or so, and do company commands in companies of ten ships (including the maintenance personnel and pilots). They worry a lot about staff work, administrative nonsense and maintenance, sure, but that also gives them the "big picture" outlook on running the organization. The mix of having specialized warrant officer pilots--almost like your NCO corps--and commissioned officers, who also have credible flight and leadership experience, is dynamite.

2.) The optempo of Army Aviation has many drawbacks--personal life being the most obvious of them--but it quickly builds valuable flight time on aviators early on in their careers. Bonus if they've flown in the mountains of Afghanistan.

3.) Marine aviators seem to have more experience in helo ops on ships than Army aviators do. While landing on a pitching ship is not without its challenges, it's not exactly the best training for landing multiship into a dusty LZ, where the air might be thin and you might be full of troops.

4.) Overall, I'd say Marine helicopters are pretty good. To start with, they have winners in the AH-1 and UH-1 series. The CH-53 is a great heavy lifter. However, I have mixed opinions on the Osprey. If you want to run ring routes--flying a bunch of troops to a lot of bases in one day--then the Osprey has its merits. In retrospect, a combination of several light fixed-wing airplanes, UH-60 Black Hawks and Chinooks would have been a better investment. The Marines already operate the Black Hawk in HMX-1, so it wouldn't be a huge paradigm shift for them to order a few more. Additionally, in keeping with the Marines' habit of making Army and Navy equipment work better, they might consider that the CH-47 Chinook is a proven design, it's highly capable, and get this--it floats in water. Perfect for littoral operations!

5.) Finally, and most importantly, the Army rules helicopter ops because, quite frankly, that's all the Army's allowed to fly. We ought to do it well.

Overally, I'd definitely echo many of the respondants at Tom Ricks' website--the warrant officers make the difference. This will probably irk many commissioned officers who lament warrant officer traditions such as the WOMAN--the Warrant Officer Mandatory Afternoon Nap. It may also irk some senior NCOs who are endlessly frustrated at the sideburns warrant officers tend to sport. But when the bullets start flying and people need to be evacuated, the warrant officer corps is worth its weight in gold.

And, in some cases, it might be a lot of weight. Love you guys just the same. ;)

Eating Soup With an Eggbeater

Anyone who's studied counterinsurgency for more than ten minutes can probably recite T.E. Lawrence's famous line from Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which notes that counterinsurgency is "messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife". With that said, disaster relief, executed rapidly, with little advanced warning and often minimal planning, is far more fast-paced, and just as messy.

If counterinsurgency is like eating soup with a knife, then disaster relief is like eating soup with an eggbeater.

The US military has been involved in disaster relief at home and abroad since its inception; whether it be the Great White Fleet's assistance to Sicilians after an earthquake and subsequent tsunami in 1908, or the 82nd Airborne's intervention in New Orleans after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, despite the fact that we have plenty of literature dedicated to counterinsurgency and conventional war, we have little written about disaster relief missions, which, aside from their rushed and hurried nature, are often performed with minimal guidance and nebulous lines of command and control. Efforts must be coordinated among not only US military and government organizations, but also among foreign governments, the host nation government (or sometimes its remnants), the United Nations, and non-government agencies, such as Doctors Without Borders and the International Red Cross. These missions often take place in harsh and austere environments (that means living in tents with generators, not containerized housing units), as they frequently happen in the Developing World, and the disaster may very well have wiped out many or all essential services (food, fuel, water, roads, airports, sea ports, etc).

Fortunately, the gang at Small Wars Journal is here to lend a helping hand to all of us who will, at some time, participate in disaster relief. Retired Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC, has penned a quick two-page essay on some of the major considerations when planning a disaster relief mission.

I read through the essay and came up with a few more pointers for planners who might be participating in disaster relief missions.

1.) Be ready. I've served my entire career with rapidly-deployable units (82nd Airborne, 10th Mountain, JTF-Bravo) which often partake in disaster relief. Over the years, I've noticed that our ability to deploy rapidly seems to have gone by the wayside. Since we've fallen into a routine of deployment/reset/pre-deployment, we see our combat tours coming a year or two in advance. In the case of Iraq or Afghanistan, we typically deploy to well-established forward operating bases, often guarded by contractors, and loaded with places to eat, shop and play. Each Soldier packs enough junk to live well for a year--bicycles, lawn chairs, Wii, televisions, you name it. A battalion might pack a massive container filled with gym equipment.

The packing, loading and deployment process takes months. Containers are inspected by US Customs, loaded onto a ship, and spend months in transit.

When disaster strikes, you won't have this time. Have some tents, generators, computers, communications equipment and cots ready to go at a moment's notice. Have Soldiers pack lightly and prepare to eat MREs for a month or two. You may deploy so quickly that you will start traveling without even knowing your exact destination, as we did when we took off for New Orleans in 2005. (We knew we were going to New Orleans, but not which airfield). Sanitation, field hygiene, and preventive health will be imperative. Make sure everyone is constantly current with their immunizations and dental readiness.

Another trick I had up my sleeve in 2005 involved a hidden stash of flight information publications I kept just in case of an emergency. I was a mere lieutenant in the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina at the time, and I had this suspicion--based on living in North Carolina for many years--that we'd be involved in some sort of hurricane relief effort in the summertime. This took little deductive reasoning, as we seemed to be involved in hurricane relief nearly every year. With that said, I was in charge of ordering flight publications--maps, approach procedures, airfield diagrams, etc--for the entire battalion. I kept a hidden stash of these locked up just in case of an emergency.

Lo and behold, Hurricane Katrina hit, and I opened up my secret stash of maps. I can't stress how important it is to have current aviation maps, which display all sorts of information regarding runway length, airport frequencies, airspace, and hazards. I didn't want to be like my predecessors in the 82nd Aviation Battalion who flew Black Hawks into Grenada, navigating off of tourist maps. As an added note, I still didn't have enough maps (New Orleans is just on the edge of the New Orleans sectional, meaning I needed Texas maps), so I went to the local airport an came up with some, shall we say, creative means of purchasing maps. Hey, pilots need maps, so it's not like I wasted money. Besides, we spend money on such frivolous things, that maps would be the least of one's concerns.

Anyway, point two regarding disaster relief:

2.) Think like a civilian. You will work with civil authorities and relief agencies who don't think like the military does. Whereas we give locations in latitude/longitude or the military grid reference system, the locals will request rescues at the intersections of two streets. It's wise to invest in street atlases before you depart, and prepare to navigate off of those. Google Earth might be your best mapping software, as you can simply look for a business or landmark, unlike the DoD's flight planning software.

The locals will probably not talk on crypto-secure SINCGARS radios, UHF, or even plain FM radio. You might want to have a cell phone in the cockpit ready to receive and send text messages, should the need arise. Sure, the FAA says not to do this, but when you bear in mind that most infantrymen hop on with all sorts of communications gear, I think a cell phone is the least of one's worries. Besides, if it's safe to tune a radio and fly, it's safe to text and fly.

If the locals do have access to an FM transmitter, prepare to see landing zones set up in the middle of parking lots and soccer fields. Need to know the frequency at the landing zone to let them know you're coming? Well, just use the Mark-1 eyeball:

Let me guess, the LZ frequency is FM 32.700...

You might also see some non-standard LZ markers. Normally, the international sign for a helicopter pad is a large "H". Well, not in New Orleans:

This might be difficult to read, but the bottom right corner of the building reads "Generator here", with a giant "X" underneath it, denoting where they wanted us to emplace a generator we had slung underneath the cargo hook of the aircraft. (I think this mission was flown by the famed one-wheel landing aviator, then-Major Carey Wagen)

All in all, the best advice one can get regarding disaster relief operations comes from Col. Anderson's article, where he warns:

Beware of Mission Creep. Your job is to try to get Haiti back to something approaching the way it was seconds before the quake struck. If the President wants you to do nation-building, he’ll let you know. Identify the things that only you as the American military can do and for how long you will need to do them. When the roads are open, they will not need helicopters anymore; stop flying helicopters. If you need to run a hospital until Doctors Without Borders get there, you should stop running it when they arrive. Your best people are the ones who will get you into mission creep situations the fastest. Doctors and engineers always want to make things better, and in these kinds of operations, better is the enemy of good enough.

When Col. Anderson speaks of mission creep, it's important to remember that the US launched Operation Restore Hope in Somalia a humanitarian assistance mission in December 1992. Less than a year later, Rangers, Night Stalkers, Delta Force Commandos and Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division found themselves in heavy urban combat during the battle at the Bakara Market in downtown Mogadishu (which we all remember from Black Hawk Down). Indeed, The Washington Post echoes Col. Anderson's sentiment about mission creep and the challenges of nation-building:

...development officials agree, the recovery effort must build up, not supplant, the Haitian government and civil society, starting with putting Haitian authorities at the center of a single, clearly defined plan to rebuild Port-au-Prince and its environs in a far sturdier form.

"National disasters, as awful as they are, you want to seize those moments, use that awful, awful opportunity, to strengthen the ability of national and local authorities to act for the benefit of their citizens," said Jordan Ryan, the assistant administrator of the U.N. Development Program. There is, to an extent, a development framework in place from efforts underway before the earthquake involving the Obama administration, the United Nations, a huge network of international aid groups and a Haitian government that, despite corruption, was viewed as more reliable than any in years. The United States budgeted $292 million in assistance to Haiti this year, including food aid, infrastructure funds and money to fight drug trafficking. And the Haitian economy grew by 2.5 percent in 2009, despite the global recession...

..."Haiti's going to have to change. And if they do, we ought to make a commitment to stick with the government of the day to keep the institutional development going," Zarr said. "Unless we are committed to institutional development, I fear Haiti's never going to get off this terrible treadmill it's been on."

Others aren't so sure. Putting more faith in Haitian authorities can be done only if there is a crackdown on corruption, said Stuart W. Bowen Jr., who has witnessed the tension between local empowerment and wasted aid money as special inspector general for Iraqreconstruction. The United States has spent $800 million in Haiti in five years, he said, with little to show for it.

"Certainly, at this stage, the delivery of aid should be direct and not through the government," he said. "And that process should be maintained for a while, until there is a sense of stability . . . to make sure that the government delivers the aid well."

Because nongovernmental organizations will play a central role for years to come, development veterans say, it will be up to the United Nations to ensure that their efforts are coordinated, as was done after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.