Whither the Strategists

I've been taking the time to catch up on some reading on the topic of strategy after  hearing a number of prominent bloggers bemoan the lack of strategic planning and theory, especially in the 21st Century, and in recent American history in particular. I'd offer that America's seemingly unlimited military resources have contributed to sloppy strategic thinking, if we're even thinking in that realm at all.

For a while, I've been heavily engaged in Piers Macksey's War for America, which delves into the strategic challenges facing Britain during the Revolutionary War.  I'd argue that it has some significant parallels for the United States, as it fights two expensive counterinsurgency campaigns abroad, with threats still lurking about from much larger powers.  I'm also reading Edward Luttwak's Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire.  Strangely enough, after the first two chapters, it seems to be less about strategy than it is about operational and tactical theory, though I think grand strategy will be explored in full later in the book.  I'm also keenly cautious about the traps of "orientalism", after reading Patrick Porter's latest book.

For specific posts on the lack of strategic thinking in America, see Ink Spots, Kings of War, Armchair Generalist, Andrew Krepnevich, edit:  Armchair Generalist again.  For blogs dedicated to strategy, see Adam Elkus' Rethinking Security and Red Team Journal, as well as Thinking Strategically, and Offshore Balancer.

Don't tell me we've stooped to the "Domino Theory"

I try to avoid making Vietnam comparisons in the Afghan debate, but sometimes it's unavoidable.

Take today's post by Londonstani in Andrew Exum's "Abu Muqawama", in which Londonstani and British General Sir David Richards invoke the old "Domino theory" argument from the Vietnam era. Says Gen. Richards in the Telegraph:

He said: "If al-Qaeda and the Taliban believe they have defeated us – what next? Would they stop at Afghanistan? Pakistan is clearly a tempting target not least because of the fact that it is a nuclear-weaponed state and that is a terrifying prospect. Even if only a few of those (nuclear) weapons fell into their hands, believe me they would use them. The recent airlines plot has reminded us that there are people out there who would happily blow all of us up."

Cute, but hardly accurate. Keep in mind that the Taliban ruled Afghanistan throughout the 1990s and seemed largely uninterested in Pakistan.

But wait, there's more to the Taliban's dastardly plans:

He said: "Failure would have a catalytic effect on militant Islam around the world and in the region because the message would be that al-Qaeda and the Taliban have defeated the US and the British and Nato, the most powerful alliance in the world. So why wouldn't that have an intoxicating effect on militants everywhere? The geo-strategic implications would be immense."

All right, so the monolithic Takfiri Jihadists in the world will then band together and continue taking over every country at will if we abandon Afghanistan? I have my doubts. The last time we invoked the Domino argument was Vietnam, and it was an utterly false assumption: after the US withdrawal from Vietnam, there were more wars among the Communist countries of Southeast Asia than anything else: Communism completely failed to take hold over the rest of Southeast Asia. Just as there was no monolithic Communism, there certainly is no monolithic Muslim jihadism (in case you didn't notice from all the sectarian violence going on).

One of the worst strategic blunders on the part of al Qaeda (and similar takfiri groups) is their propensity to cause mass civilian casualties among the Muslim community--significantly reducing their appeal. They also appear to have little interest in actual nation-building and governance. (T.E. Lawrence said it best--insurgents rarely make effective civil leaders). Especially in light of the elections in Iran, which showed considerable disinterest in the leadership of the ayatollahs and the like, I have my doubts that the Muslim world is going to rush to accept militant jihadism as a form of governance in the wake of an American withdrawal.

Strategy vs. Tactics

Apparently, I missed a huge COINdinista festival hosted by the US Marine Corps. Attendees included Thomas Ricks, Dave Dilegge, General Petraeus, Brig. Gen. H.R. McMaster, Robert Haddick, and Spencer Ackerman (who posted about it at his blog, Attackerman).

(As an aside, I should mention that Dave Dilegge told me that there's great food and coffee at these functions. He even provided me with an in-depth analysis of who has the best snacks. Yes, this is what I have to look forward to.)

Anyway, since I can't partake in COINtoberfest, I have to settle for the milblogosphere, primarily, SWJ. They provided a link to an article in the New York Times, entitled The Afghan Imperative. This particular article caught my eye, as it represents someone who just doesn't get the debate. Quoth the author:

Always there is the illusion of the easy path. Always there is the illusion, which gripped Donald Rumsfeld and now grips many Democrats, that you can fight a counterinsurgency war with a light footprint, with cruise missiles, with special forces operations and unmanned drones. Always there is the illusion, deep in the bones of the Pentagon's Old Guard, that you can fight a force like the Taliban by keeping your troops mostly in bases, and then sending them out in well-armored convoys to kill bad guys.

There is simply no historical record to support these illusions. The historical evidence suggests that these middling strategies just create a situation in which you have enough forces to assume responsibility for a conflict, but not enough to prevail.

The record suggests what Gen. Stanley McChrystal clearly understands — that only the full counterinsurgency doctrine offers a chance of success. This is a doctrine, as General McChrystal wrote in his remarkable report, that puts population protection at the center of the Afghanistan mission, that acknowledges that insurgencies can only be defeated when local communities and military forces work together.

This is a straw man argument at its worst. The debate isn't between those who want to apply few troops to counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and those who want to surge. That's a tactical question. Rather, the debate is between those who want to continue nation-building and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, versus those who want to concentrate on a counter-terror campaign. The question is strategic—what are the national objectives, and how do we go about achieving them. If you believe that counterinsurgency against the Taliban is in our interests, then yes, you need more troops. However, if you feel that al Qaeda is the real enemy (and, I dare say, it is), then the question isn't about how to conduct counter-insurgency—it's about re-framing the strategic picture.

Bonus: This point wasn't lost on the editors who referenced this article in the comments section of Small Wars Journal. They were able to provide me with a link to Cato@Liberty for a more in-depth deconstruction of the aforementioned article.

In the news, more links

I guess some things I wrote generated a lot of talk recently.  Jason Sigger at Armchair Generalist sent some traffic (which, unfortunately, included some Internet trolls) my way the other day.  I also got a recent mention from a Military Transition Team leader in Iraq who goes by the blogger handle of Boss Mongo , who provides excellent reading.  I should also be getting a quote in Small Wars Journal in the next few days.  

Boss Mongo also provides some tongue-in-cheek humor which I can relate to.  He and I have based our blogs extensively on counterinsurgency doctrine.  Why?  Because while we're in Iraq, we can't drink alcohol or associate with women with lax moral values, (nor can I wear my usual obnoxious T-shirts) so we really don't have much else to write about.  Indeed, more than one person has assured me that my well-documented life of debauchery has assured me a space in

 my very own personal Tenth Circle of Hell (feel free to chime in here).  Which is good, because I don't want to waste time at the in-processing station nor do I really want to deal with a room mate.  

This also means that, come block leave time, you're going to see a dramatic shift in topic.  But more on that later.

Anyway, William Lind wrote something today at Defense and the National Interest that's worth reading.  Mr. Lind is one of the authors of modern-day maneuver conflict, and helped to develop the term "Fourth Generation Warfare", which describes state vs. non-state combatants.  He offers a scathing critique of American infantry tactics, which he describes as unimaginative.  While I don't think the dearth is quite as bleak as he writes, let's take a look at some of his

 criticisms.  The first critique is that, obviously, too many Afghan civilians have died in airstrikes, which fuels the insurgency. This should come as no surprise to those who have witnessed the number of airstrikes by NATO forces grow some tenfold over the last few years.  The effect of civilian casualties has become so great that Secretary Robert Gates has said that, unless we can minimize the number of civilian casualties, we are lost.

Lind talks about airstrikes and artillery as the American way of war:

The answer is, because American infantry tactics are bad. They amount to

 little more than bumping into the enemy and calling for fire. The easiest way to provide the overwhelming

 firepower our bad infantry tactics depend on is with airstrikes. So to win

 tactically, we have to lose strategically. At least from the Vietnam War onward, that equation has come to

 define the American way of war. It is the price of bad tactics.

In my ROTC days, I can remember reading some professional magazine for the Field Artillery branch, which discussed the role of artillery and air strikes in battle, noting that the real role of the infantry was to find and fix the enemy so that overwhelming artillery and airstrikes could be brought to bear on them.  Which is great on a linear battlefield, free of complex terrain.  Unfortunately, this is based on the assumption that the real goal in battle is the destruction of

 the enemy's forces, as was posited by the miltary theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini.  But unfortunately, that's not the real object of military force--maneuver warfare theorists such as Lind and John Boyd note that the goal is to destroy the enemy's will to resist.  Indeed, airstrikes which kill civilians only increase the enemy's will to resist.   

The first is the unfortunate combination of hubris and

 intellectual sloth which characterizes most of the American officer corps - and infantry officers in particular. Most read nothing about their profession. Of those who d

o read, most confine their study to doctrinal manuals — the U.S. Army’s are wretched rehashed French stuff, the Marine Corp’s somewhat better — or histories of American

 victories. The number who really study tactics, learning about infiltration tactics, Jaeger tactics, the

 infantry tactics of oriental militaries etc. through reading, is tiny.

While I'd say that this might be a gross exaggeration, I will say

 that when forced to read regulation after regulation, plus field manuals, standard operating procedures,

 emergency procedures, policy memorandums, and a whole slew of e-mails in a regular day, I can see why so many officers

 are reluctant to crack open a book (or power on their

 Kindles).  Not to mention, reading is somewhat out of favor in this day and age as

 well.  But with the large number of officers now using the New Media to reach out and connect with one another, the

 learned officer is not an extinct species.  

 Almost all American training is focused on procedures and techniques

, taught by rote in canned, scripted exercises where the enemy is a tethered goat. Free-play training,

 against an active, creative enemy, generates imaginative tactics, because whoever employs such tactics wins. But free-play training is so rare in the American military that

 most American infantrymen receive none at all. They become expert in techniques for applying fires, but they know nothing else. In effect,

 many American infantry units have no tactics, they only have techniques.

Undeniably yes.  Almost every scenario is scripted.  In training scenarios, we will always know where the enemy is, what his general composition is, how many of him there are, and how he will behave upon making contact.  The enemy always plays right into our hands, is never too large to take on.  Training missions are almost always accomplished, barring massive failure, and

 focuslargely on the tactical aspects the mission.  You will never see the long-term effects of your air assault on a villiage, and how that affects their daily life.  

In the 80s, many military officials subjected units to "free-play" exercises.  For example, a battalion of troops might be conducting a movement and suddenly (and unexpectedly) see a battalion of paratroopers landing on their position--something they had never planned for.  The exercises generated much frustration, since none of the enemy's movements were known ahead of time, but they also tested the flexibility of commanders in dealing with a whole host of unexpected threats.  

Focus:  Feel free to agree or disagree with Bill Lind as necessary.

And here it is, your daily Star Wars.  Happy Mardi Gras.  (I don't think I want to know how the clone troops in this picture amassed these beads.)

  

Okay, I'm lazy today

I've been running a little ragged the last few days.  I have a few links, some fun stories, and some deep thoughts, for certain.  But for now, enjoy this link from the blog of Timothy Ferriss, the author of The 4-Hour Work Week, which discusses the wisdom of Napoleon.   

(With assistance from Ryan Holiday)

"Never ascribe to malice that which is adequately explained by incompetence"--Napoleon Bonaparte

Indeed, Napoleon's campaigns form at least part of the basis of maneuver conflict and strategy.  Take the following quote from Napoleon:

"Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious, than the ability to decide"

John Boyd has said that in maneuver conflict, the whole idea is to cause such massive confusion, friction, and panic in the minds of one's enemies, and to place them in a situation in which they are not only unable to maneuver themselves, but also choose between one course of action and another--to put them on the horns of a dilemma, so to speak.  Similarly, armies exercising maneuver conflict would want to maximize their opportunities to maneuver, strike, act, and minimize confusion and disarray within their own ranks. 

To steal a concept from biology, then, all armies, much like all organisms, seek to increase their capacity for independent action, while seeking to decrease the ability of their enemies to exercise independent action.  

I guess the same could be said for all of us, too.  Does your job or your lifestyle decrease your capacity for independent action?  How could you arrange your life to accomodate it?

Meditate on this, my young padawans...

And here it is now, your moment of Machiavelli

The 16th Century writer Nicollo Machiavelli is often associated with methodical, calculated evil, even though his writings simply offer pragmatic advice for leaders, and even praise the merits of virtue.  Machiavelli is often misunderstood and even more frequently quoted out of context (Jason Sigger at Armchair Generalist elaborates).

One of the most famous, and most misunderstood phrases of Machiavelli is "it is better to be feared than loved".  But let's take a look at the quote in a larger context (Chapter XVII of The Prince).  

"And here comes in the question whether it is better to be loved rather than feared, or feared rather than loved. It might perhaps be answered that we should wish to be both; but since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved...Nevertheless a Prince should inspire fear in such a fashion that if he do not win love he may escape hate...Returning to the question of being loved or feared, I sum up by saying, that since his being loved depends upon his subjects, while his being feared depends upon himself, a wise Prince should build on what is his own, and not on what rests with others. Only, as I have said, he must do his utmost to escape hatred."

With that said, let's take a look at a quote from Defense and the National Interest's latest publication on Fourth Generation Warfare, and the methods it takes to win it.  See if something doesn't ring true in it:

What succeeds on the tactical level can easily be counter productive at the operational and, especially, strategic levels. For example, by using their overwhelming firepower at the tactical level, Marines may in some cases intimidate the local population into fearing them and leaving them alone. But fear and hate are closely related, and if the local population ends up hating us, that works toward our strategic defeat. That is why in Northern Ireland, British troops are not allowed to return fire unless they are actually taking casualties. The Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that they have taken more casualties than they have inflicted.

When you learn to truly read Machaivelli properly, you might yield some surprising results...