What's in a Name?

I suspect one of the reasons many Americans don't follow the Iraq War is its sheer complexity. The Second World War felt a little more simple. There were the good guys (The US, the British, and, I hate to admit it, the Soviets) and then there were the bad guys (obviously, Germany, Japan and Italy). The Iraq War, however, baffles many observers. Our allies in the Iraqi government can be, well, unscrupulous to say the least. Furthermore, the insurgent groups (if they can even be called that--few have any interest in governing) often change names, merge with one another, and splinter off into different factions. There's really no clear villain in the war.

The most vicious of the insurgent organizations the US has faced off with in Iraq is al Qaeda in Iraq, often abbreviated "AQI". Don't let the name fool you though, as they're not quite Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. Often referred to as a "franchise" of al Qaeda, it shares some ideological connections with Osama bin Laden, the occasional communique, but two organizations do disagree on some points. In fact, AQI--the murderous group which relished in beheadings and bombed hotels in Jordan--was actually a little too violent for even al Qaeda's senior leadership. In a 2005 letter, Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the top commanders of al Qaeda, advised Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of AQI, that videos of AQI operatives beheading American contractors might be a little over the edge. (No kidding, look at bullet point #5 in that letter)

Some AQI members left to join "concerned local citizens" groups, which are local militia and police forces dedicated to fighting terrorists. Some insurgent groups actually split, with half supporting the insurgency, and half supporting the US and Iraqi government. One such group was the 1920 Revolution Brigade, which featured a spinoff group, "Hamas in Iraq" (no relation whatsoever Hamas in Gaza, though). Depending on whom you ask, either the 1920 Brigade served alongside US troops in operations against AQI in Diyala Province, or Hamas in Iraq did. I'd say most American troops really can't keep them straight. I can't imagine what the American public thinks about them.

Actually, it reminds me a little bit of...

Confused yet?

Ricks vs. Lynch. There Can Be Only One...

(H/T CNAS Twitter feed, Marc Lynch's Twitter feed)

Today, the milblogosphere was treated to a showdown between two Colossi of CNAS, Titans of Tactics, Sultans of Strategy.

In one corner, we have Pulitzer Prize-winning Tom Ricks, posting in the New York Times, who claims that US forces will likely remain in Iraq beyond the December 2011 deadline, albeit in vastly reduced numbers. In Ricks' opinion, Iraq is unraveling (on part XXIX right now), and might likely descend back into a civil war similar to what we saw in 2005, particularly after next month's national elections.

In the other corner, we have Marc Lynch, a Middle Eastern expert who used to blog at Abu Aardvark and has since moved to Foreign Policy Online. Mr. Lynch feels that the Obama administration is committed to complete withdrawal from Iraq, despite reports that General Odierno is drafting plans to stay in Iraq past 2011. In Mr. Lynch's opinion (and mine), plans of this nature are par for the course for military operations; successful military planners have to at least consider the worst-case scenarios. Interestingly enough, Lynch seems to echo Ricks' pessimism about Iraq, noting that he feels that the end state in Iraq will be certainly less-than-optimal, but not catastrophic, as Ricks believes.

Choice quotes from Tom Ricks:

All the existential questions that plagued Iraq before the surge remain unanswered. How will oil revenue be shared among the country’s major groups? What is to be the fundamental relationship between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds? Will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what will be the role of Iran (for my money, the biggest winner in the Iraq war thus far)?

Unfortunately, all of these questions have led to violence in the past, and could again just as the Obama administration’s timeline calls for troops to leave areas that are far from quiet. The plan this year is to pull out about 10,000 troops a month for five months, beginning in late spring. That will halve the American military presence, with the remainder (other than a “residual force” of unspecified size) scheduled to be withdrawn in 2011. The withdrawal plan was written on the assumption that the elections would be held late in 2009 or early in 2010. Under the plan, troop numbers would be kept level to ensure stability in a vulnerable period, especially if the Sunnis were to feel that the electoral process was unfair, or if they were not given a role in the new government commensurate with their success at the polls.

But given the changed timetable, just as Iraqi political leaders are struggling to form a new government, American military leaders will be distracted by the myriad tasks of supervising major troop movements. On top of that, the deeper the troop withdrawals go, the more potentially destabilizing they will be — because the first withdrawals will be made in areas that are considered more secure, or where Iraqi forces are deemed more reliable or evenhanded.

In addition, a continued American military presence could help Iraq move forward politically. No one there particularly likes having the Americans around, but many groups seem to trust the Americans as honest brokers. And there would be a moral, humanitarian and political benefit: Having American soldiers accompany Iraqi units may improve the behavior of Iraqi forces, discouraging relapses to Saddam Hussein-era abuses, or the use of force for private ends and feuds. Advisers not only instruct Iraqi commanders, they also monitor them.

And from Marc Lynch:

The drawdown will probably matter considerably less than people expect. With the new SOFA-defined rules of engagement, U.S. forces have already stopped doing many of the things associated with the "surge." The Iraqi response to American efforts on the de-Baathification circus demonstrate painfully clearly that the nearly 100,000 troops still in Iraq gave very little leverage on an issue which the U.S. at least publicly deemed vital -- a point made very effectively by Ambassador Hill at the Council on Foreign Relations last week. The sharp backlash against even the measured criticisms by U.S. officials offers an important lesson: Doing the sorts of assertive things which may please Obama's critics are highly likely to spark a negative reaction among Iraqis, generating more hostility to the U.S. role without actually accomplishing anything. The U.S. is wise to avoid them.

That doesn't mean that things are rosy. The de-Baathification circus has demonstrated the fragility of Iraqi institutions, and helped to reignite sectarian resentments and fears (many Sunnis feel targeted, while many Shia are being treated to an endless barrage of anti-Ba'athist electoral propaganda). There's very much a risk of long, drawn-out coalition talks after the election. It isn't certain how a transition from power will go, should Maliki's list lose, given the prime minister's efforts to centralize power in his office over the last few years. There may well be a spike in violence by frustrated losers in the elections. If there's massive fraud on election day, things could get ugly. The elections, already marred by the de-Baathification fiasco, may well end up producing a new Parliament and government which doesn't really change much. There are big, long-deferred issues to confront after the elections, such as the Article 140 referendum over Kirkuk.

But none of those issues would be resolved by an American effort to delay its military drawdown. They generally fall into the "sub-optimal" rather than the "catastrophic" category. An American decision to delay the drawdown would not likely be welcomed by Iraqis in the current political environment. Nor would it generate more leverage for the U.S. over internal Iraqi affairs. Iraq's future is not really about us, if it ever was -- not a function of American military levels, commitment, or caring, but rather of internal Iraqi power struggles and dynamics.

Although both bring up great points, I think the debate is irrelevant without considering the 2012 presidential election season--which kicks off right as the December 2011 deadline passes--as well as the American public's attitude towards Iraq. I would suspect that the voters might demand total withdrawal, but only time will tell.

209th Aviation Support Battalion donates L-29 jet to nascent Iraqi Air Force

Those of us who have been stationed in the "aviation section" of Contingency Operating Base Speicher are quite familiar with the L-29 Delfin jet which sat right outside the dining facility. Jets of this type were made in Czechoslovakia during the 1960s, and were used as trainers in air forces throughout the Warsaw Pact, as well as in Soviet client states in the Middle East, to include Iraq.

After the US invasion in 2003, American forces captured the Iraqi Air Force's flight school at al-Sahra Airfield (now called COB Speicher), north of Tikrit. A few years later (roughly 2007), Soldiers from B Company, 209th Aviation Support Battalion--an aviation maintenance company--discovered the remains of four L-29 jets in various states of disrepair. The men and women of this organization worked diligently to refurbish one of the aircraft, which served as a display outside the aviation brigade dining facility.

Two years later, the men and women of the 209th Aviation Support Battalion--known as the "Lobos"--are back at COB Speicher, only this time, the Iraqi security forces--to include their Air Force--are preparing to take the lead in combat operations. As such, the Iraqis are gradually re-establishing their flight school at al-Sahra Airfield. To commemorate the transition from US-led operations to Iraqi-led operations, the men and women of the 209th ASB have donated the L-29 jet to the Iraqi Air Force. This press release from the Hawaii-based 25th Combat Aviation Brigade--the 209th's higher headquarters--has the story.

(As an added note, I had the honor of being replaced in Iraq by the men and women of the 209th ASB, and found them to be a great organization. Excellent work!)

(H/T US Army Stand-to from Monday)

CONTINGENCY OPERATING BASE SPEICHER, Iraq (Army News Service, Dec. 31, 2009) -- On Dec. 16, Soldiers from the 209th Aviation Support Battalion, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, Task Force Lobos, dedicated an L-29 Delfin aircraft they had refurbished to Iraqi Security Forces and U.S. Division-North.

The plane will serve as a static display at COB Speicher, outside of Tikrit, Iraq. The dedication occurred in conjunction with a ceremony marking the return and re-opening of the Iraqi Air Force College to its original location.

The L-29 Delfin originated in Czechoslovakia in 1959 and was powered by a Bristol Siddeley Viper turbo-jet engine. It was designed as a straightforward, rugged and easy to fly jet. The aircraft were sold to Iraq between the late 1960s and early 1980s and were used primarily as jet trainers and advanced combat flight trainers.

Lt. Col. Erskine R. Bentley, Task Force Lobos commander, explained how his unit became involved with the L-29 Delfin now prominently displayed at an entrance control point to COB Speicher.

"During this unit's last rotation to Iraq in 2007 and 2008, Soldiers from Bravo Company located four L-29s in various stages of ... disrepair," Bentley said. "Over a process of weeks and months, from those four planes, they pieced together a complete aircraft [without the engine and avionics] and displayed it in front of one of the dining facilities here.

"The Delfin is a unique part of Iraq's military history," he added. "Upon learning that the Iraqi Air Force College was being re-opened here, we thought it fitting to dedicate it to them. Now it's a centerpiece of this location and hopefully serves to highlight the partnership between the United States, and Iraq's military and its citizens."

According to Chief Warrant Officer Jason Runckel, Task Force Lobos' maintenance technician and shops platoon leader from Tigard, Ore., refurbishing the L-29 was an entirely volunteer effort.

"It's the Soldiers that made this project happen both last deployment and this deployment," said Runckel. "They wanted to demonstrate their friendship with the Iraqis and mark this moment in history in their own way."

Sgt. Robert Milam and Pfc. Daniel Pollard, both structural repair specialists who were primarily involved in the aircraft sheet metal repair. Milam and Pollard volunteered to assist with the L-29's restoration by helping hammer out dents in the Delfin and assisting with sanding, stripping and re-painting.

"We all volunteered our time on the project both last deployment and this deployment," said Milam. "I was happy to do it. It feels good to know that we've left our mark in a way that our Iraqi counterparts can appreciate too."

"The Iraqis are our partners, and this plane will be here as long as they want it," said Pollard. "We all took great pride in getting to contribute to the partnership in this way. I really want them to be proud of it and I hope they will be."

(Staff Sgt. Mike Alberts serves with 25th Combat Aviation Brigade Public Affairs.)

Single-National Force-Iraq

Yesterday, the big news in Iraq concerned the official genesis of US Forces-Iraq, an acknowledgement of the fact that the US is currently the only intervening power in the Iraq War. This actually comes a few months after the British withdrew the last of their forces from Southern Iraq.

What amazed me is that it actually came as a shock to many that the US was, as of August, the only member of "Multi-National Force Iraq", as per this conversation.

Me: What classification should we use for this briefing? I know it says "releasable to Multi-National Corps-Iraq", but that really only means the US, since everyone else left.

Another officer: What do you mean? The British are still here.

Me: No, they left last month.

Officer: And the Ugandans guard the dining facility...

Me: Fuck my life...

Although there is reason for a bit of optimism: December 2009 is the first month in which no US forces have been killed in Iraq.

Speaking of a great discussion in SWJ...

One poster in the thread on "Counter-bureaucracy" posted quite a gem--an unintentionally amusing excerpt from a question-and-answer session with General Stanley McChrystal on Capitol Hill. See if you found this as hilarious as Schmedlap and I did:

[Question from member of Congress] Indeed, you have written also that ISAF forces have been "preoccupied with force protection," and must change this "manner that distances itself, both physically and psychologically, from the people they seek to protect" as a means of winning support from the Afghan people.
Where do we look in history for any victorious precedent for this strategy?

I nearly doubled over laughing at that question. Did "COINhata" Col. Gian Gentile sneak into Congress? Seriously, how do you respond to questions like that with a straight face?

Iraqi shoe thrower gets his comeuppance

Great video from Barbells and Bacon about the Iraqi Shoe Thrower getting his just deserts. (Although, truth be told, I'm glad people are throwing shoes instead of throwing RKG-3s)

Barbells and Bacon is a blog about a number of things--from Crossfit workouts to international relations.

In the Sky with Emma Sky

Emma Sky has become a very unlikely heroine in the Iraq War. An avowed pacifist, she nevertheless has become a fixture alongside Generals Raymond Odierno and David Petraeus. A woman of particularly small build, she seems to be quite an amusing walking beside General Odierno. (If Gen. Odierno is Shrek, according to comedian Stephen Colbert, Emma Sky must be Princess Fiona. Before Princess Fiona turned into a green thing, I need to make that clear).

She's become somewhat of an unlikely celebrity in Iraq. I was part of the afternoon crew, flying a mission in Northern Iraq to pick up a general, after the morning crew had dropped him off for a meeting. The morning crew had passed along some details of their mission.

"We flew the general and Emma Sky!", said one warrant officer, with some noticeable excitement.

Another warrant officer asked, "Wait, you mean the Emma Sky? From that book, The Gamble?"

He turned to me and said, "Sir, have you read that book?" I sheepishly nodded an affirmative. (I only hang out with cultured people.)

It surprised me that she was well known not only among the ranks of senior policymakers in Iraq, but also among many of the troops who usually spent most of their day talking about airspace coordination measures.

The warrant officer continued, "Yeah, they accidentally put her in the 'hurricane seat'", referring to the rearmost right passenger seat of the Black Hawk. When the cabin doors were open, which they usually were in the summertime, owing to the lack of air conditioning in the aircraft, the winds would buffet whoever was flying in that particular seat.

The warrant officer noted that the day's ride was not the best one she'd experienced. I felt sorry that she had such a horrible flight--the hurricane seat isn't where you put a VIP, to be certain. Fortunately, there was a little e-mail correspondence back and forth between us, and I was relieved to learn that reports of her discomfort were greatly exaggerated. (Still, don't put VIPs in the hurricane seat. Seriously.)

With that said, the New York Times ran a great story about Dr. Sky today. I find it amazing that a pacifist has become an important player in military policy. I'll also never forget her words when referring to the quality of character found in the US military, when contrasted with much of American society: "America does not deserve its military".

The old lessons still apply

In the old US Army Field Manual FM 7-8, "Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad", there's a section which covers the basics of patrolling. In this section, the infantry patrol is told that it should be fully alert and at 100% defensive posture no later than 30 minutes prior to dawn, a process known as "stand-to". The book's reasoning is that this is the time when the Soviet Army is most likely to attack.

The great book, The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa, notes that the same thing is done in Iraq. The authors tell a story which features American troops on a combat outpost waking just before dawn to man the defensive positions. What's interesting is that the young platoon leader gets this advice from one of his sergeants, who notes that this tactic comes not from the conventional battlefield, but from the campaigns against the Native Americans on the plains of the American West during the 19th Century.

Some things really never change. Indeed, the Taliban also appear to use this tactic, judging from this video from the Battle at Wanat, shot from the Taliban's perspective.

Light vs. Heavy: Brigade Combat Teams

While the Obama White House debates the exact troop numbers for the new counterinsurgency strategy, it's safe to say that there will be an increase of around 20,000 to 40,000 additional "combat troops" (definition to follow). While the troop numbers must primarily take into consideration the desired effect in Afghanistan, planners must also take into account one additional factor: how many brigade combat teams we have available. (Based on over 100,000 troops in Iraq and over 60,000 in Afghanistan)

The Washington Independent (H/T Spencer Ackerman) has the rollup of current US Army force strength (including a really good chart). Before I begin, let me define some terminology. There's been a huge debate at Tom Ricks' "The Best Defense" blog regarding what "combat troops" are in this era of asymetric war and non-contiguous battlefields. Using the term "combat troops" and "support troops" is somewhat of a misnomer, as even cooks and lawyers have been shot at and returned fire during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the purposes of this entry, however, we will use the term "combat troops" to refer to troops who serve in brigade combat teams, as opposed to aviation brigades or support brigades. (See also "combat brigades")

According to the Washington Independent, there will be some 50,000 troops in 14 active-duty

brigade combat teams available for reinforcements in Afghanistan, based on a 12-month "dwell time" at home for rest, refitting, and re-training. However, of those 50,000 active-duty troops, 19,000 are in "heavy" brigade combat teams. That means they fight in tanks and Bradley armored fighting vehicles, which are unsuited for Afghanistan. The 30,000 remaining troops are a mix of light brigades and "Stryker" brigades--using the Stryker wheeled armored vehicle for transportation.

Light infantry units can be deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan, but heavy units have only been used in Iraq. While serving in Iraq, most brigades fight as "motorized infantry"--trading their usual vehicles for up-armored HMMWVs and MRAPs--so there really isn't much of a difference. Afghanistan is a different story--only light and Stryker brigades have participated, leaving about 1/3 of the force unsuited for combat operations.

Solution? Re-train tankers and mech guys as infantrymen. I'll admit that I'm recycling this story, but The Capatain's Journal had a great piece about physically training mechanized infantrymen--who normally ride in Bradleys--for operations in Afghanistan by conditioning them to 50-mile long excursions in the Appalachians.

On Sports Analogies

According to popular legend, the Duke of Wellington had once claimed that "The Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton". Indeed, there always seems to be a link between war and sports--note the Victorian British Army's irrational obsession with rugby skills which will seem all too familiar to captains in our career courses forced to play Ultimate Frisbee ad nauseam.

The link between sports and war are most striking in American football, which seems to perfectly mirror the linear battlefield. Two lines of similarly-equipped teams clash into one another, sometimes in a battle of attrition and gridlock, sometimes in deft maneuver-war like passes and lateral movements.

Should anyone doubt the link between war and football, just witness dozens of defensive linemen bashing through gaps in the offensive line at top speed, wreaking havoc in the rear areas of the formation as they sack the quarterback-- American crowds refer to this play as a blitz, as the quick breakthrough of the defensive line resembles the dreaded blitzkrieg, when German Panzer formations broke through the heavily-fortified Maginot Line in France, as they sacked Paris.

But just as football takes terms from linear war, so do American commanders take terms from football. For example, in the movie Black Hawk Down, Army Rangers parody then-Captain Michael Steele's motivational speeches which draw heavily from football imagery. (Steele played football for the University of Georgia before being commissioned as an infantry officer)

However, while football analogies have their place, they're not always the best framework for understanding a non-linear battlefield, which counterinsurgencies and policing actions usually are.

When I first arrived in Iraq, we sat down to brief a general regarding our upcoming year-long mission. The general, after a few introductions, turned to the commanders in the unit we were replacing. He noted their accomplishments during their deployment, which took place during 2007-2008, just as the violence in Iraq began to drop off precipitously. The general claimed, "This team here has taken the ball to the twenty yard line. And I think you guys", he said, pointing to us, "are going to take this one all the way across the goal line to put this one into the 'W' column for the United States of America"

Some cheered when they heard this, but I remained skeptical. (Sorry, but the last time someone dramatically claimed that we won the war, he wasn't exactly right).

A year later, as we transferred control to another unit, I heard the following speech from yet another general:

"You guys have taken this one to the twenty yard line, and I think [your replacements] are going to take this one to the goal line as we depart Iraq and turn over responsibility to..."

Wait, that was the exact same speech from two different generals! You mean we're still on the twenty yard line?! How long have we been on the twenty yard line? Have we been on the twenty yard line for two or three rotations now? Are we 3rd and 10 on the 20 yard line? Seriously, I think these guys need to have their speech writers compare notes.

Which came first, The Awakening or The Surge?

Abu Muqawama provides a link to an article from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology-Zurich which provides a brief summary of the many reasons for the massive decrease in violence in 2007. I've gotten into this topic before, (and a number of great authors, such as Tom Ricks and Bob Woodward have also delved into this realm) but it bears some repeating.

I would say that the decrease in violence in Iraq in 2007 is not solely the result of the additional five brigades, nor is it fully attributable to the success of counterinsurgency theory (although, I would argue that they did, in fact, play a key role). Certainly the Sunni Awakening--well underway in late 2006--played a significant role in the decrease in violence, as was the stand-down of the Mahdi Army, a Shia milita. Additionally, some studies have also noted that, by early 2007, many of the mixed neighborhoods, particularly in Baghdad, had completed the process of driving out or killing their respective minority groups, leaving behind homogeneous and far less violent areas.

The decrease in violence was not the result of any one factor--rather, all of these elements came together at exactly the right time to quell the violence in Iraq...at least for right now. Let's see how tenuous the peace is when American troops begin to withdraw next year.

I got beat to the punch...

The worst part about having a day job which prohibits blogging is that bloggers frequently beat you to the punch on some of the best articles.

Take this article from the New York Times, which appeared in SWJ's daily roundup--it's chock-full of unintentional funny (which has already been recognized by Andrew Exum and by the people at Ink Spots).

According to the article, an American company has sold the Iraqi Army 1500 bomb-detecting devices which cost tens of thousands of dollars apiece (ranging from $16,000 to $60,000). The only catch is that American bomb experts say that the devices are completely useless, and "work on the same principle as a Ouiji board". Yes, apparently, a company known as ATSC Ltd. is selling bomb-detecting equipment which is based on absolutely no known scientific principle whatsoever. This is about as laughably dishonest as a door-to-door mammogram salesman.

The Iraqis, on the other hand, claim that these work exceedingly well (despite a number of high-profile bombing attacks this week), although they really can't explain how they work. In what is perhaps the ultimate expression of the inshallah (Arabic for "God willing") attitude, an Iraqi general noted, "Whether it’s magic or scientific, what I care about is it detects bombs". I'll summon the spirit of Han Solo and note that hokey religions and ancient weapons are no match for a good bomb-sniffing dog at one's side. Speaking of which, the New York Times article continues:

The Baghdad Operations Command announced Tuesday that it had purchased an additional 100 detection devices, but General Rowe said five to eight bomb-sniffing dogs could be purchased for $60,000, with provable results.

Checking cars with dogs, however, is a slow process, whereas the wands take only a few seconds per vehicle. “Can you imagine dogs at all 400 checkpoints in Baghdad?” General Jabiri said. “The city would be a zoo.”

Baghdad may have suicide bombers which have killed hundreds in the past month, but dogs are where we draw the line.

And finally, folks, your moment of Zen:

The Justice Department has warned against buying a variety of products that claim to detect explosives at a distance with a portable device. Normal remote explosives detection machinery, often employed in airports, weighs tons and costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. The ADE 651’s clients are mostly in developing countries; no major country’s military or police force is a customer, according to the manufacturer.

“I don’t care about Sandia or the Department of Justice or any of them,” General Jabiri said. “I know more about this issue than the Americans do. In fact, I know more about bombs than anyone in the world.”

Yes, the Iraqi Army may be plagued by sectarian differences, and conduct mass porno raids, but by God, do they know bombs!

I'm not looking forward to 2010...

Regarding Fortresses (Redux)

One of the replies I got to yesterday's post regarding the battles at COP Keating and at Wanat comes from Paul, a Vietnam veteran. I thought I'd discuss it here, as he brings up a lot of great points.

Now, I'd love to show everyone a 3D Google map of the area like Fareed Zakaria on CNN's GPS, but alas, I can't quite find COP Keating, so I leave you all mapless. Not to fear, as Paul does a great job at summing up much of the difficulties at Keating.

I knew nothing about COP Keating until after the battle. When I saw some of the photos, I said to myself “oh sh*t, I can see why these guys got pounded.” Anytime the opposition can direct fire down on you, you’ve got a big helping of hurt on your hands. On the other hand, it didn’t look like there was much in the way of flat ground, or even a reasonable slope, on which to set up a base in the hills. And locating it too far up the hill would have meant that resupply could probably only be done by helicopter. I gather that that’s not a real solid link at times during the year.

I had some questions, though. Did these guys have listening posts out? Did they do nighttime patrols in the village and in the hills around their base? How was their intel capability within the village? If something out of the ordinary was going on, would they have known about it? How were they keeping an eye on the mosque (which was an obvious rallying point)? Did they set ambushes every night? The impression I’ve gotten is that the answers to these questions might be kinda negative. It strikes me that if they were doing these things properly, it would have been fairly difficult to assemble over 100 fighters without our troops knowing about it.

If you have a base on bad ground, you absolutely cannot sit around and wait for the other guy to come to you. You have to project your eyes and ears outward so you have advance warning. You also have to make the enemy cautious about approaching you. That’s the purpose of foot patrols and ambushes.

In the kind of guerrilla warfare that we’re facing now, the enemy is always going to go for the lowest hanging fruit on the tree. The T’ban undoubtedly spent a fair amount of time observing this base, absorbing what their routine was and then figuring out how they could use the terrain (including the buildings in the village) to their advantage. Had their observation been adequately disrupted, they may well have said “hey, these guys are on their toes — let’s go somewhere else.”

The change to a counterinsurgency force (at least in some circles) has been positive in many aspects, but it's caused some skills to atrophy. Nearly a decade of war has allowed the US military to build increasingly massive garrisons in the middle of nowhere in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before the US military really had an enemy, we focused on "joint forcible entry"--parachuting in to an area and setting up an air head or beach head for follow-on operations. US forces were trained to enter a country, secure an area, occupy it, and defend it.

Years after the initial invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the concepts of "secure, occupy and defend" are not in the lexicon of most troops. We simply move to massive garrisons which have already been built for us--the guard towers, the fortifications, the defenses are all in place. The "priorities of work" that are often found in infantry manuals (and at the conclusion of the first segment of The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa) are an anathema to most troops. Upon hopping off the plane, troops can easily go to their sleeping quarters, the mini-mall, the post exchange, the Starbucks, etc. instead of securing and defending their positions. Indeed, "improving the foxhole" on these bases meant building more luxurious conditions, not making the area more tenable.

And there's little defending to do, particularly in Iraq, especially on the larger bases. These bases are located in the middle of the desert, where no insurgent group can realistically mount a credible sustained assault upon it. Most troops play little role in external base defense--a small cadre performs that duty, while troops are free to do their everyday tasks such as fixing aircraft, mission planning, operating a blog, you name it. The massive Forward Operating Bases are static and immobile, not just in the physical sense, but also in the sense that it stagnated one's thinking.

Only a few troops have had the task of setting up defensible areas in the past few years, most notably those who established many of the combat outposts during the troop surge of 2007 (with an urban siege on a combat outpost in Baghdad described in detail in Tom Ricks' The Gamble) .

I wonder if, based on experience in Iraq, we've lost the ability to accurately analyze terrain. Numerous people looked at the locations of these bases and instantly smacked their heads upon realizing they were located on the low ground. A number of the Vietnam veterans correctly noted comparisons to the Battle at Dien Bien Phu, where the French were pummeled by Vietnamese forces, after taking up positions in the low ground.

The battles at COP Keating and Wanat also bring up another interesting tidbit--the lack of unmanned aerial sensors, which are the modern-day equivalent of the listening post. (The official AR 15-6 investigation specifically suggests adding more air-ground sensors in its conclusion) One of the key observations many made about both battles was the Taliban's propensity to attack during periods of poor weather, presumably to take advantage of degraded NATO air support (which affects not only the ability detect the enemy, but also to target and destroy attacking forces).

Focus: Soldiers got quite a bit of good combat experience conducting counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, but some skills have atrophied. What other skills have you noticed?

Reintegration Cliche...

There's an old cliche about the reintegration process which basically states that, upon arriving back in the United States, returning troops often feel a little jaded as to the news stories which average Americans find themselves watching. For example, Soldiers returning from Iraq or Afghanistan may feel taken aback at the number of Americans watching, say, celebrity news as opposed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Aviators are, by their very nature, far removed from the realities of counterinsurgency. Rarely will aviators discuss topics such as Arab-Kurd relations, Iraqi politics, economics, and the like. Oddly enough, even though I was in Iraq, I was stuck within the confines of the forward operating base, only knowing Iraq as a featureless swath of sand which occasionally passed below me as I went from base to base. I would have to teach myself about the happenings in Iraq myself; strangely enough, I got some of the best analysis from bloggers who were back in the United States, and who never wore a military uniform.

You see, the Armed Forces Network's news--really just clips from the major media sources--had plenty of "not news": movie openings, Michael Jackson's death, you name it. All of these stories were devoured by many Soldiers, while real news (such as the Iranian elections) were often ignored. The information technology of the 21st Century allowed us to entertain ourselves with mindless drivel, even in the middle of a complex counterinsurgency environment.

Although, the strange fact of the matter is that even the most reputable military analysts delve into this realm. Today's example is Jules Crittenden. Yes, Crittenden's post today involves a love triangle between Jon Gosselin, Kate Gosselin, and, most shockingly, the Octomom. I have no idea why these people are so famous or why they're on every news stand, but seriously, stop it. Their fifteen minutes of fame is over.

Why can't we go back to the drama surrounding Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, whose exploits seem to be captured on a daily basis on Foreign Policy Online. From his steamy phone sex chats with Italian Equal Opportunities Minister (and former hot model) Mara Carfagna (see attached pic), to his teenage groupies, to...most shockingly...allegedly paying the Taliban not to shoot at Italian troops--this guy's got enough material to keep us amused for quite a while.

Regarding re-integration

Over the next few days, posting might be light as I attempt to experience everything I've missed for the last year. However, a few interesting points about re-integrating back into everyday life kind of struck me.

• The morning after we landed back safe and sound at Fort Drum, I went to the Verizon store in the local area to re-activate my cell phone and swap it out for a new one. Clearly, every Soldier on the same flight decided to do the same exact thing, with many of them showing up in uniform, due to the fact that they probably didn't have any other clothes with them. Over the next few days of re-deployment classes, I could see Soldiers out of the corner of my eye fumbling with their new high-tech iPhone or Blackberry--it's amazing at how much a part of our everyday life these things have become. I literally went nuts without a Blackberry while in Iraq.
• One of the upsides about being stationed at Fort Drum (home of 12 feet of snow annually), is that the civilian workers at this base combine Northern efficiency with Southern charm (without the Southern accents, too). This is, by far, the best of all possible combinations.
• The only bad part about being home is the drastic drop in temperature from 95 degrees F (37C) to roughly 30F (0 degrees C).

Clear, Hold, Build...in Fayetteville NC

Tom Ricks opened the field to a debate in his blog regarding the merits of light infantry leaders in counterinsurgency operations. In The Gamble, Ricks mentions the merits of commanders in the 82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions, noting that it was they who participated in the "small wars" and peacekeeping operations--Panama, Grenada, Somalia, Haiti, Sinai, etc, as opposed to the tank divisions which merely sat in Germany the entire time.

It prompted a response from an armor officer who noted that many of the early COIN successes came from armor officers such as now-Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, a particularly brilliant counterinsurgent who, nevertheless, won an important tank battle during the first Gulf War at the Battle of 73 Eastings.

Now, I hate to break it to Tom, but this debate isn't exactly new, having been done before in Kings of War, where they posited the "Boots Beats Bolts" hypothesis, a sentiment echoed in this thread in Small Wars Journal's Council. Nevertheless, many of the respondants in these articles and threads note that, in many cases, armored divisions did well with counterinsurgency, while light infantry divisions did poorly in some cases--leadership played a critical role. (With many armored leaders, such as McMaster, doing better than some light infantry commanders, such as Col. Michael Steele).

Tom Ricks brings up the example of the 82nd Airborne Division's tour in 2003-2004, during which they allowed the city of Fallujah to become a cesspool of insurgent activity as an example of poor counterinsurgency being practiced by light infantry. It shocks me that the 82nd would be unable to comprehend COIN as well as they did. You see, the city of Fayetteville, NC--just adjacent to the 82nd Airborne's home at Fort Bragg--has had its own experiences with the principles of counterinsurgency.

About twenty years ago, Fayetteville was a cesspool. Violent neighborhoods (with ethnic and sectarian tensions), rampant car theft and vandalism, you name it. Downtown Fayetteville, with seedy bars, streetwalkers, and the like, was a walled citadel of Dis from one of the lower levels of hell itself.

But, according to legend, Fayetteville cleaned up its act. You see, the city of Fayetteville revoked all of the liquor licences of the vendors downtown. That allowed the city to clear itself of seedy elements, who quickly went out of business and were forced to vacate. The city then bought up all of the property, holding it so that the aforementioned seedy elements would not come back. Then, the city sold the property to businesses who built microbreweries, decent restaurants, an art-house theater, the Airborne and Special Ops Museum, and so forth.

Clear, hold, build. It's classic counterinsurgency theory, except instead of ridding downtown Fayetteville of insurgents, the downtown area rid itself of crackwhores. Same thing, really. (Note: COIN hasn't hit every area of Fayetteville, as Boss Mongo has astutely pointed out in a post not too long ago)

It begins...

I've done well being just a tad cynical.

When I first arrived in Iraq, I heard a lot of senior officers and NCOs scoff at me when I expressed my belief that our presence in Iraq wasn't permanently sustainable, even after the US and Iraqi governments signed a Status of Forces Agreement was signed in November of last year. They would always look at me, laugh at my apparent naivety and say, "This place is the new Korea. We'll be here for fifty years".

If I had a nickel for all the bad military advice I've received...

Anyway, looks like I may have been right, after all based on this article in the New York Times:

(h/t Abu Muqawama)

JOINT BASE BALAD, Iraq — There is no more visible sign that America is putting the Iraq war behind it than the colossal operation to get its stuff out: 20,000 soldiers, nearly a sixth of the force here, assigned to a logistical effort aimed at dismantling some 300 bases and shipping out 1.5 million pieces of equipment, from tanks to coffee makers.

It is the largest movement of soldiers and matériel in more than four decades, the military said.

“It’s a real Rubik’s Cube,” Brig. Gen. Paul L. Wentz, the commander of the Army’s logistical soldiers, said in an interview at this sprawling military complex north of Baghdad, which will serve as the command center for the withdrawal effort.

But just as the buildup in the Kuwaiti desert before the 2003 invasion made it plain that the United States was almost certain to go to war, the preparations for withdrawal just as clearly point to the end of the American military role here. Reversing the process, even if Iraq’s relative stability deteriorates into violence, becomes harder every day.

The scale of the withdrawal is staggering. Consider a comparison with the Persian Gulf war in 1991: it lasted 1,012 hours, or about six weeks, and when it was over, Lt. Gen. William G. Pagonis, in charge of the Army’s logistical operations at the time, wrote a book, “Moving Mountains” (Harvard Business Press Books, 1992), about the challenges of moving soldiers and equipment in and out of the theater.

He called the undertaking the equivalent of moving all the people of Alaska, along with their belongings, to the other side of the world “in short order.”

In August, about 3,000 shipping containers and 2,000 vehicles were shipped out of Iraq, and the heavy lifting is just beginning.

“When the brigade combat teams come out, I want to be in a position where I don’t have to deal with the excess equipment and matériel at the same time,” General Wentz said.

In a conference room here at the base, dozens of soldiers monitor the movements of every American truck in the country on two large flat-screen televisions, using GPS technology and radio communications, getting current information about attacks and the progress of convoys. Every movement is planned about 96 hours in advance to allow for rehearsals and readjustments.

As the pace of withdrawal is stepped up, the American military must also assuage the worries of Iraqi politicians who want the American troops to be less visible, so most missions are carried out in the dark of night.

The Americans hope that by next spring, they will be operating from what General Wentz described as a hub-and-spoke system, with 6 supersize bases and 13 smaller ones. Fewer bases means traveling greater distances, at greater risk.

“The distance between two points does not get any shorter,” said Colonel Pagonis, asserting that the logisticians in his command — known as “loggies” — are also warriors.

Turning the former American bases over to the Iraqis, and deciding what to give them, have proved to be among the biggest challenges.

Until May, there was no system in place even to figure out who legally owned the property where Americans had set up camp. This led to scenes like the one at Forward Operating Base Warhorse, where a local Iraqi commander showed up essentially demanding a list of items that the Americans were not ready to turn over.

So last spring, panels made up of Iraqi and American officials were set up to help work through some of these issues.

Congress has limited the total value of equipment — like computers and furniture — that the military can leave to the Iraqis to roughly $15 million per base, but that amount does not include items considered part of the infrastructure, like buildings, sewerage and power facilities.

Even coming up with a value for some of the American investments is hard because in many cases the initial costs were inflated by large outlays for security.

Commanders say it is often simply more economical to turn over more equipment to the Iraqis because the cost of moving it is prohibitive. Last month, the military announced the end of its detention operations at Camp Bucca on the Kuwaiti border and said that $50 million worth of infrastructure and equipment would be given to the Iraqis.

The United States has also brokered a deal with an Iraqi trucking network, led by a coalition of tribal sheiks, to move equipment that is not deemed sensitive between bases. The truckers currently move about 3 percent of all American matériel here, commanders said.

Posting will be light...

...for the next few days. The next post might be from the USA...

Hey, can I still call this blog "Wings Over Iraq" if I'm not in Iraq?

The most bizarre items in the Post Exchange in Iraq

Every journalist (or wannabe journalist) has their "slow news day" story that they keep in their back pocket, ready to publish when they can't think of anything else to write about. Today, I'm dipping in to that "tactical reserve", so to speak. I'm going to lampoon the bizarre collection of items available for sale at the PX, and the dearth of items that, you know, I might actually need.

Former US Navy SEAL Dick Marcinko has a little glossary in the back of many of his books to define certain phrases he and his SEAL buddies use all the time. When I was in high school, a few friends of mine took great pleasure in using many of these terms--usually filled with all sorts of colorful expletives--in general conversation all the time.

One term he uses bears special recognition--the term "wannabe". Marcinko uses it to describe many faux SEALs who buy all sorts of tactical equipment and walk about as if they are, in fact, SEALs. The military surplus stores and, of course, the Internet, are filled with expensive tactical gadgets which are just designed to rip you off. Many of these products have migrated to your local post exchange. Observe:

Yes, for the low, low price of $26.95 USD, you too can have your very own "tactical checkbook". (This sounds like it has almost as much value as the vaunted M5 Tactical Segway which was actually being touted on Small Wars Journal one time). I like how the tag-line on the packaging says "on the body--on the weapon--on the move", as if Special Operations Soldiers are going to be mounting their checkbook covers to their M4s.

I'm not certain what's so "tactical" about it, as it's actually just a checkbook cover made of black vinyl. I'm not sure why one would even need a tactical checkbook cover in the first place. I rarely even write checks back in the US, and I certainly don't need to use checks in Iraq. Maybe it might come in handy in the following scenario.

Soldier: Sir, the Iraqi insurgents are attacking us!

NCO: Never fear, take a look at this!

Soldier: I didn't even notice you had that tactical checkbook! It blends in so well.

NCO: With this check, I will turn these insurgents into the Sons of Iraq! Ta-da!

Eh, maybe not. At any rate, "tactical checkbooks" are part of what we like to refer to as the

"black velcro"phenomenon. That is to say that any Soldier will look that much more elite with the proper application of black velcro items all over his uniform--and he will spend top dollar to do so. See the attached picture of the "Geardo" from Bob on the FOB for more information. (Correlary to these archetypes is the following rule: the more obnoxious, unwieldly, ACU patterned, and the more magazine pouches and lanyards you place on your holster, the less likely you are to actually need your pistol in combat. Seriously, just get a paddle holster for on-the-FOB use and a chest rig for your body armour.)

Moving along. I would also like to note that it's quite difficult to get many of the things that I actually need in Iraq at the Post Exchange--things like shoelaces, captains' rank, unit patches, et cetera. Instead, we get the following. Check out the rank insignia in the picture:

You'll need to click on the picture to fully appreciate this, but note that there's no sergeant insignia, no captain insignia...but (at the bottom right), there's brigadier general insignia. I always wonder if the PX understands the bell curve. There's never a shortage of extra-small, extra-large or extra-high-rank insignia, but there's never anything in stock for those of us who are medium-regular captains or sergeants.

Although I can't get shoelaces or rank insignia at the PX, here's what I can get:

Just what I always needed! A hibachi grill and a rice cooker (at least that's what I think the German says)! That's perfect for those of us who aren't allowed to grill food inside our quarters due to the fire prevention regulations!

Christ, I need to go home to the US just to do some real shopping.

Your Daily Dose of Pragmatism

CNN ran an article today regarding General Raymond Odierno’s pragmatism about the future of Iraq.

It isn't clear whether the United States will ever be able to declare victory in Iraq, [General Odierno] said Thursday.

"I'm not sure we will ever see anyone declare victory in Iraq, because first off, I'm not sure we'll know for 10 years or five years," Army Gen. Ray Odierno told reporters at the Pentagon.

This is an easy statement to take out of context, so it’s worth examining in full. For starters, General Odierno is, rightfully so, removing a lot of the rhetoric from his assessment of Iraq. Iraq, as a nation, is a deeply flawed institution; there is no doubt about that. With an economic downturn (which, in turn, affects the funding available to security forces, and can turn young men towards insurgency), and looming Arab-Kurd tensions, I have doubts that we will see a stable democracy in Iraq ten years from now. The threat of civil war and a regression to a non-democratic state will loom over Iraq for years to come. The removal of Iran’s long-time enemy probably won’t work out in our favor either.

It should be noted that Odierno, in the epilogue of Tom Ricks’ book, The Gamble, expresses a fair amount of skepticism about the future of the nation, although he does remark that, since the Surge of 2007, incredible progress has been made to repair sectarian differences.

But there’s something else about General Odierno’s remarks that should give us room to pause. Our conventional warfare paradigms tell us that there are usually clear winners and losers in any war. This zero-sum aspect of war has its roots in the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17^th Century, when the European powers agreed to authorize only armed forces which were under the control of the then-recognized European nation-states—banning the mercenary groups, pirates, and private armies which had participated in war for centuries. Since that time, the nation-state has had a monopoly on violence, with the state deciding when to send an army into war, and, following hostilities, the negotiation of peace terms.

But in the modern era, in 4^th Generation War and in counterinsurgency, the state does not have a clear monopoly on violence—politics and warfare are inextricably linked. As such, there’s no negotiation of peace terms over insurgents, no victory as we will typically envision it based on centuries of European military tradition. Rather, there’s merely varying degrees of success or failure. In the ever-ambiguous, complex wars of the future, we need to be prepared to experience combat with no guarantee of decisive victory—simply a quiet success.